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ABSTRACT 
 
  The issue of democratic consolidation has become an important field of study in relation to 
developing states, especially with regards to Southern Africa. The region’s history of 
liberation struggles and the emergence of liberation movements as ruling parties are vital 
factors to take into account when investigating democracy and, more specifically, democratic 
consolidation in these countries. However, there are only a few comparative studies that have 
looked at the effects of liberation movement governance on democracy. Therefore, in this 
study two case studies – Zimbabwe and South Africa – are compared in an effort to offer 
more insight into this topic. 
 
  The focus of the study was placed on how the behavior of liberation movement governments 
has affected the rule of law in order to assess their impact on democratic consolidation in 
general. This study follows the premise of studies in political behavior that actors’ attitudes 
(in this case, liberation movements’ political cultures) affect their behavior or actions that in 
turn have an influence on democratic institutions that eventually impacts democratic stability. 
In order to investigate this, the two case studies were compared and discussed in terms of the 
following themes: firstly, the respective liberation struggles and transitions to majority rule; 
secondly, the political cultures that have developed within ZANU-PF and the ANC during the 
liberation struggles; and lastly, the effect of the two parties’ behavior – informed by the 
political cultures – on the rule of law, a central feature of democratic consolidation.  
 
  The findings indicate that in Zimbabwe, the rule of law disintegrated and democracy faltered 
largely due to the behavior of ZANU-PF. In South Africa, on the other hand, the rule of law 
has so far been upheld and the prospects for democratic consolidation seem more positive 
than in the case of Zimbabwe. In the last few years, though, the ruling ANC has shown 
tendencies that could prove to be detrimental to the future of democracy in South Africa. The 
ANC and ZANU-PF have both exhibited an authoritarian political culture, a desire to capture 
the state, tendencies towards centralization of power and the delegitimation of opposition. 
However, perhaps the key explanation for the protection of the rule of law in South Africa and 
the disintegration thereof in Zimbabwe has less to do with the political culture than the 
constraining influence of the international context with a renewed focus on democracy and 
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human rights and internal factors such as the constitution, civil society and a robust media. 
Furthermore, Zimbabwe experienced a watershed moment in the 2000 with the constitutional 
referendum which the Mugabe regime lost. With the loss of the referendum, ZANU-PF’s 
democratic credentials were tested and it failed. In South Africa, such a watershed moment 
has not happened yet – the ANC’s democratic credentials have yet to be tested like this. 
Therefore, the future of democracy is still uncertain even though in comparison with 
Zimbabwe, the prospects of democratic survival seem to be more positive. In conclusion, it is 
not possible to claim that liberation movement governance in general negatively affects 
democratic consolidation. The findings of the study indicate that this has definitely been the 
case in Zimbabwe, but so far not in South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
v 
OPSOMMING 
 
  Die kwessie van demokratiese konsolidasie het ‘n belangrike veld van studie geword in 
verband met ontwikkelende lande, veral met betrekking tot Suider-Afrika. Die gebied se 
geskiedenis van bevrydingstryde en die opkoms van vryheidsbewegings as regerende partye is 
belangrike faktore om in ag te neem wanneer demokrasie en, meer spesifiek, demokratiese 
konsolidasie ondersoek word. Tog is daar sover net ‘n paar vergelykende studies wat gekyk 
het na die effekte van bevrydingsbewegings se regeerkunde op demokrasie. Gevolglik, in 
hierdie studie is twee gevallestudies – Zimbabwe en Suid-Afrika – vergelyk in ‘n poging om 
meer insig te bied met betrekking tot hierdie onderwerp. 
 
  Die fokus van die studie is geplaas op hoe die gedrag van regerende bevrydingsbewegings 
die oppergesag van die reg beïnvloed in ‘n poging om te bepaal hoe hulle demokratiese 
konsolidasie in die algemeen affekteer. Die studie volg die veronderstelling van studies in 
politieke gedrag dat akteurs se houdings (in hierdie geval die politieke kulture van die 
bevrydingsbewegings) beïnvloed hul gedrag of aksies wat weer ‘n invloed het op 
demokratiese instellings wat uiteindelik ‘n effek het op demokratiese stabiliteit. Om dit te 
ondersoek is die twee gevallestudies vergelyk en bespreek met betrekking tot die volgende: 
eerstens, die onderskeidelike vryheidstryde en oorgange tot meerderheidsregerings; tweedens, 
die politieke kulture wat ontwikkel het binne ZANU-PF en die ANC gedurende die 
vryheidstryde; en laastens, die effek van die twee partye se gedrag – geïnspireer deur die 
politieke kulture – op die oppergesag van die reg, ‘n sleutel kenmerk van demokratiese 
konsolidasie. 
 
  Die bevindinge dui daarop dat die oppergesag van die reg in Zimbabwe in duie gestort het en 
demokrasie gefaal het grootliks as gevolg van ZANU-PF se gedrag. In Suid-Afrika, aan die 
anderkant, is die oppergesag van die reg sover gehandhaaf en die vooruitsigte vir 
demokratiese konsolidasie blyk om meer positief te wees as in die geval van Zimbabwe. Tog 
het die ANC oor die laaste paar jaar tendense getoon wat skadelik kan wees vir die toekoms 
van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika. Die ANC en ZANU-PF het beide ‘n outoritêre politieke 
kultuur geopenbaar, ‘n begeerte om beheer oor die staat oor te neem, tendense tot die 
sentralisering van mag en om opposisie te ondermyn. Alhoewel, die moontlike sleutel 
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verklaring vir die beskerming van die oppergesag van die reg in Suid-Afrika en die 
disintegrering daarvan in Zimbabwe minder te doen het met die politieke kultuur as die 
beperkende invloed van die internasionale konteks met ‘n hernude fokus op demokrasie en 
menseregte en interne faktore soos die grondwet, die burgerlike samelewing en ‘n robuuste 
media. Verder, Zimbabwe het ‘n keerpunt beleef in 2000 met die konstitusionele referendum 
wat die Mugabe regime verloor het. Met die verlies van die referendum, is ZANU-PF se 
demokratiese getuigskrifte getoets en dit het gefaal. Suid-Afrika het nog nie so ‘n keerpunt 
beleef nie – die ANC se demokratiese getuigskrifte moet nog op so ‘n wyse getoets word.  
Daarom is die toekoms van demokrasie steeds onseker, maar in vergelyking met Zimbabwe, 
blyk dit dat die vooruitsigte vir demokratiese oorlewing meer positief is. Ter slotte, is dit nie 
moontlik om te verklaar dat bevrydingbewegings se regeerkunde demokratiese konsolidasie 
oor die algemeen negatief beïnvloed nie. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat dit definitief die geval 
in Zimbabwe is, maar sover nie in Suid-Afrika nie. 
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Chapter 1 
 Research Plan 
 
1. 1. Introduction: 
  Since the third wave of democracy took place from the 1970s onwards – which many 
developing countries, including African states, experienced – focus has shifted towards 
studying the prospects for democratic consolidation in these new democracies. Attention has 
been particularly given to Southern African countries that experienced the transition from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic rule. Many of these countries in Southern Africa have 
liberation struggle histories which have produced liberation movement governments in the 
post-liberation dispensation. It is important, when looking at democracy in Southern Africa, to 
understand the effects of these histories on democratic consolidation. 
 
1. 2. Preliminary Study & Rationale: 
  In the preliminary study, literature on liberation struggles and movements in Southern Africa 
has been reviewed to determine what has been focused on and what has been found on this 
particular topic. Furthermore, important works on democratic consolidation have been 
consulted in order to establish a comprehensive understanding of this specific field of study.  
 
1.2.1 Theoretical framework: democratic consolidation: 
  Since Huntington’s ‘third wave of democracy’ (1991), democratic consolidation has become 
a central field of inquiry for students of democracy. Various scholars with divergent 
approaches and views have contributed to this particular field, including Andreas Schedler, 
Adam Przeworski, Adrian Leftwich, Thomas Carothers, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. 
 
  Originally, according to Schedler (1998: 91), democratic consolidation describes the 
challenge of making new democracies secure and preventing them from regressing to 
authoritarianism. However, the concept has come to mean so many different things that it is in 
danger to becoming meaningless. Schedler (1998) introduced negative and positive notions of 
democratic consolidation in a four-fold regime classification (authoritarian regime; electoral 
democracy; liberal democracy; advanced democracy); essentially identifying degrees of 
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democracy. Negative consolidation refers to the avoidance of democratic breakdown and 
erosion whilst positive democratic consolidation refers to the completion and deepening of 
democratic rule. The strength of Schelder’s work lies in his thorough discussion of the 
different concepts of democratic consolidation. Despite describing and discussing these 
different concepts, Schedler (1998: 103) fundamentally argues that democratic consolidation 
should be restricted to its original meaning – that of avoiding democratic erosion and 
authoritarian regression.  
 
  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in their article Towards Consolidated Democracies (1996) 
focus on the features and conditions necessary for democratic consolidation to take place. 
Democratic consolidation has taken place when democracy “as a complex system of 
institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has become…the ‘only game in 
town’” (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 15). Three minimal conditions are identified for democratic 
consolidation to take place: a) the existence of a state; b) a completed democratic transition; 
and c) rulers who govern democratically and constitutionally (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 14). 
Furthermore, democratic consolidation takes place on three levels: behaviorally (when no 
group attempts to overthrow the democratic regime), attitudinally (democracy is still 
supported by the majority of people despite severe political and economic crises) and 
constitutionally (everyone is subject to the rule of law) (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 15-16). There 
are also five conditions necessary in order for a democracy to be consolidated: a) free and 
lively civil society; b) a relatively autonomous political society; c) the rule of law; d) a 
functioning bureaucracy; and e) an economic society. The rule of law as discussed by Linz 
and Stepan, will be the central factor/condition of democratic consolidation to be focused on 
for the purposes of this study. 
 
    Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (1996) conducted an empirical study regarding 
the factors necessary for democratic consolidation by looking at conditions in 135 countries 
between 1950 and 1990. The question they ask is if a randomly selected country is to have a 
democracy in the next year, what factors/conditions should be present this year? This study 
places great emphasis on economic factors, illustrating the important interaction between 
socio-economic conditions and democratic stability. In fact, one of the central findings is the 
importance of economic factors in sustaining democratic rule (Przeworski et al, 1996: 49).      
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  Adrian Leftwich’s arguments regarding democratic consolidation share many similarities 
with the above-mentioned authors’ findings. Leftwich (2000: 136) identifies five main 
conditions – similar to Przeworski et al and Linz and Stepan – that are necessary for 
democratic consolidation to take place. This includes: legitimacy (geographical, constitutional 
and political); adherence to the rules of the game and policy restraint by winning parties. 
Furthermore, Leftwich (2000: 142) argues that poverty is an obstacle to democratic 
consolidation and that there is a correlation between the democracy and the wealth of a 
country. Ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages also make the transition to democracy and 
democratic consolidation difficult, but not impossible (Leftwich, 2000: 144). The above-
mentioned factors are critical structural conditions for democratic consolidation to take place, 
but Leftwich also identifies another six wider factors that will enable these essential political 
conditions to take hold (Leftwich, 2000: 145). These include: affluence; economic growth; 
income inequalities that are either moderate or declining; the avoidance of democratic 
breakdown; parliamentary systems; and a pluralistic civil society (Leftwich, 2000: 145-146).  
 
 Thomas Carothers in his work, The End of the Transition Paradigm (2002), draws attention 
to the so-called ‘transition paradigm’ and the problems with the core assumptions of this 
theoretical model. This paradigm posited that countries experiencing the end of authoritarian 
rule during the 1980s and 1990s were on the path to establishing democracies (Carothers, 
2002: 5). Carothers (2002: 6) argues that this model, which was used to understand the period 
of democratization during the early 1990s, was no longer useful because reality no longer 
conformed to it. In reality, most countries considered to be ‘transitional’ “have not achieved 
relatively well-functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever 
democratic progress they have made” (Carothers, 2002: 9). In fact, most of the ‘transitional 
countries’ are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy. In other words, the quest for 
establishing a democracy is not a clear-cut process involving a neat set of sequential stages; 
rather, it tends to be messy process with various gray areas (Carothers, 2002: 9). From the 
above-mentioned authors’ work, a comprehensive understanding of democratic consolidation 
can be established. 
 
  As we can see from the above-mentioned, there are various factors/conditions that are 
important for democratic consolidation. These include economic (for example: income 
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inequality, economic growth), societal (for example: civil society, racial and social cleavages) 
and institutional (for example: rule of law, autonomous political society) factors/conditions. 
But for the purposes of this study, focus will be placed on a single institutional factor, namely 
the rule of law. The rule of law as identified by Linz and Stepan (1996) is a vital condition for 
democratic consolidation to take place. This does not mean that the other factors/conditions 
are not considered to be important; to the contrary. However, the rule of law represents a key 
condition/factor to analyze when looking at the effect of liberation movement’s governance 
on democratic consolidation.  
 
1.2.2 Liberation struggles & movements in Southern Africa: 
  In the latter part of the twentieth century, numerous armed liberation struggles were waged 
in Southern African countries for independence and political self-determination of indigenous 
peoples. These struggles were led by liberation movements who took power through a 
combination of armed resistance, international pressure, the ending of the Cold War and an 
agreement with political rivals. Various scholars have investigated liberation struggles, 
liberation movements and post-liberation politics in Southern Africa, placing specific focus 
on liberation movement governance. In the works that have been reviewed, it has been found 
that most scholars compared various case studies with each other in an attempt to identify 
patterns of behavior (Southall 2003; Dorman 2006; Melber, 2010). Furthermore, all the 
studies that have been reviewed were qualitative in nature and made use of existing data.  
 
  There seems to be a general consensus amongst several scholars (Southall 2003; MacFarlane 
1985; Dorman 2006; Ntalaja 1979) that a distinction can be made between the decolonization 
process in Africa during the 1950s/1960s and the armed struggles that were waged by various 
indigenous liberation movements from the 1970s onwards. According to Southall (2003: 30-
31) there were two ‘waves’ of liberation struggles in African states. During this first wave, 
nationalist movements fighting against colonial powers gained relatively easy successes. This 
predominantly occurred in non-settler states1 with little economic value that became a burden 
to colonial powers in the aftermath of the Second World War (Southall, 2003: 31). According 
 
1
 Non-settler states refer to those African countries that did not inherit significant and permanent 
settler communities from the colonial era. 
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to MacFarlane (1985: 2), there seemed to be a decided shift from an era of decolonization to 
an era of national liberation in Africa since the 1970s.  
 
  The second wave of liberation struggles – of particular interest to this study – was directed 
against a reluctant colonial power (for example Portugal in Mozambique and Angola) and 
settler-dominated political economies who claimed or enjoyed political independence (for 
example Rhodesia and South Africa) (Southall, 2003: 32). These struggles were characterized 
by the appearance of national revolutionary movements that engaged in (armed) struggles 
against foreign rulers or indigenous regimes that were deemed illegitimate (MacFarlane, 
1985: 1). This occurred in the settler states of Southern Africa where movements that resisted 
colonialism turned to armed struggle by the 1970s (Dorman, 2006: 1087). These armed 
struggles did not produce military victories, but rather negotiated settlements and multi-racial 
elections in Zimbabwe (1980) and South Africa (1994) with the assistance of international 
pressure (Dorman, 2006: 1087).  
 
  Various scholars (Melber; Southall; Dorman) agree that the armed struggles many liberation 
movements were engaged in, produced a certain and distinctly authoritarian political culture 
within these movements. Dorman (2006) and Melber (2010) argue that the militaristic and 
violent nature of the armed liberation struggles, forced liberation movements to adopt certain 
strategies and behavior and this has had a profound effect on the political culture that 
developed within these movements. Furthermore, Southall (2003: 31) argues that the logic of 
national liberation struggle or the political culture of liberation movements seems to be 
authoritarian in nature and reluctant to engage with democracy. Rather than promoting 
democracy, it suppresses it (Southall, 2003: 31). For the purposes of this study, it is important 
to investigate how this political culture has affected democratic consolidation in Southern 
African countries with liberation struggle histories. This political culture will specifically be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Even though various authors have investigated liberation and post-
liberation politics in Southern Africa, few have focused on how liberation movements have 
affected prospects for democratic consolidation. Therefore, a thorough study of how the 
political culture of liberation movements has affected their style of governance and ultimately 
democratic consolidation is warranted. 
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1.2.3. Rationale: 
  As pointed out in the above section, there are various authors who have investigated 
liberation struggles, liberation movements and post-liberation politics in Africa, but few have 
investigated the particular effects of liberation movement governance on democratic rule and 
consolidation. Furthermore, very little in-depth comparisons in this regard have been done – 
especially between Zimbabwe and South Africa. With regards to Southern African states, it is 
important and relevant to investigate the impact of liberation movement governments on 
democracy, specifically democratic consolidation to judge whether democracy has a longer 
future in this region. To achieve this, two case studies – Zimbabwe and South Africa – with 
similar past political configurations, but divergent contemporary situations will be used to 
investigate the impact of liberation movement governance on democratic consolidation.  
 
1. 3. Problem statement & purpose of the study: 
  The research question that will guide this study is as follows: What has been the impact of 
liberation movement governance on democratic consolidation in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa? 
 
The focus of the study will be narrowed down to two case studies and two crucial sub-
questions: 
 
What has been the impact of ZANU-PF’s conduct – as Zimbabwe’s ruling party – on the rule 
of law? 
 
What has been the impact of the ANC’s conduct – as South Africa’s ruling party – on the rule 
of law? 
 
Additional sub-questions: 
What are the main features of liberation movements? 
Do liberation movements promote an authoritarian political culture? If so, how? 
Was democratic rule the main objective of the liberation movements? 
What are the conditions for democratic consolidation? 
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Has democratic rule been entrenched or eroded during the (former) liberation movement’s 
rule?  
Are there similar patterns of behavior between the ZANU-PF and the ANC as ruling parties? 
 
  The expectation is that liberation movement governments have a negative impact on the 
prospects of democratic consolidation and ultimately democratic survival. This assumption 
will be examined. 
 
 The main purpose of this study is to investigate how democratic consolidation has fared in 
Southern African countries with liberation movement governments. Furthermore, this study 
will attempt to determine whether the case studies (Zimbabwe and South Africa) show similar 
patterns and account for differences with regard to the respective liberation struggles, the 
democratic transitions, the post-liberation governments and prospects for democratic 
consolidation. It has to be kept in mind that Zimbabwe is no longer considered to be 
democratic; it has a ‘not free’ status according to Freedom House whilst South Africa has a 
‘free’ status. Thus, this is not a comparison between two democratic regimes, but rather two 
case studies that share various similarities with each other, most importantly a liberation 
struggle history and a transition to democracy. Many similarities have been pointed out 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa and it is therefore the core purpose of this study to 
investigate whether South Africa is following a similar pattern of democratic disintegration as 
in Zimbabwe or whether there are significant differences between the two case studies. 
Special attention will be given to the South African context in an effort to try and make 
predictions about the state of democracy in South Africa and whether the ANC’s dominance 
might negatively influence democratic consolidation. South Africa and Zimbabwe were 
selected for comparison because of historical similarities in terms of former racist regimes and 
liberation struggles against white-minority rule. 
 
1. 4. Research Methodology & Design:  
  A descriptive research design is used in order to determine what the impact of liberation 
movement governance has been on democratic consolidation. A major aim of many social 
scientific studies is to describe events/situations and many qualitative studies – which this 
study aims to be – focus primarily on description (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 80). The purpose 
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of the study, as stated in the previous section, is to assess how democratic consolidation has 
fared in Southern African states with a liberation movement government. Therefore, 
throughout the study, focus will placed on answering four core descriptive questions: a) What 
is the political culture of liberation movements? b) Did it change when they came into 
government? c) How does this political culture influence the behavior of the ruling liberation 
movements? d) How does the behavior of the ruling liberation movements affect the rule of 
law?  
 
  A comparative research methodology is implemented by using two case studies. As pointed 
out earlier, most of the studies reviewed are based on comparison between two or more case 
studies. Zimbabwe and South Africa will be compared in terms of their respective liberation 
struggles, liberation movements, democratic transitions and post-liberation dispensations.  In 
qualitative research, cases and not variables are placed at centre stage with a wide variety of 
aspects of the case(s) being examined (Neuman, 2005: 148). According to Neuman (2005: 
148) the passage of time is important to qualitative research and that qualitative researchers 
look at the sequence of events, paying attention to what happened first, second, third, and so 
forth. In terms of this study, the two case studies (Zimbabwe and South Africa) are examined 
over a period of time by firstly looking at the liberation struggles in each case, the transitions 
to democracy in each country and what has happened since then. There are various reasons 
for comparison, including contextual description, classification, hypothesis-testing and 
prediction (Landman, 2003: 5-10). In terms of the two case studies, the assumption that 
liberation movement governments have a negative impact on democratic consolidation will be 
examined. Furthermore, it is the aim that at the end of the study lessons for the entrenchment 
of democratic rule in South Africa can be identified.  
 
 This study is largely qualitative in nature, using both primary and secondary data. In terms of 
primary data, speeches, policy documents and constitutions were used for analysis. In terms 
of secondary data, literature reviews were done, focusing on prominent scholars’ works. An 
overwhelming majority of research about liberation struggles, post-liberation politics and 
democracy in Africa and democratic consolidation is based on literature reviews and analysis 
of existing data. One problem with doing literature reviews is that the researcher may exclude 
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studies that could have contributed to the study or certain authors may be excluded because of 
the researcher’s prejudice. 
 
  In terms of what is studied, a specific unit of analysis can be identified. A unit of analysis 
refers to what will be studied; what object, phenomenon, process, et cetera will be 
investigated (Mouton, 2001: 51). If this object is a real-life (World 1) object – for example 
human behavior, historical events, social organizations – then we are conducting empirical 
research (Mouton, 2001: 52). In terms of this study, the main unit of analysis is the liberation 
movements/political parties, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) and the ANC (South Africa). Specific 
focus is placed on the organization, characteristics and behavior of the respective movements 
during the liberation struggles and post-liberation dispensations. Throughout the study, the 
respective liberation struggles, democratic transitions from minority-rule and various aspects 
of the democratic dispensations are investigated. 
 
1. 5. Chapter layout: 
  The thesis includes six chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical frameworks that are used 
to analyze and interpret the two case studies. Chapter 3 sets out historical overviews focusing 
on the liberation struggles and democratic transitions in each country. Chapter 4 focuses on 
the political cultures that have developed in both ZANU-PF and the ANC while Chapter 5 
focuses on how the rule of law has been affected in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Chapter 6 
includes the findings and concluding remark. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: 
Democratic Consolidation & Liberation Movements 
 
2. 1. Introduction: 
  The aim of the proposed study is to establish whether the political culture that informs the 
behavior of the liberation movements that now govern in Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
impacts democratic consolidation; more specifically the rule of law. Before this can be 
investigated, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of democratic consolidation and liberation 
movements. It is important to have a clear understanding of what democratic consolidation 
refers to and how it will be measured when investigating the case studies. Furthermore, when 
looking at liberation movements, we have to determine whether they (specifically in Southern 
Africa) share similar characteristics and, if so, construct a framework in order to assess the 
behavior of these movements in the post-liberation dispensations.  
 
  The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the most important literature on 
democratic consolidation and liberation movements (specifically movements in Southern 
Africa). This will provide the theoretical framework through which the impact of liberation 
movement governments on democratic consolidation can be assessed critically.  
 
2. 2. Democratic Consolidation:  
  Democratic consolidation, since Huntington’s (1991) ‘third wave of democracy’, has 
become a central field of inquiry for students of democracy. In this section, democratic 
consolidation will be defined and conceptualized for the purposes of this study. Secondly, a 
literature review of prominent scholars’ work will be provided. This will be done in order to 
identify the most important debates and issues surrounding the study of democratic 
consolidation. Lastly, the rule of law (a necessary factor/condition for democratic 
consolidation) will be discussed in more detail.  
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2.2.1 Conceptualising Democratic Consolidation: 
  Democratic consolidation – like most other concepts in political science – is contested. 
Various scholars (Schedler; Linz & Stepan; Prezworski; Leftwich; Beetham) have 
investigated democratic consolidation, have attempted to define it and determine what 
factors/conditions are important for it to take place.  
 
  Andreas Schedler (1998: 103) argues that democratic consolidation should be limited to its 
original meaning: that of democratic survival. Democratic consolidation should thus be 
restricted to the tasks of avoiding democratic erosion and authoritarian regression. David 
Beetham’s (1994) understanding of democratic consolidation also seems to correspond with 
the ‘survival’-notion that Schedler advocates. According to Beetham (1994: 160), a 
democracy can be said to be consolidated when there is good reason to believe that it is 
capable of withstanding shocks and pressures without abandoning the fundamental 
democratic principles which it depends on. But why would democratic rule survive and 
regression into undemocratic regimes be prevented? A possible answer may be that a 
democratic way of organizing and governing society has become entrenched or – put 
differently – a democratic political culture has taken root.  
 
  The definitions or conceptions put forward by Linz and Stepan (1996), Diamond (1996) and 
Leftwich (2000) focus on the creation and entrenchment of a democratic political culture 
which is crucial to democratic survival. Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) argue that a democracy is 
consolidated when it has become the ‘only game in town’. Therefore, democracy as a 
complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives has been 
established and entrenched. They go on to state the following: “In short, with consolidation, 
democracy becomes routinized (sic) and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even 
psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success” (Linz & Stepan, 
1996: 16). Diamond (1996: 33) similarly argues that democratic consolidation is about the 
widespread acceptance of and support for a democratic government and democratic politics: 
“…consolidation is the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation (sic), such that all 
significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic 
regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine”. In this 
conception, Diamond (1996: 33) also closely relates democratic consolidation to a shift in 
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political culture; thus a change from an authoritarian or an anti-democratic political culture to 
a democratic one. Leftwich (2000: 135), in the same vein as Linz and Stepan (1996) and 
Diamond (1996), argues that a democracy is consolidated where parties, groups and people 
pursue their interests according to peaceful, rule-based competition, negotiation and 
cooperation and where the succession of one government by another is decided by these 
democratic means. Thus, democratic processes and decision-making become the norm. These 
conceptions of democratic consolidation indicate that it is more than just about avoiding 
authoritarian regression, but it is a process of establishing the widespread acceptance of 
democratic rule; thus the creation of a democratic political culture.  
 
  For the purposes of this study and reflecting the conviction of the researcher, democratic 
consolidation refers to the survival and entrenchment of democratic rule, making democracy 
the ‘only game in town’. A democracy can be said to be the ‘only game in town’ when the 
overwhelming majority of actors (governmental and non-governmental) accept democracy as 
the only legitimate form of governance even in the face of severe crises; rejecting all other 
non-democratic forms of government. Furthermore, democratic consolidation refers to the 
general acceptance of democratic procedures, practices, rules and institutions as the norm. 
When looking at democratic consolidation, it is also important to take into account that it is 
not a unilateral process, but according to Linz and Stepan (1996) and Schedler (2001) the 
entrenchment of democratic rule takes place on various levels. 
 
  Linz and Stepan (1996: 15) argue that democratic rule becomes entrenched on three levels: 
behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional. Schedler also looks at the behavioral and attitudinal 
foundations of democratic consolidation as Linz and Stepan, but adds a different third 
dimension – that of structural foundations. It is argued that a democracy is likely to survive 
when the structural foundations are solid. The structural foundations of democracy include 
socio-economic and institutional factors and in this study, particular attention will be paid to 
the institutional factors. Schedler (2001: 81) states the following with regards to this: 
 
“In general, the literature has conceived formal institutions primarily as incentive 
structures (that either encourage or discourage antidemocratic behavior), and only 
secondarily as structural constraints (that either allow or prohibit antidemocratic 
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behavior). It has analyzed institutions as sets of rules that reward some kinds of 
actors and some types of conduct, while punishing others.” 
 
  Behaviorally, a democracy is consolidated when there is no significant national, social, 
economic, institutional or political groups which attempt to overthrow a democratic regime or 
promote violence in order to secede from the state (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 15). A democracy 
can be said to be consolidated behaviorally when in the face of severe political, social or 
economic crises, important actors do not abandon the democratic process (Schedler, 2001: 
73). Schedler (2001: 70) states that anti-democratic behavior is a significant threat to 
democratic consolidation. He argues that if actors engage in anti-democratic behavior, 
democracy is in trouble. Instances of anti-democratic behavior include the usage of violence, 
the rejection of elections and the subversion of the rule of law or the transgression of authority 
(Schedler, 2001: 71).  
 
  Attitudinally, a democracy is consolidated when the overwhelming majority of people 
believe that democratic institutions and procedures are the most appropriate way to govern 
collective life, even in the midst of great social, political, institutional or economic crises 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996: 16). The attitudinal consolidation of democracy refers to the 
preferences and perceptions of actors, rather than their overt behavior (Schedler, 2001: 75). 
This non-instrumental and intrinsic support for democracy is considered by some to be the 
defining element of democratic consolidation. There is also substantial empirical evidence 
suggesting that actors’ regime preference does matter for regime survival. Importantly, 
Schedler (2001: 75) also states that a democracy that is embedded in a ‘democratic consensus’ 
very rarely breaks down. 
 
  A democracy is constitutionally consolidated when governmental and non-governmental 
actors become subject to and habituated to the rule of law (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 16). In other 
words, a democracy is consolidated when all forces (governmental and non-governmental) 
become subject and accustomed to the resolution of conflict within the bounds of democratic 
procedures. This is a vital aspect for the entrenchment of democratic rule and will be 
elaborated on when discussing the rule of law.  
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  In this study, Schedler’s (2001: 69) model of democratic consolidation will be followed. He 
argues that the behavioral, attitudinal and structural dimensions influence one another: 
 
“They form a chain of causation whose links are causally embedded: a) behavior 
appears as a proximate cause of regime stability, b) attitudes work as a prime mover 
of behavior, and c) structural contexts represent a proximate source of both actors 
and attitudes.” 
 
With this comprehensive conceptualization of democratic consolidation, a thorough 
investigation of the impact of liberation movement governance on democratic consolidation 
can be made.  
 
2.2.2. Measuring Democratic Consolidation: Institutional, Social & Economic 
Factors/Conditions:  
 Measuring democratic consolidation once again depends largely on where one stands 
normatively. Therefore, scholars (Linz & Stepan; Prezworski; Beetham; Leftwich) have 
identified various factors/conditions that are deemed important or even necessary for the 
entrenchment of democratic rule. These factors/conditions can be divided into three broad 
categories: institutional, economic and social. 
 
  Linz and Stepan (1996), in their article Toward Consolidated Democracies, focus primarily 
on institutional factors/conditions. According to them, citizens need to “develop an 
appreciation for the core institutions of a democratic political society – political parties, 
legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances” (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996: 17). They identify five conditions that must be present for a democracy to be 
consolidated, including an autonomous political society, a usable bureaucracy and the rule of 
law (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 17). An autonomous political society in this regard refers to the 
arena where political actors compete legitimately for the right to govern; in other words, the 
right to exercise control over the public power and the state apparatus. Another important 
institutional factor/condition that Linz and Stepan (1996: 20) identify is a usable bureaucracy. 
A modern democracy is in need of a capable and usable bureaucracy in order to meet the 
needs of citizens and to guarantee that their rights are protected. In order for a democratic 
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regime to protect the rights of citizens and deliver basic services to the public, it has to be able 
to effectively exercise its claim over the monopoly on legitimate force (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 
20). In addition to this, a democratic government should also be able to extract tax revenues in 
order to provide citizens with basic services. The other institutional factor/condition they 
focus on, the rule of law, is probably one of the most important factors/conditions for 
democratic consolidation, but will be discussed in detail in the following sub-section2. 
 
  Another important feature that is highlighted in the literature on democratic consolidation is 
the constitutional framework of a particular democracy. In terms of institutional design, some 
presidential systems encourage unconstitutional or even anti-constitutional behavior that 
threatens the rule of law, democracy and democratic consolidation. Leaders in parliamentary 
systems who attempt to abuse their power are more likely to be checked by other institutions. 
Other authors (Stepan and Skach [1993]; Prezworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi [1996]; 
Beetham [1994]; Leftwich [2000]) all argue that in terms of constitutional frameworks, a 
parliamentary system seems to hold better prospects for the consolidation of democracy. 
Kapstein and Converse (2008: 64) on the other hand argue that it may not necessarily be the 
constitutional framework that strengthens or weakens the prospects for democratic 
consolidation, but rather how strongly the power of the executive is checked. There are also 
various social factors/conditions to take into account when looking at democratic 
consolidation. 
 
  One such social factor/condition is the existence of a lively civil society. The existence of a 
pluralistic and strong civil society is an indispensable feature for the entrenchment of 
democratic rule. Civil society refers to the arena where relatively autonomous and self-
organizing individuals, groups and movements attempt to create associations to advance their 
interests and to articulate values (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 17). Leftwich (2000: 146) mentions “a 
rich and pluralistic civil society” as a vital factor for the entrenchment of democratic rule. 
Beetham (1994: 167) also emphasizes the importance of different social groups in democratic 
politics. There is also agreement amongst these authors with regards to social obstacles to 
democratic consolidation.  
 
2
 2.2.3 The importance of a Rechsstaat: Democratic Consolidation & the Rule of Law, pg. 17. 
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  Linz and Stepan (1996: 23) argue that ethnic conflict in multi-national states poses a danger 
to democratic consolidation, but is a surmountable obstacle. They state that democratic 
regimes under such conditions could still make significant strides towards consolidation. 
Similarly, Leftwich (2000: 143) argues that ethnic, cultural or religious cleavages are 
constraints on democracy, making the transition to democratic governance and also the 
consolidation of democratic rule difficult. He argues that where societal cleavages exist, it is 
important that measures are taken to ensure political stability; for example a carefully crafted 
constitution (Leftwich, 2000: 144). Beetham (1994) also confirms the above-mentioned 
authors’ assumptions regarding the impact of societal cleavages on democratic consolidation. 
He states the following: “…societies divided by clearly defined and historically antagonistic 
cultural groups will have great difficulty in sustaining democracy. Of all the hypotheses this is 
the one least easy to dispute…” (Beetham, 1994: 169). In addition to institutional and social 
factors, economic conditions are also important to take into account when looking at 
democratic consolidation. 
 
 Most authors reviewed (Przeworski et al; Leftwich; Kapstein & Converse; Linz & Stepan; 
Beetham) emphasize the importance of economic factors/conditions for democratic 
consolidation to take place. Linz and Stepan (1996: 21) argue that in order for a democracy to 
consolidate, it needs an economic society. An economic society in this sense refers to a set of 
socio-politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations that mediate between 
the market and the state. They go on to argue that a democracy needs a relatively autonomous 
market economy, but that completely free market economies are not suitable for the survival 
of democratic regimes (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 21).  Beetham (1994), in his study, also points 
out the paradoxical relationship that exists between capitalism and democracy. On the one 
hand, a market economy helps to disperse decisional and other forms of power and also to 
promote individualism; something that is important to a democracy (Beetham, 1994: 164). On 
the other hand, a market economy could yield various negative consequences for a democratic 
regime, including: a) the erosion of the public service ethos due to the market’s emphasis on 
private interest; b) the rapid fluctuations and widespread unemployment that accompanies a 
market economy may leave voters vulnerable to demagogic and radical mobilization, in 
support of anti-democratic politics; and c) inequality in terms of wealth tend to prevent 
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political equality. Inequality in terms of wealth is a factor that is widely viewed as a serious 
threat to democratic stability and consolidation. 
 
  In the empirical study Przeworski et al (1996: 43) conducted, they found that democracy is 
far more likely to survive where income inequality is declining over time. Leftwich (2000), 
Beetham (1994) and Kapstein and Converse (2008) all mention the threat of income 
inequality and the importance of reducing it. One way of reducing income inequality is 
through economic growth. The above-mentioned authors (Przeworski et al; Leftwich; 
Beetham; Kapstein & Converse) all agree that economic growth is an important, but not a 
sufficient, factor for the entrenchment of democratic rule. This is especially crucial in poorer 
democracies. Economic growth can compensate for poverty; thus, democracy in poor 
countries is likely to survive if the economies do not stagnate or contract (Leftwich, 2000: 
145). Przeworski et al (1996: 42) states the following on economic growth in poorer 
countries: “Economic performance, then, is crucially important for the survival of democracy 
in less-affluent countries. When the economy grows rapidly with a moderate rate of inflation, 
democracy is much more likely to last even in the poorest lands.” It is clear that most of the 
authors reviewed agree that economic factors such as the reduction of income inequality and 
economic growth are vital factors/conditions for democratic consolidation to take place. 
 
  As we can see from the above-mentioned, there are various factors/conditions that are 
important for democratic consolidation. This includes economic (for example: income 
equality, economic growth), societal (for example: a lively and independent civil society, 
overcoming racial and social cleavages) and institutional (for example: rule of law, 
autonomous political society) factors/conditions. For the purposes of this study, focus will be 
placed on a single institutional factor, namely the rule of law. The rule of law as identified by 
Linz and Stepan (1996) is a vital condition for democratic consolidation to take place.  
 
2.2.3 The Importance of a ‘Rechtsstaat’: Democratic Consolidation & the Rule of Law: 
  The rule of law (underscored by constitutionalism) is an indispensable factor for the 
consolidation of democracy and probably one of the most important features of a functioning 
democratic regime. For democratic consolidation to take place, all important actors, especially 
the state apparatus and democratic government, must be held accountable and become 
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accustomed to the rule of law (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 18). But what is meant by the ‘rule of 
law’?  
 
  Like any other concept in the social sciences, there seems to be no consensus on what the 
rule of law refers to, even if it is clear what it stands against (Rosenfeld, 2001: 1308). It has to 
be kept in mind that the rule of law has different meanings to different legal traditions, 
including the German Rechsstaat, the French État de droit and the Anglo-American common 
law (Rosenfeld, 2001: 1309). The rule of law is generally contrasted to the ‘rule of men’ 
which denotes the unrestrained and arbitrary personal rule by an unconstrained ruler 
(Rosenfeld, 2001: 1313). It is the principle then that the law should enjoy the highest authority 
in the sense that it establishes a framework to which all conduct and behavior of actors 
(citizens or government officials) should conform (Heywood, 2007: 326). According to 
Hutchinson and Monahan (1987: 100) “the enduring concerns of the rule of law are the 
limitations of state power, the maintenance of a broad sphere of private liberty and the 
preservation of a market-exchange economy.”  
 
  The rule of law is a core liberal-democratic principle that embodies the ideas of limited 
government and constitutionalism. It is based on the ideal of a limited government which is 
the cornerstone of liberal democracy (Hutchinson & Monahan, 1987: 101). All actors 
(especially the democratic government and state apparatus) must be accountable to and 
become habituated to the rule of law (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 19). Leftwich (2000: 139), in 
accordance with Linz and Stepan, argues that one of the conditions for democratic survival is 
the adherence to the rules of the game by both (electoral) losers and winners. He states the 
following: “For democracies to survive, there needs to be agreement or acquiescence about 
the rules of the political game and loyalty to those rules; that is, to the democratic process 
itself, especially amongst the political elites” (Leftwich, 2000: 138). Furthermore, the rule of 
law is also closely linked to individual rights which are considered to be the core of 
democracy (Carothers, 1998: 97). According to Carothers (1998: 97), “A government’s 
respect for the sovereign authority of the people and a constitution depends on its acceptance 
of law”. Linz and Stepan (1996: 19) argue that the emergence of a Rechsstaat – a state of law 
or a state subject to law – is vital for the consolidation of democracy: “The consolidation of 
democracy…requires a law-bound, constraint-embedded state”. A Rechsstaat has meant that 
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the government and state apparatus would be subject to the law, that discretionary powers 
would be defined and limited and that citizens could turn to the courts to protect themselves 
against the state. Furthermore, the rule of law and constitutionalism must determine which 
offices are to be filled by elections, the procedures to elect those officials and the definition 
and limits to their power (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 19). This corresponds with what Hutchinson 
and Monahan (1987: 101) state; they argue that the rule of law implies that rule must occur by 
law and not by (individual) discretion and even the lawmakers should be subject to the law. 
Essentially, the rule of law means that everyone within a state – especially government 
officials – is subject and accountable to the law, the protection of citizens’ democratic rights 
and also the application of law without fear or favor. It is clear from the above-mentioned that 
the rule of law is a crucial and necessary condition for a democracy to exist and for it to 
consolidate. 
 
  In the context of this study, the focus will be placed on how liberation movement 
governments have affected the rule of law in order to assess their effect on democratic 
consolidation in general. This study follows the premise of studies in political behavior that 
actors’ attitudes – in this case, liberation movements’ political cultures – impact their 
behavior or actions that in turn have an influence on democratic institutions that eventually 
impacts democratic stability.  
 
 
     Actors’ Attitudes 
 
          Behavior/Actions 
 
                    Democratic Institutions 
 
                   Democratic stability    
Fig. 1.1. A graphical model of democratic consolidation based on Andreas Schedler’s (2001) 
conception of democratic consolidation. 
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 When specifically looking at the effects of liberation movement governance on the rule of 
law, the following factors will be focused on in Chapter 5, namely: a) government 
transparency and accountability; b) fundamental democratic rights; and c) judicial 
independence and respect for the judicial process. By looking at government transparency and 
accountability, the ruling liberation movement’s willingness to subject itself and be 
accountable to the law can be examined. In terms of fundamental democratic rights, it is 
important to look at the amount of consideration that the respective liberation movement 
governments give to these rights. The existence and protection of fundamental rights are vital 
to any democratic regime and without it, a democracy cannot exist. The protection of 
fundamental rights also relates back to the principle of a constrained, law-embedded state. 
Lastly, judicial independence and respect for the judicial process are also important features 
of the rule of law. This relates to the application of the law without fear of government 
interference and favor to government officials. These are the most suitable factors to help 
determine what the effects of liberation movement governance are on the rule of law and by 
extent democratic consolidation. 
 
 2. 3. The Logic of Liberation Movements:  
  In the latter part of the twentieth century, numerous armed liberation struggles were waged 
in Southern African countries for independence and the political self-determination of 
indigenous peoples. These struggles were led by liberation movements who took power 
through a combination of armed resistance, international pressure, the ending of the Cold War 
and an agreement with political rivals. When looking at liberation movements in Southern 
Africa, there seems to be similar histories, shared experiences and patterns of behavior. This 
also seems to extend into the post-liberation era where these (former) liberation movements 
have become the ruling parties. Various scholars (Melber; Dorman; Southall) have 
investigated liberation struggles, liberation movements and post-liberation politics in 
Southern Africa, placing specific focus on liberation movement governance. These scholars 
have identified certain features of liberation movement governance in the post-liberation era 
and these features especially relate to the political culture that has developed within these 
movements and how this affects their governance – especially in a democratic context.  
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2.3.1 Conceptualising Liberation Movements:  
  According to Montiel and Rodriguez (2009: 157) liberation movements – as those who were 
present in the liberation struggles throughout Southern Africa from the 1970s onward – are 
political types of social movements. Social movements, in this context, refer to:  
 
“…pluralities of individuals who move collectively. Synchronized group actions of 
social movements emanate from identical collective goals and a shared collective 
identity” (Montiel & Rodriguez, 2009: 157).  
 
Liberation movements – as social movements – act collectively in the political arena and their 
collective goals are largely influenced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas that can be deemed 
as revolutionary. Richard Gibson (1972: 10) also touches on this by pointing out that African 
liberation movements were influenced by a plethora of ideas; ranging from eighteen-century 
European ideas, North American bourgeois democratic convictions to Marx’s Communist 
Manifesto. The common feature here is that liberation movements were committed to radical 
social change and employed revolutionary rhetoric, and in some instances, also revolutionary 
tactics in order to achieve their goals of liberation.  
 
  One of the defining features of a liberation movement, according to Gibson (1972: 3), is that 
these movements were forged in struggles against oppressive and foreign rulers. African 
liberation movements, therefore, fought against entrenched white minorities for the political, 
economic, social and cultural emancipation of indigenous peoples. This corresponds with 
what Montiel and Rodriguez (2009: 156) state with regards to liberation movements:  
 
“Collective action frames of liberation movements include economic and political 
independence from foreign and domestic exploitation, and profound social change 
toward an equitable social configuration benefiting the masses of poor people.”  
 
MacFarlane (1985: 5) also states – in accordance with the above-mentioned – that national 
liberation, as conceptualized by these movements, included four elements: political 
independence; freedom from external economic control; social revolution aimed at the 
removal of indigenous oppression due to tradition or colonial rule manipulation; and cultural 
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regeneration. Another important feature of liberation movements is the fact that they extract 
intense commitment from their members (Montiel & Rodriguez, 2009: 157). Thus, one could 
argue that this could be one of the reasons why many liberation movements (who have 
converted into political parties) are in power for long periods of time in the post-liberation 
dispensations – they extract intense commitment from their members and supporters.  
 
  By combining the above-mentioned factors, a thorough conceptualization of liberation 
movements can be provided. Firstly, liberation movements – as those in Southern Africa – 
refer to groups who fought an armed struggle against an oppressive white-minority regime; in 
the Southern African cases, settler-dominated governments. Furthermore, they fought for the 
political, economic, social and cultural emancipation of indigenous peoples in these countries. 
They were informed by various ideas, most of them revolutionary, emphasizing the radical 
change of society. According to MacFarlane (1985: 5), the idea of national liberation – as 
conceptualized by these movements – included the following elements: a) political 
independence; b) freedom from external economic control; c) social revolution aimed at the 
removal of indigenous oppression due to tradition or colonial rule manipulation; and d) 
cultural regeneration. Furthermore, liberation movements also extract intense commitment 
from their members and supporters (Montiel & Rodriquez, 2009: 157).  
 
2.3.2 Theoretical Foundations: What has been written? 
  Studies done on liberation politics – specifically in an African context – mostly focus on the 
nature of the liberation struggles, the liberation movements who were involved, the aftermath 
of these struggles in the post-liberation era and also how these struggles have impacted the 
political culture of liberation movements. There are a few authors (Southall; Dorman; Melber; 
MacFarlane; Gibson) who have focused on liberation and post-liberation politics in Africa, 
and more specifically in Southern Africa. This study will focus on the so-called “second 
wave” of liberation struggles against white-minority rule and settler domination in Southern 
Africa.  
 
  The struggles for national liberation in the post-Second World War era were some of the 
most dramatic events of the previous century (Southall, 2003: 30). These struggles took a 
variety of forms, but were all characterized by the rejection of imperialism and racism and the 
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demand for equality by the previously subjected indigenous citizenry. But a distinction has 
been made between the decolonization process of the 1950s/1960s and the armed liberation 
struggles that swept through Southern Africa from the 1970s onward (Dorman, 2006; 
Southall, 2003; MacFarlane, 1985; Ntjala, 1979; Gibson, 1972). Dorman (2006: 1087) argues 
that Southern African states, unlike African countries that attained independence in the 
1950s/1960s, resisted decolonization causing thwarted nationalist movements to turn to armed 
struggle by the 1970s. Thus, in accordance with Dorman, Gibson (1972: 4) argues that where 
white minority regimes were entrenched, African liberation movements were forced to turn to 
an armed struggle to achieve liberation. During this period, there was a considerable upsurge 
of radical African nationalism throughout Southern Africa, triggering the armed struggles that 
followed (Guelke 1980: 654). The Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the subsequent 
transition to majority rule in its African territories (Mozambique and Angola), reinforced the 
trends toward radicalism in other countries in the region (Guelke, 1980: 655). But, 
importantly, liberation movements did not attain power through military victories (Dorman, 
2006: 1087). Instead, through a combination of international pressure, internal domestic 
pressure and – to a limited extent – the ‘bush war’, multi-racial elections were held and a 
negotiated removal of settler rule was achieved in Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and 
South Africa (1994). This shift from decolonization – the relatively peaceful acquisition of 
political independence – to armed liberation struggles also seemed to introduce a shift in the 
political culture of these movements. 
 
  The main focus of Roger Southall’s (2003), Sara Dorman’s (2006) and Henning Melber’s 
(2002; 2008; 2010) works is the political culture that has developed within liberation 
movements and how this affects post-liberation governance. Dorman (2006: 1086) and 
Melber (2010) both point out that the liberation struggles forced these movements to organize 
in strict military hierarchies and adopt rough survival techniques and strategies. Melber 
(2008) argues that when liberation movements (specifically referring to movements in 
Southern Africa) came into power, political office bearers were often influenced by military 
mindsets. This in turn has had a considerable impact on the political culture that developed 
within these movements. The political culture within these movements, on the other hand, 
influences the mode of governance of liberation movement governments. William Gumede 
(2007: 13) argues that it is difficult for these liberation movements to establish a democratic 
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political culture within their own ranks because during the liberation struggles, the decision 
making was left in the hands of a powerful few. In accordance to this, Southall (2003: 31) 
states the following: “…once having attained national independence, the inexorable logic of 
national liberation seems to be to suppress rather than to liberate democracy.” Thus, he argues 
that the logic of liberation – or in other words the political culture of these movements – 
seems to be inherently authoritarian and difficult to reconcile with liberal democratic politics. 
In the next section, greater attention will be paid to this political culture and a more in-depth 
discussion will be provided. Another important aspect that many scholars (MacFarlane; 
Keenleyside; Southall; Guelke) have investigated is the impact of the Cold War-security 
context and superpower rivalry on the struggles for national liberation in Southern Africa. 
 
  The Cold War-security context has been identified as a major factor in the liberation 
struggles that took place in Southern Africa. In many instances, Southern Africa became the 
battleground for the Cold War superpowers with various conflicts taking place that were 
influenced by outside actors. The involvement of Western and Eastern superpowers in the 
conflicts of Southern Africa has been widely documented by various scholars (Guelke, 1980; 
Keenleyside, 1980; MacFarlane, 1985; Southall, 2006; et cetera). Guelke (1980: 649) notes, 
for example, that the 1950s/1960s, when most African states attained independence, were 
marked by years of considerable tension between the US-led West and the USSR-led East; 
this was partly exacerbated by the competition for influence among new African states. The 
upsurge of radical African nationalism by the 1970s, the Portuguese revolution of 1974 and 
the subsequent transition to majority rule in the former Portuguese territories, Mozambique 
and Angola (Guelke, 1980: 655), led to the greater involvement of superpower rivals in 
Southern Africa’s liberation wars. Southall (2006: 225) states that the increase of the USSR’s 
and China’s influence in strategically sensitive zones by the mid-1970s, drew Africa closer 
into the orbit of superpower military competition. The conflict between the superpowers was 
most intense in Southern Africa (Southall, 2006: 226). Furthermore, and very importantly, 
both China and the USSR (who competed with each other for socialist leadership in Africa) 
both supported various prominent (rival) liberation movements3 (Southall, 2006: 225). It is 
 
3
 China provided aid to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe and the Pan 
African Congress (PAC) in South Africa. The USSR, on the other hand, provided support and aid to 
the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South 
Africa (Southall, 2006: 225). 
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thus evident from the above that the Cold War-security context and superpower rivalry had a 
considerable impact on the liberation struggles and liberation movements of Southern Africa.  
 
2.3.3 Liberation Movements in the Post-Liberation Dispensations: Defining Features & 
Characteristics: 
  There is agreement amongst various scholars (Melber; Southall; Dorman) that the armed 
struggles many liberation movements were engaged in produced a certain political culture 
within these movements. Subsequently this political culture has affected the liberation 
movements’ metamorphosis into political parties as well as their behavior as ruling parties. In 
this section, the features and characteristics of this political culture, or logic of liberation as 
Southall (2003) calls it, will be set out in order to create a framework through which the 
behavior of liberation movements can be understood and analyzed. 
 
   Sara Dorman (2006: 1086), who specifically investigated the legacy of liberation struggles 
in Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Rwanda, says the following on how this type of 
political culture has developed within liberation movements: 
 
“Prolonged warfare leads to the development of hierarchies, hardship and brutality 
have been experienced, and links with external supporters and arms dealers have 
been strengthened. These factors continue to influence the style of governance, 
institutional reforms and relations with civilian populations ‘post-liberation’.” 
 
  This corresponds with what Henning Melber (2010), who has written extensively on 
liberation and post-liberation politics in Southern Africa, argues: “Resistance movements 
normally adopt rough survival strategies and techniques while fighting an oppressive regime. 
That culture, unfortunately, takes root and is permanently nurtured”. This is true of most of 
the liberation movements across Southern Africa who engaged in armed liberation struggles. 
Importantly, as pointed out earlier, liberation movements in countries like Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa did not come into power as a result of military victories, but did so 
through negotiated settlements and multi-racial elections (Dorman, 2006: 1087). Therefore, 
liberation movements had to (re)organize themselves into political parties and operate within 
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a liberal democratic setting – a transition which many of these movements have found 
difficult.  
 
  Roger Southall (2003: 31) argues that the logic of national liberation struggle or the political 
culture of liberation movements seems to be authoritarian in nature and reluctant to engage 
with democracy. Rather than promoting democracy, it suppresses it (Southall, 2003: 31). 
Furthermore, this authoritarian logic came to greater fruition during the so-called ‘second 
wave of liberation’ (armed struggles) directed against settler-dominated states (Southall, 
2003: 32). He argues that where this logic has become completely dominant, as in 
Zimbabwe’s case, it could yield drastic results. Where this authoritarian logic has had to 
engage with opposition forces in a liberal democratic setting – as in South Africa – the 
outcome (authoritarianism or democracy) remains in the balance (Southall, 2003: 32). These 
movements, once in power, display features that are rooted in the experiences of armed 
conflict. 
 
  Liberation movements’ claim to legitimate rule “stemmed from their emergence from the 
decolonization process as representatives acting on behalf of the majority of the people” 
(Southall, 2011: 81). A feature that ties into this is the continued use of exclusionary 
liberation rhetoric and the reversion back to the we/they-divide of the liberation struggle. The 
exclusionary language of the liberation, according to Dorman (2006: 1092), comes to the fore 
once the dominant parties are being challenged by the opposition or civic groups. In many 
instances, opposition to the government is accused of working against the ‘national interest’ 
and is therefore dismissed as being ‘racist’ or ‘counter-revolutionary’. In essence, when you 
are not with the liberator, you are the enemy (Melber, 2002). The increasing blurring of the 
boundaries between the party and the state and the equation of the party being the government 
and the government being the party, any opposition is viewed as hostile and branded as an 
enemy to ‘the people’ and against the national interest. With this exclusionary language 
comes the conviction that the liberation movements are the sole liberators and therefore the 
only legitimate rulers. Melber (2010) states the following with regards to the latter: “At the 
same time, a decidedly patriotic form of writing history turned the independence struggle 
soon thereafter into a myth, upon which the erstwhile liberation movements based their claim 
to be the sole liberators.”  
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  The exclusionary language of liberation movements also relates to the post-colonial national 
identity where the application of militant rhetoric is used as a tool for the exclusion or 
inclusion in terms of the post-colonial/liberation identity (Melber, 2002). The ideas of 
reconciliation and ‘unity in diversity’ are not always acknowledged in terms of political 
pluralism and permissiveness: 
 
“There is a lack of (self-)critical awareness and extremely limited willingness to 
accept divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed in public. Non-
conformist thinking is interpreted as disloyalty, if not equated with treason” (Melber, 
2011: 86). 
 
Through the use of the exclusionary language of the liberation, liberation movements 
establish themselves as the rightful rulers due to their liberation credentials. Lastly, the use of 
this exclusionary language, in the hands of the (former) liberation movements, serves as a tool 
for the exclusion or inclusion in terms of the post-colonial/liberation national identity. 
Another important feature of liberation movements is their focus on the capture of state power 
and the subsequent domination of governance.  
 
  Armed liberation struggles, waged by Southern African liberation movements, were 
primarily about wresting power from colonial and/or settler rule (Southall, 2003: 35). The 
national liberation struggles in this sense targeted the ‘nationalist’ capture of states which 
were previously monopolized by ‘foreigners/aliens’ (colonial administrators or settlers) 
(Southall, 2003: 36). In a way, for the liberation movements the capture of power signaled 
something similar to Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘the end of history’ with the conviction 
being that the liberation movement should permanently stay in power after succeeding in the 
liberation struggle (Melber, 2011: 89). Even though democratization was a desired result, it 
was not the main goal; rather, decolonization was the priority (Melber, 2011: 82, 83). 
Therefore, it was about seizing power and reorganizing the state in accordance to the goals 
and objectives of the liberation movements. The adoption of a socialist worldview by many 
liberation movements and their endorsement of the liberation struggle as simultaneous with a 
preceding class struggle, led to Leninist notions of a vanguard leadership and democratic 
centralism to predominate (Southall, 2003: 36). Therefore, there was a tendency for 
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democracy – with its questioning of received truths – to be converted into anti-democracy. 
Mohamed Salih (2007: 673) states the following:  
 
“…liberation movements’ leaders persistent politicking under the banner of 
liberation, with all its military and violent connotations, not only calls into question 
their democratic credentials, it speaks loudly of a leadership mindset that found it 
difficult to turn its back on the revolutionary methods that brought them to power in 
the first place.”  
 
  Liberation movements, upon capturing state power, also come to dominate governance. For 
example, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa can be described as dominant party systems 
where the dominant party is able to maintain power by virtue of winning successive elections 
either through popular support and/or by its control of the state machinery (Southall, 2003: 
37). Dorman (2006: 1091) argues that even countries with a multi-party system and plural 
civil societies have gravitated towards dominant party rule partly due to inclusionary tactics 
whereby allies and old enemies are brought into a governing coalition as was the case in 
Zimbabwe. The other reason, in accordance with Southall, is the dominance of electoral 
competition by the former liberation movements, as in Namibia and South Africa. 
Importantly, dominant party systems are characterized by increasing centralization and 
presidentialism (Dorman, 2006: 1092). Furthermore, Southall (2003: 37) points out that party 
dominance is usually associated with the fusion of party and state, the denunciation of 
minority groups who mobilize around vital issues for them, the delegimisation of opposition 
and also the development of a ‘culture of entitlement’ (to state resources amongst others) 
amongst the powerful governing elite. Liberation movements, in the post-liberation era, have 
also been plagued by bitter internal struggles due to the internal structures and dynamics of 
the movements. 
 
  Dorman (2006: 1092) points out that one of the lasting impacts of the liberation struggle are 
found in the alliances and relationships formed during the ‘struggle’ years. The patterns of 
policies in the post-liberation state may be a reflection of the internal composition and 
dynamics of the liberation movements. For example, Gumede (2007: 13) states that during the 
liberation struggle, the decision making was left in the hands of a powerful few; thus 
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promoting an authoritarian tendency within these movements. Furthermore, there has also 
been a general suppression of the personal/individual in favor of the collective (Melber, 
2010). Suttner (in Melber, 2010) argues that the underground structures of liberation 
movements restricted and cloaked individual, independent-minded thinking under a collective 
which used democratic centralism as a guiding principle to ensure loyalty and maximum 
discipline as a requirement for survival and ultimate victory. The authoritarian tendencies of 
liberation movements are reflected in the enforcement of internal (party) discipline, violence 
directed at ‘sell-outs’ and the treatment of female members/cadres (Southall, 2003: 1093). 
Conflicts within formal party structures emerge due to questions of entitlement, rewards and 
compensation (Southall, 2003: 1094). Southall (2003: 1094) points out that as some members 
of the liberation movement take control of government apparatus, while others are busy 
themselves with the more menial tasks of reconstruction. It can therefore be argued that a 
culture of entitlement with regards to compensation and position has caused many divisions 
and serious conflicts within former liberation movement parties.  
 
  The liberation struggles have had a decided impact on the political culture that has 
developed within liberation movements. The features of this political culture, as discussed 
above, have influenced liberation movements’ governance style in the post-liberation era.  
 
2. 4. Conclusion: 
   Democratic consolidation and liberation movement are the core concepts of this study. 
Democratic consolidation refers to the survival and entrenchment of democratic rule, making 
democracy the ‘only game in town’. Furthermore, there are various factors – institutional, 
economic and social – that are deemed important or even necessary for a democracy to be 
consolidated. For the purposes of this study, though, focus is placed on a single institutional 
factor, namely the rule of law because a) it is a crucial condition for democratic consolidation 
to take place and b) it represents the key condition/factor to analyze when looking at the 
impact of liberation movement’s political culture on democratic consolidation. 
 
  In terms of liberation struggles and movements, the focus of the study is on the so-called 
‘second wave’ of liberation struggles of the 1970s and on the nationalistic and revolutionary 
movements which spearheaded these struggles. The features and characteristics of liberation 
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movements in the post-liberation dispensations point to a certain (undemocratic) internal 
political culture that has been informed by the organizational needs that developed during the 
liberation struggles and the ideological inputs that have guided liberation movements. This, 
thus, provides a useful theoretical framework through which the impact of liberation 
movement governments on democratic consolidation can be investigated. 
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Chapter 3 
Zimbabwe & South Africa Compared: 
Liberation Struggles 
 
3. 1. Introduction: 
  Zimbabwe and South Africa have both experienced long periods of racist white-minority 
rule, liberation struggles that were waged against these minority regimes and (negotiated) 
transitions to (black) majority rule. The two case studies provide valuable information in 
relation to the nature of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and also how the political 
culture that characterizes the behavior of liberation movements, has developed.  
 
  The purpose of this chapter is to sketch the history of the liberation struggles as well as the 
primary movements that were involved in these struggles, explain the negotiated transitions to 
majority rule, and describe the wider international context that exerted considerable pressure 
on the quest for liberation. Furthermore, the fundamental aim is to provide a comparison 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa in order to highlight similarities and also account for 
differences between the cases. 
 
3. 2. Historical overview: Zimbabwe: 
  The history of Zimbabwe, as with most African states, is one marked by discriminatory 
colonial rule, the exploitation of natural resources and the repression of indigenous peoples. 
But it also includes the resistance to colonial and white-settler rule that eventually culminated 
in the gaining of independence and the transition to black majority rule in 1980 (Booysen & 
Toulou, 2009: 630).  
 
3.2.1. Fighting for Zimbabwe: The Second Chimurenga4: 
  Rhodesia – contemporary Zimbabwe – was governed by white-minority settler governments 
as a British colony until 1965 when Ian Smith’s right wing regime announced Rhodesia’s 
 
4
 Chimurenga is a Shona term for ‘armed struggle’ (Phimister, 2008: 211). The First Chimurenga, or 
uprising against British colonialism, took place between 1896 and 1897 (Kössler, 2010: 33). The 
Second Chimurenga refers to the armed liberation struggle from the 1960s onwards that the African 
nationalist movements took part in (Phimister, 2008: 211). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
32 
(illegal) Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain (Gibson, 1972: 145, 148). 
The period of white-minority rule was characterized by the continuation of discriminatory and 
overtly racist policies which included the allocation of the majority of land to white people 
and the repression of black citizens’ political, social and economic rights (Gibson, 1975: 148, 
149). This exploitation and repression of black people gave rise to bouts of resistance from 
the 1930s onwards, evolving into an armed struggle by the 1970s (Kössler, 2010; Mhanda, 
2005; Maxey, 1977).  
 
  African resistance to white suppression and exploitation, according to Foley (1993), was 
constant and assumed various forms. Resistance to colonial, or more specifically settler rule, 
arose during the 1930s and 1940s in the form of industrial workforce action which directly fed 
into the new, fledging nationalist movement (Kössler, 2010: 33). By the late 1950s, African 
political parties were being established that attempted to persuade whites to share power, 
initially winning some concessions (Foley, 1993). According to Fogel (1982: 339), these 
African political organizations that placed themselves at the head of the developing mass 
movement, did not have the “aroused consciousness of the African masses and the objective 
task of national liberation”. Rather these movements appealed to Britain over the head of the 
Rhodesian government to oversee the decolonization process; essentially confining the 
liberation struggle to the legal political arena (Fogel, 1982: 339). This pattern continued 
throughout the 1950s, but unfortunately, these efforts proved fruitless. This was due to the 
European settlers’ inflexible attitude, the economic and political resources they had at their 
disposal and the crucial buffer that a ‘fraternal’ South Africa provided; thus, they could fight a 
war against African revolutionaries without the assistance from British imperialism. 
Furthermore, efforts in the early 1960s to broker a constitutional transition to African majority 
rule only produced frustration amongst the nationalist activists and anxiety among the settlers 
(Fogel, 1982: 339). The 1960s would prove to be a difficult period for African movements 
due to a growing backlash from white settlers in reaction to the increased political activism of 
these nationalist movements (Meredith, 2002: 30). 
 
  In December 1961 the Zimbabwe African People’s Union was formed (ZAPU) as a result of 
the preceding nationalist movements’ failure and banning (Gibson, 1972: 157). The 
conditions for African nationalist movements like ZAPU worsened considerably after the 
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1962 general elections which the right-wing Rhodesian Front5 won (Gibson, 1972: 157). After 
its victory at the polls in the 1962 general elections, the Rhodesian Front went on to repress 
African political organization (Foley, 1993); most notably with the banning of ZAPU in 1962, 
only nine months after its formation (Gibson, 1972: 163). Instead of establishing another 
organization, as had been done before, Joshua Nkomo – leader of ZAPU – and his associates 
agreed that if the organization was to be banned, that they would move underground at home 
and operate in exile. Under the leadership of Nkomo, who had by that time become 
accustomed to exile politics, ZAPU continued their appeals to Britain, intensified its lobbying 
to the United Nations and requests to the Organization for African Unity (OAU) for financial 
assistance (which was initially rejected) (Gibson, 1972: 159; 161). Meanwhile in the ranks of 
ZAPU there was growing dissatisfaction with Nkomo’s leadership (Meredith, 2002: 29); it 
was criticized as “vacillating and indecisive, focused almost exclusively on pseudo-diplomacy 
and lobbying foreign governments and international organizations” (Gibson, 1972: 161, 162). 
Consequently in 1963, a split6 occurred in ZAPU with dissidents – including Ndabaningi 
Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Moton Malianga and Robert Mugabe (Gibson, 1972: 162) – 
defecting and forming the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (Fogel, 1982: 340).   
 
  ZANU was born out of the frustration over the lack of political activity within Rhodesia and 
also due to the lack of success of the tactics and strategy adopted by ZAPU in exile (Gibson, 
1972: 174). The split was immediately followed by vicious fighting – mainly in the townships 
of Salisbury – between the youths of the two rival liberation movements; this would set the 
scene for the antagonistic relationship between the two parties which would have a decisive 
impact on the liberation struggle and Zimbabwean politics (Kössler, 2010: 34). In the 
immediate aftermath of the split, Gibson (1972: 162) states that the two movements “probably 
struck more blows at each other than at the white regime”. Martin Meredith (2002: 33), in 
accordance with the above-mentioned, states the following: “As each group tried to assert 
itself, however, the rivalry developed into uncontrolled violence... Little attention was paid 
either to whites or to the causes the nationalists were ostensibly serving”.  In August 1964 
both ZAPU – by this time also known as the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) – and ZANU 
 
5
 The Rhodesia Front, a white supremacist party, was established in the early 1960s due to the 
determination of whites to maintain their political domination (Foley, 1993). 
6
 There have also been suggestions that tribal and ethnic differences played a role in the split, with 
observers pointing out the Ndebele identity of ZAPU and the Shona identity of ZANU (Kössler, 2010: 
34). 
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were outlawed by the Ian Smith regime (Gibson, 1972: 163) and by 1965, after the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI), the nationalist movement was completely driven 
underground (Fogel, 1982: 342). The UDI proved to be a watershed occurrence for the 
nationalists because it provided a clear justification for an armed liberation struggle (Kössler, 
2010: 34). But the sporadic armed attacks7 against the Rhodesian army were designed to once 
again gather international attention and apply indirect pressure onto the Smith regime (Fogel, 
1982: 342). 
 
  Various scholars (Maxey, 1977; Fogel, 1982; Foley, 1993; Meredith, 2002) seem to agree 
that the armed struggle began in earnest in 1972 with an offensive launched by ZANU’s 
military wing, the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the north-east of the 
country (Maxey, 1997: 64). Ian Phimister (1995: 82) argues that the escalation of the armed 
struggle from 1972 onwards was interlinked with growing rural economic grievances and 
when “many of the landless unemployed ‘joined the stream of guerrilla volunteers leaving 
Rhodesia’”. At this stage, virtually all the African nationalist movements were joined in 
opposition to settler colonialism, putting their different interests aside (Phimister, 1995: 82). 
By 1974, ZANU’s armed struggle was starting to pose a serious threat to the Smith regime 
and to the settler farmers (Fogel, 1982: 343). It is important to take into account that many of 
the ZANU cadres, based among the Shona people in the east, came into contact with the 
Mozambican revolution that was led by FRELIMO and this had a significant impact on the 
young Zimbabwean guerrilla fighters (Fogel, 1982: 342). In the same year, South Africa and 
Zambia – due to the adverse affects that the conflict was having – in conjunction with other 
African leaders forced the Smith regime and the nationalists to the negotiation table in a so-
called detente (Fogel, 1982: 344).  
 
  This arrangement or detente brought ZANU and ZAPU together under the umbrella of the 
Bishop Muzorewa-led African National Congress (ANC). The aim was to allow Muzorewa 
and Nkomo access to the ZANLA guerrillas in an effort to persuade them to abandon their 
struggle by “dangling before them the prospects of the ‘promising’ negotiations between the 
 
7
 In April 1966 ZAPU launched its first attack in the armed struggle against white rule and in 1967, the 
Zimbabwe Independence Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) with the support of the ANC from South 
Africa, launched an attack on the Rhodesian armed forces in Wankie, but were defeated (Breytenbach, 
2000: 46). 
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reformist nationalist leaders and the Smith regime” (Fogel, 1982: 344). In November 1975, 
ZANU and ZAPU attempted to put aside their differences and formed the joint Zimbabwe 
People’s Army (ZIPA) (Norman, 2008: 60). During this period, the recruitment of new cadres 
did increase significantly with a mass exodus of young men and women to Mozambique to 
become freedom fighters. 
 
  In 1976, the liberation struggle spread rapidly across the northern part of the Rhodesia and 
the eastern border of the country (Maxey, 1977: 65). Deprived from its northwest base area in 
Zambia, ZANU’s armed struggle moved heavily to the east along the Mozambican border 
while ZAPU predominantly operated in western Rhodesia, using bases in Zambia8 (Fogel, 
1982: 348; Meredith, 2002: 38). The Smith regime responded to the increased guerrilla 
activity by imposing a range of new regulations which basically gave the executive carte 
blanche in the military, political and judicial spheres (Maxey, 1977: 65). Furthermore, the 
regime launched attacks on neighboring countries, predominantly targeting Mozambique 
(Maxey, 1977: 66). Within Rhodesia, the strategy against the guerrillas was to isolate the 
ZANU army from mass support by hoarding thousands of peasants into “protected villages”; 
thus breaking the contact between ordinary citizens and the guerrillas (Maxey, 1977: 65; 
Fogel, 1982: 348). It was during this time that the broad anti-colonial alliance came under 
increasing strain and while guerrillas “continued to be rapturously welcomed in some areas, 
their appearance elsewhere was less than enthusiastically received” (Phimister, 1995: 83).  
 
  At the end of 1976, negotiations were held in Geneva where Smith was brought together 
with Sithole, Muzorewa, Nkomo and Mugabe who had replaced Sithole as ZANU’s president 
(Fogel, 1982: 349). Once again the negotiators attempted to put pressure on the British 
government to “oversee the transition to African political rule” (Fogel, 1982: 349). In October 
1976 the Patriotic Front (PF), a military alliance between ZANU and ZAPU was created, but 
with both organizations maintaining their command structures (Norman, 2008: 61). This was 
done in Geneva by Mugabe and Nkomo in an effort to freeze Sithole and Muzorewa – who 
did not have recognizable armed forces – out of a possible negotiated settlement (Fogel, 1982: 
350). After the Geneva negotiations failed and broke up, the formal military alliance between 
 
8
 During this time, ZANU received assistance from Mozambique after its independence in 1975 whilst 
ZAPU received help from Zambia; reinforcing their diverse regional support bases (Kössler, 2010: 
34). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
36 
ZANU and ZAPU continued while the struggle against Smith’s regime escalated. Meredith 
(2002: 38) argues that despite their military partnership, relations between the two 
organizations and their respective armies remained acrimonious due to a lack of trust. It is 
important to note that the two armies differed considerably – ZANLA (ZANU’s army) was a 
typical guerrilla army employing non-conventional methods of warfare whilst ZIPRA 
(ZAPU’s army) was a conventional army designed to “substitute itself (partially) for the 
existing state apparatus after a prospective political deal with the colonial settler regime” 
(Fogel, 1982: 350).  
 
  In November 1977, after several talks, a war weary Smith negotiated with Sithole and 
Muzorewa and eventually agreed to majority rule (Norman, 2008: 63). In March 1978, he 
“co-opted Muzorewa and Sithole, and a puppet tribal chief into his government in an ‘internal 
settlement’” (Fogel, 1982: 355). Importantly, neither Nkomo nor Mugabe was involved in the 
talks and the subsequent internal settlement (Norman, 2008: 63). Meanwhile the liberation 
struggle – and the violent repression thereof – continued unabated (Meredith, 2002: 63). But 
in August 1978 Nkomo held a secret meeting with Smith – much to Mugabe’s ire – in an 
effort to achieve a settlement in which he would come to power separately (Meredith, 2002: 
38). In April 1979, elections were held in which Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime 
Minister; despite this, the violence continued (Fogel, 1982: 356). The new government with 
Muzorewa as Prime Minister, however, was not recognized by the international community. 
Finally in September 1979 all relevant parties, including British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, her foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua 
Nkomo and Robert Mugabe – under severe pressure from the Front Line States9 (Reed, 1993: 
51) –  met in London for the Lancaster House Conference (Norman, 2008: 64) which would 
eventually lead to a negotiated transition to majority rule.  
 
  It is clear from the above that the struggle over Zimbabwe was a complex and long conflict, 
involving various actors who all had a significant impact on the nature of this struggle and 
also the shape of the post-liberation dispensation. The armed struggle eventually led to the 
Lancaster House Conference of 1979 which brought all the relevant parties to the negotiation 
 
9
 The Front Line States refer to those Southern African states that were directly involved in the 
negotiations between the liberation movements and the settler government throughout the liberation 
struggle and also at the Lancaster House Conference (Reed, 1993: 43). 
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table and led to the Independence Elections of 1980 and the peaceful transition from white 
minority rule to black majority rule. 
 
3.2.2 Transition to Majority Rule: Negotiating with the Enemy: 
  The 1979 Lancaster House Conference10 provided the final impetus for the transition to 
majority rule. Following this conference, the Independence Election was held on the 18th of 
April 1980 which Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF – much to everyone’s surprise – won 
convincingly (Booysen & Toulou, 2009: 630, 631). The Lancaster House Conference was 
essentially an agreement to bring an end to the conflict and to manage the transition from 
minority rule to majority rule. 
 
  The conference was chaired by Lord Carrington and was attended by all the parties who 
were involved in the Rhodesian conflict (Stiff, 2000: 20). It should be kept in mind that the 
Lancaster Agreement was fundamentally a political pact between political elites. Under the 
stipulations of the Lancaster Agreement, Zimbabwe – as Southern Rhodesia was now to be 
called – would become a sovereign republic (Norman, 2008: 69); thus gaining formal 
independence from Britain. Most importantly, a new constitution – which would serve as the 
supreme law of the land – was agreed upon which endorsed a ‘one man, one vote’ election in 
early 1980 (Norman, 2008: 69; Stiff, 2000: 20). The Lancaster House Agreement led to a 
majority-rule constitution whereby Zimbabwe would adopt a multiparty system (Breytenbach, 
2000: 46). Until the election, it was agreed upon that the Muzorewa government would stand 
down and that Southern Rhodesia would be governed by a British governor, Lord Soames. 
Crucially, both Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to a new constitution where blacks would have 80 
seats in the new parliament and whites 20 (Norman, 2008: 67). Whites were guaranteed 20 
seats in parliament for five years (Stiff, 2000: 20).  
 
  The new constitution also had a Declaration of Rights which included various civil liberties 
and political rights; importantly also property rights (Norman, 2008: 69). The section entitled 
‘Freedom from Deprivation of Land’ was guaranteed for ten years and protected settlers 
against the forcible seizure of land and required sufficient compensation for expropriated land 
 
10
 The Lancaster House Conference was held in London from 10 September to 21 December 1979 
(Stiff, 2000: 19). 
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(Fogel, 1982: 358), thereby implying that land distribution would only be implemented 
through the principle of ‘willing seller/willing buyer’ (Breytenbach, 2000: 47). The 
acceptance of this section was particularly significant given ZANU’s zealous socialist 
program that envisaged the nationalization of land (Fogel, 1982: 357). Wilfred Mhanda 
(2005: 3) states the following regarding the Lancaster House Agreement: 
 
“The Lancaster House Agreement served to underscore the divergence in the 
interests of the nationalist leadership on the one hand and the broad masses of the 
people on the other. To the masses of Zimbabwe, the national liberation war was 
being waged for the attainment of self-determination and full democratic rights whilst 
for the nationalists, the war was essentially a pressure mechanism to induce political 
negotiations for the transfer of power to them.” 
 
  Following the negotiations in London, the Independence Election was held in April 1980, 
marking the end of British colonialism in Southern Africa, Rhodesia’s transformation into 
Zimbabwe and the transition from minority white-rule to majority black rule. Before the 
election, it was decided – largely due to the animosity between Mugabe and Nkomo – that 
ZANU and ZAPU would be contesting the elections separately (Meredith, 2002: 38). Nkomo 
felt that the Patriotic Front (PF) should represent a united front, but the decision was made by 
Mugabe to contest the elections alone (Norman, 2008: 70).  
 
  Unfortunately, the run-up to the elections was marred by systematic acts of violence – both 
by the intact forces of the Smith regime and also the ZANLA forces in the areas that were 
under their control (Kössler, 2010: 35). But intimidation of voters was not only limited to 
ZANU, ZAPU also made use of this method in Matabeleland (Stiff, 2000: 23). Furthermore, 
opposition election agents who ventured into ZAPU and ZANU controlled areas to canvas 
votes for their parties were simply murdered. Despite the violence and intimidation that 
ZANU in particular employed “Lord Soames had orders to ensure that the election, with 
ZANU contending, took place no matter at what cost in terms of fair play” (Stiff, 2000: 25). 
Regardless of the widespread violence, the elections were the first relatively free and fair ones 
in Zimbabwean history with a large turnout of the registered voters; 93.6% (2.7 million) of the 
electorate participated (Fogel, 1982: 360). The outcome of the election stunned most 
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observers and participants – in particular Joshua Nkomo – with ZANU winning a resounding 
majority with 63% of the vote and 57 seats out of the 80 seats reserved for African 
representation; ZAPU won 20 seats11 while Muzorewa’s United African National Congress 
only won three seats (Cliffe, Mpofu & Munslow, 1980: 44). The Rhodesian Front won all 20 
seats reserved for white representation (Fogel, 1982: 360). ZANU-PF’s electoral victory 
reflected their unique relationship with the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe and also its 
reputation as a liberation movement, as described by Fogel (1982: 360): 
 
“ZANU’s electoral victory reflected not only the fact that it shouldered the burden of 
the armed struggle against the Smith regime, but also that the broad masses of 
Zimbabweans were awakening to radical political life, voting for ZANU because they 
identified it with revolutionary change.” 
 
  The Lancaster House agreement, the nature of the negotiated settlement and the 
characteristics of the independence election would have a profound impact on the post-
liberation era in Zimbabwe.  
 
3.2.3 The International Context: 
  British imperialism, the Cold War-security context and Southern African regional politics all 
had a significant impact on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and the subsequent negotiated 
transition to majority rule. In this section, these factors and the impact they had on the 
struggle for Zimbabwe will be explored and discussed. 
 
  Britain’s role in Rhodesia – from 1923 onwards – seemed to be one of reluctance to get too 
involved and also an unwillingness to support the transition to African majority rule. Rather, 
Britain gave every indication – especially after the illegal UDI – that it wanted total 
disengagement (Gibson, 1972: 150). The illegal UDI of 1965 challenged Britain and initiated 
Rhodesia’s formal break from England (Fogel, 1982: 340). African nationalists – following 
their policy of appealing to Britain – demanded British military intervention to stop Smith’s 
rebellion and to “proceed to supervise a ‘proper’ decolonization” (Fogel, 1982: 340). But the 
 
11
 ZANU won 70% of the vote in Mashonaland whilst ZAPU won all their votes in the Ndebele-base, 
Mtabeleland (Fogel, 1982: 360); reconfirming the ethnic dividing lines between the two parties. 
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British government was not willing to use military force against ‘kith and kin’ in Rhodesia 
(Gisbon, 1972: 149). The UDI actually worked in Britain’s favor because it “enabled England 
diplomatically to wash its hands of the Rhodesian problem” (Fogel, 1982: 341). Britain was, 
however, a concerned party in most of the negotiations and talks held between the Smith 
regime and the African nationalists, especially the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. The 
participation of Britain in the Conference was probably influenced by their desire to facilitate 
an advantageous outcome for British as well as capitalist interests; thus in affect an outcome 
favorable to neo-colonialism.  
 
  The Cold War-security context and Sino-Soviet split also played an important role in the 
Zimbabwean liberation struggle; specifically with regards to the liberation movements it 
influenced. In many instances, Southern Africa became the battleground for the Cold War 
superpowers with various conflicts taking place that were influenced by outside actors. It was 
no different in Zimbabwe. When the liberation struggle was at its most intense, Smith’s 
regime managed to portray the guerrilla war not as a purely white-black conflict, but as a 
battlefield between the East and West in an effort to enlist the assistance of Britain and the 
United States (Guelke, 1980: 657). Furthermore, the split in the Eastern bloc between China 
and the Soviet Union had a particular influence on the liberation movements operating in 
Zimbabwe. Reed (1993: 40) states the following regarding this: “When the Sino-Soviet split 
erupted, and both emerging blocs sought to gain as many allies – including liberation 
movements – as possible”. The Soviet Union and China, in a bid to attain the socialist 
leadership in Africa, provided (military and financial) aid to various liberation movements 
throughout Southern Africa (Southall, 2006: 225).  
 
  The USSR formally aligned itself with the older, more established movements, including the 
African National Congress (ANC), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 
the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and ZAPU. China, on the other hand, 
tended to support principal rival organizations of these groups, including ZANU (Reed, 1993: 
40). These divergent trajectories of support tended to influence the military strategies, tactics 
and the worldviews that the movements adopted. ZANU’s military-political strategy, for 
instance, was applied directly from the Chinese experience through which the countryside is 
gradually liberated and then the surrounding cities (Fogel, 1982: 350). China also had a 
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profound impact on the ideology that ZANU adopted and the liberation movement also started 
to reiterate a worldview that reflected this ideology (Reed, 1993: 41). ZAPU, on the other 
hand, moved closer to the Soviet orbit and also received military training from Soviet Union 
instructors (Gibson, 1972: 164; Shubin, 2007: 256). The Cold War also had a profound 
impact on the regional politics of Southern Africa, which in turn influenced also the liberation 
struggle in Zimbabwe. 
 
  Conflict between the Cold War superpowers in Africa was most intense in Southern Africa, 
especially after the Portuguese revolution of 1974 which led to the abandonment by Portugal 
of its African colonies (Angola and Mozambique) (Southall, 2006: 226). These developments 
had far-reaching consequences for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa (Guelke, 1980: 
655). According to Guelke (1980: 655): “This (the Portuguese coup) ensured that the 
transition to majority rule in the Portuguese territories would be a revolutionary rather than an 
evolutionary character. Above all, it reinforced the trends towards radicalism in other 
countries in Southern Africa.” The developments in 1974 caused the interactions of events in 
the different countries to become marked. These international and regional factors all played a 
significant role in the Rhodesian liberation struggle and ZANU’s position as liberation 
movement. 
 
3. 3. Historical overview: South Africa: 
  South Africa has endured a long history of exploitation and racist oppression initiated in the 
colonial era and ruthlessly entrenched during the Apartheid-era, stretching from 1948 until 
1994 (Deegan, 2001: 4, 23). Similarly, the struggle against Apartheid was a long process that 
went through various phases, eventually leading to the climax of Nelson Mandela’s release 
from prison in 1990 and the ensuing negotiations of the early 1990s.  
 
3.3.1 Fighting for South Africa: The People’s War12: 
  In 1948, the National Party government inherited a system of segregation that was on the 
verge of collapse due to accelerated industrialization during the Second World War and the 
 
12
 People’s War refers to the approach of Vietnamese guerilla fighters that was later adopted by the 
ANC in their armed struggle against the Apartheid regime. In terms of a so-called ‘people’s war’, all 
individuals – including those who support the revolutionaries – are regarded as weapons of war 
(Jeffery, 2009: 26). 
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subsequent influx of Africans into urban areas (Clark & Worger, 2004: 36). Rejecting the 
Fagan Commission’s13 recommendation that total segregation was impracticable, the 
Nationalist government went on to entrench segregation by rooting it into the ideology of 
Apartheid (Deegan, 2001: 23); thereby ushering in an unprecedented era of racial 
discrimination, exploitation and oppression. This provoked resistance to Apartheid from the 
beginning of the 1950s, initially taking on the form of passive resistance, evolving to an 
armed struggle by the start of the 1960s and finally developing into violent mass action in the 
aftermath of the 1976 Soweto revolt (Jeffery, 2009; McKinley, 1997). 
 
  The fight against Apartheid went through several different phases, evolving from peaceful 
and non-violent mass protest to armed struggle and violent mass action. The fight against 
Apartheid was led by the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC was established in 
1912 with the principle purpose of defending and pressing for African civil and political 
rights (Dubow, 2000: 1).  It was established in reaction to the creation of the union of South 
Africa in 1910. The early ANC’s actions were influenced by moderate liberal-minded 
tradition “whose core components mixed appeals to moral authority with a measure of 
pragmatism and a willingness to compromise” (Dubow, 2000: 8). In 1949, the first step was 
taken against the newly instituted Apartheid regime with the ANC’s adoption of the ANC’s 
Youth League’s Program of Action14 (Gerhart, 1978: 83). The program called for mass action 
in the form of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience. These events, according to Gerhart 
(1978: 83), “opened a new phase in African politics”.  The Youth League sought a change of 
direction from the ANC’s previous policies to more “direct forms of mass-orientated 
struggle” (McKinley, 1997: 15).  
 
 In 1953, the multi-racial, multi-organizational Congress Alliance15 was formed and went on 
to construct the Freedom Charter16 which set out its demands and basic program (McKinley, 
 
13
 A commission set up by the former government to evaluate the feasibility of total segregation, 
concluding that total segregation was impracticable. It therefore advocated the acceptance of a 
permanent ‘native’ population in urban areas (Deegan, 2001: 23). 
14
 The ANC Youth League was formed in 1943 under the leadership of Anton Lembede and seemed to 
adopt a more militant, revolutionary and racially exclusive position (De Jager, 2009:277).  
15
 The Congress Alliance was formed by the ANC, the Congress of Democrats, the South African 
Coloured Organization and the South African Indian Congress; the Alliance also included the newly 
formed South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the (mainly white) Federation of 
South African Women (FSAW) (McKinley, 1997: 19). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
43 
1997: 20). The Charter became the ANC’s basic policy document and embodied the vision for 
a democratic and multi-racial South Africa17 (Gerhart, 1978: 94). Furthermore, it included a 
discourse of rights in conjunction with one of liberation (Seekings, 2000: 7). The Charter set 
out a list of demands that included the following:  
 
* the people shall govern;  
* all national groups shall have equal rights;  
* the people shall share in the country’s wealth;  
* the land shall be shared among those who work it;  
* all shall be equal before the law;  
* all shall enjoy equal human rights;  
* there shall be work and security;  
* the doors of learning and culture shall be opened;  
* there shall be houses, security and comfort; there shall be peace and friendship 
(Freedom Charter, 1955).  
  
  It is clear from the above quote that some sections – for example “the people shall share in 
the country’s wealth” – are ambiguous and unclear; the Charter was – and still is – therefore 
open to widespread interpretation due to its eclectic nature (McKinley, 1997: 21). According 
to Ellis and Sechaba (1992: 28), the Freedom Charter represented most of the distinct strands 
in the ANC and that it was not a policy document, but rather a declaration of principle. The 
result of this ambiguity meant that the strategic approach of the ANC Alliance was both a 
nationalist anti-Apartheid umbrella for all social forces as well as a revolutionary struggle for 
radical socio-economic transformation (McKinley, 1997: 22). This confirms the perception 
that the ANC represented a broad church of interests, ideologies and members ranging from 
“socially conservative and radical nationalists, democratic socialists, liberal constitutionalists 
and Marxists of various persuasions” (Lodge in Deegan, 2001: 28). The adoption of the 
Charter also elicited a repressive reaction from the Apartheid government who saw this as 
confirmation that the ANC was bent on a violent overthrow of the state (McKinley, 1997: 22). 
Furthermore, after the publication of the Freedom Charter, the state responded by passing two 
      
16
 The Freedom Charter was adopted at Kliptown in June 1955 (McKinley, 1997: 20). 
17
 In fact, some of the clauses present in the Freedom Charter were later to be incorporated into South 
Africa’s post-Apartheid constitution in 1996 (Deegan, 2001: 28). 
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censorship Acts, namely: the Customs and Excise Act of 1955 and the Official Secrets Act 
(No. 16) of 1956 (Clark & Worger, 2004: 57). 
 
  A split occurred in the ANC ranks in 1959 due to the movement’s accommodationist 
approach and cooperation with whites and Indians due to its relationship with the South 
African Communist Party (SACP). A small group that referred to themselves as Africanists 
were opposed to the Charter, were dissatisfied with the ANC’s seeming ideological ambiguity 
and argued that the liberal multi-racialism of the Congress Alliance was undermining radical 
nationalism (Gerhart, 1978: 124; McKinley, 1997: 19). Consequently, the Africanists, led by 
ANC Youth League members Potlako Leballo and Robert Sobukwe, broke away from the 
ANC in 1959 and formed the Pan African Congress (PAC) (McKinley, 1997: 19). The PAC’s 
emergence became a major challenge to the ANC as it gained a real foothold in some parts of 
the country (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 29). These events, coupled with the government’s 
repression, would have a significant impact on the direction the struggle against Apartheid 
would take in the 1960s. 
 
  The Sharpeville shootings18 of March 1960 where 69 people were killed by police caused an 
uproar within South Africa and abroad and led to a shift in the struggle against apartheid. In 
fact, “among more militant opponents of the government, there was also a growing 
groundswell of anger and an increasing desire to jettison peaceful protest in favour of armed 
confrontation” (Jeffery, 2009: 1). The reaction from the black population to these shootings 
was swift with riots breaking out in Soweto, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth (Jeffery, 
2009: 1). Sharpeville can be described as a turning point in the history of the liberation 
struggle; it brought unprecedented turmoil to the country and also, for the first time, 
widespread international condemnation. After Sharpeville, both the ANC and PAC were 
banned under the Suppression of Communism Act and forced into exile (Mandela, 1994: 
287). In short, the banning of the ANC in the wake of the Sharpeville incident provided the 
justification for the launch of an armed struggle. According to Nelson Mandela (1994: 287):  
 
18
 On 21 March 1960, the PAC called for a mass protest campaign against the pass laws with large 
numbers of people gathering outside police stations in Nyanga, Langa and Sharpeville (Deegan, 2001: 
31). The police opened fire on the protesters and subsequently killed an estimated hundred people; 69 
in Sharpeville (McKinley, 1997: 26). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
45 
“Now even non-violent law-abiding protests under auspices of the ANC were illegal. 
The struggle had entered a new phase. We were now, all of us, outlaws.” 
 
  The ANC established their armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in November 1961 and 
launched its sabotage campaign19 on the 16th of December 1961 (Jeffery, 2009: 4). The new 
organization was composed of leading ANC and SACP members with the SACP playing a 
dominant role within MK (McKinley, 1997: 30; de Jager, 2009: 277). The South African 
Communist Party (SACP)20 – formerly known as the Communist Party of South Africa – had 
a major influence on the move to an armed struggle and the establishment of MK (de Jager, 
2009: 277). Anthea Jeffery (2009: 4) confirms this by stating the following:  
 
“...Joe Slovo, a member of the SACP’s central committee and one of the party’s most 
accomplished strategists, identified the ANC’s shift from a policy of non-violence to 
one of armed struggle as ‘one of the major struggles initiated by the leadership of the 
SACP.’”   
 
Crucially, due to SACP’s connections in Moscow, the Soviet Union went on to provide the 
ANC with money, weapons, military training and leadership corps skills in revolutionary 
tactics (Jeffery, 2009; 4). The decision to launch an armed struggle and build a guerrilla army 
significantly increased the SACP’s weight in its alliance with the ANC (Ellis & Sechaba, 
1992: 35). Meanwhile, the response of the South African government, under the leadership of 
Verwoerd, was swift and severe. 
 
  According to Deegan (2001: 32), the government responded to the activities of MK with 
even harsher methods of repression. This included legislation that gave the police authority to 
hold detainees for ninety days without trial and laws that upheld the death penalty for people 
found guilty of sabotage. In addition to this, the state made major arrests in 1962 and 1963; 
Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962 (for sabotage) and in early 1963, almost the entire 
leadership of the ANC – and also MK – was arrested in Rivonia (McKinley, 1997: 31). The 
 
19
 Within 18 months of its establishment, MK carried out over 200 acts of sabotage, specifically 
targeting government buildings and property. Most of the attacks and explosions were directed at 
property rather than people (Jeffery, 2009: 4). 
20
 The Communist Party of South Africa was established in 1921 and in 1928 it formed a relationship 
with the ANC (de Jager, 2009: 276) which would prove to be crucial in the struggle against Apartheid. 
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Rivonia accused – including Mandela who was Umkhonto’s commander – were tried in 
October 1963 on charges of conspiring to overthrow the state by means of a violent 
revolution21 (Jeffery, 2009: 6). Eight of the accused22 were found guilty and sentenced to life 
in prison. This paralyzed the internal leadership of the armed struggle and left the 
responsibility of continuing the armed struggle primarily to the external mission of the ANC. 
It was seemingly decided, according to Eidelberg (1999: 57), that a guerrilla strategy would 
be pursued from bases outside the country; in other words, it would be directed by the 
ANC/SACP-alliance in exile. 
 
  Despite the increased assistance from the Soviet Union, the establishment of headquarters 
and military camps in Tanzania and insurgents at their disposal, the ANC found it difficult to 
infiltrate South Africa because the country was surrounded by Portuguese and British colonies 
(Jeffery, 2009: 7). The situation was compounded after a second tier of MK leaders inside 
South Africa were arrested. Furthermore, underground cells were destroyed and were not able 
to be rebuilt due to police infiltration. The flow of MK recruits also largely ceased due to 
economic growth and the generation of more jobs and better wages (Jeffery, 2009: 7). Despite 
the ANC’s efforts to change the direction of the faltering armed struggle at a conference in 
Morogoro23 in 1969, little progress was made (Jeffery, 2009: 8). The 1960s can be described 
as the ‘hey-day’ of Apartheid with the enforcement of Grand Apartheid through the policy of 
separate development that was advocated by H. F. Verwoerd (Clark & Worger, 2004: 59). 
During the 1960s, the NP government consolidated its power and resistance to Apartheid was 
muted (Jeffery, 2009: 13).  
 
  If the 1960s were characterized by the successful oppression of internal opposition to 
Apartheid, the 1970s represented resurgence in the struggle against the system (Deegan, 2001: 
43). During the 1970s, South Africa experienced economic difficulties due to the limitations 
 
21
 The blueprint for the overthrow of the government was captured in a document Operation Mayibuye 
(Jeffery, 2009: 5). The document revealed a plan of prolonged guerrilla warfare in the hope to spark 
internal uprisings against the Apartheid state (McKinley, 1997: 31). 
22
 The accused included Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Raymond 
Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi and Andre Mlangeni (Jeffery, 2009: 6). 
23
 There were three key developments at the conference: the formation of the Revolutionary Council 
who would be responsible for the coordination of the armed struggle, the admission of non-black 
members to the ANC and the adoption of Strategy and Tactics, a document outlining the military and 
political tactics necessary for a successful revolution (Jeffery, 2009: 8). 
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of Apartheid capitalism and changes in the world economy after the oil crises (McKinley, 
1997: 41; Deegan, 2001: 43). This situation created fertile ground for renewed resistance 
against Apartheid. Tellingly, the ANC was not responsible for this renewed surge, but was 
rather largely forgotten by black South Africans (Jeffery, 2009: xxxii). By the mid-1970s the 
ANC (and SACP) had virtually no presence or role inside South Africa (Jeffery, 2009: 9). A 
new political movement, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM)24, a rejuvenated version 
of the Africanist tradition, had a major influence on the fight against Apartheid in the 1970s 
(McKinley, 1997: 44). The Black Consciousness Movement “prioritised struggles around 
culture and identity” (Seekings, 2000: 31). In other words, it focused on the psychological 
liberation of black people and was concerned with creating a new identity for black South 
Africans and “a new pride which could liberate them from subservient attitudes” (Gerhart, 
1978: 271). The BC movement had a particular impact on and following from African 
intellectuals, the emerging black middle class and crucially students (Jeffery, 2009: 17). The 
impact of the BC philosophies, though, was the greatest on the urban black youth and this 
would prove to be a critical factor in the events to follow.  
   
  In 1976, despite growing militancy amongst the black youth, the government pursued a 
policy that decreed Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in black high schools (McKinley, 
1997: 47; Jeffery, 2009: 17). Consequently on the 16th of June, 20 000 Soweto pupils marched 
in protest to this new language policy. Initially the protest march was peaceful, genial and 
high-spirited (Jeffery, 2009: 17). The events in Soweto had a ripple effect throughout the 
country with violence spreading from Soweto to other parts of South Africa with violent 
consequences (Jeffery, 2009: 18). Despite these developments, the state successfully subdued 
the potential insurgency with mass arrests and detentions. It was furthermore aided by the lack 
of well-organized structures to direct the action and anger that swept through South Africa 
(McKinley, 1997: 47).  
 
  After 1976, many youths left the country and flooded the ranks of Umkhonto we Sizwe to 
either evade incarceration, police violence or to contribute to the struggle against Apartheid 
(Jeffery, 2009: 20). It is important, though, to take note that many of the young people who 
 
24
 The Black Consciousness Movement was co-founded by Steve Biko and Barney Pityana (Jeffery, 
2009: 16). 
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flooded the MK’s ranks did not do it out of an ideological or organizational affinity towards 
the ANC, but because of necessity (McKinley, 1997: 48). The ANC was the organization best 
equipped to provide lodging and other related resources (Jeffery, 2009: 20). Thus it can be 
argued that many of the (Black Consciousness) youths who joined the MK in exile were only 
partially willing recruits to the ANC’s cause. Nevertheless, their arrival revitalized MK 
(Jeffery, 2009: 21). But in spite of the strengthening of MK and an increase in Soviet support, 
the ANC did not have a significant presence within South Africa despite still enjoying strong 
support (Jeffery, 2009: 23). However, the ANC had largely been eclipsed by new internal 
organizations. 
 
  By the end of the 1970s25, the ANC concluded that in order for them to successfully confront 
the Apartheid government and gain an upper hand over its rivals, a fundamental change in 
strategy was needed. Thus, in 1979 a change in policy was announced, encapsulated in the so-
called Green Book26 that indicated a shift in the guerrilla warfare from focus on the 
countryside to an urban, and specifically township orientation (Eidelberg, 1999: 58). 
According to the Green Book, the ANC’s aim was to seize power through a protracted 
people’s war “involving the whole people and in which partial and general uprisings would 
play a vital role” and during this, the Apartheid state would be systematically weakened by a 
combination of political and military action (Jeffery, 2009: 41). According to Eidelberg 
(1999: 58), this included a broad spectrum of insurgency that involved links to legal and semi-
legal mass political organizations. In addition to embarking on a campaign of armed 
propaganda27 and other efforts to popularize the movement (Jeffery, 2009: 45), the ANC 
forged links with newly established civic organizations (Eidelberg, 1999: 58). This formed 
part of what Giap (in Jeffery, 2009: 62) refers to as the preparatory phases of the people’s 
war.  
 
 
25
 In 1978, a delegation from the ANC, SACP and Umkhonto went to Vietnam in order to gain 
knowledge in relation to the strategies used in the so-called people’s war (Jeffery, 2009: 26). 
26
 The Green Book was the ANC’s strategic document for launching a full-scale ‘people’s war’ in 
South Africa. It was composed by a special commission and drew heavily on the lessons learned in the 
Vietnamese war (Jeffery, 2009: 41).  
27
 A program of violence aimed at stimulating political activity and organization; the ANC did this 
through a series of bomb attacks (Jeffery, 2009: 43). 
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  According to Jeffery (2009: 56) and Eidelberg (1999: 59), the Green Book had emphasized 
the need for the creation of a nation-wide popular liberation front when the time was right. In 
1983 a variety of newly established trade unions, civic organizations and other groups formed 
a broad alliance of anti-Apartheid movements under the aegis of the United Democratic Front 
(UDF)28; this was done in opposition to the so-called tricameral constitution29 that the P. W. 
Botha-led government proposed (Alden, 1993: 67). The UDF presented the product of six 
years of “fundamental transformation in extra-parliamentary politics in South Africa” 
(Seekings, 2000: 29). Even though a connection between the ANC and the UDF was denied, 
it was clear that the ANC and the social movement were closely involved (Jeffery, 2009: 63). 
In fact, the ANC gave direction to UDF activities while the UDF espoused the principles 
enshrined in the Freedom Charter (Seekings, 2000: 29). Furthermore, in 1985 the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU)30 was formed and soon after, contact between the 
new trade union and the ANC was established (Jeffery, 2009: 120). In 1987, COSATU made 
their support for and partnership with the ANC clear when they adopted the Freedom Charter 
(Jeffery, 2009: 121). Now with the support of these internal organizations, the ANC went on 
to implement the various stages of the ‘people’s war’.  
 
  In 1984, the ANC called for a people’s war that would make South Africa ‘ungovernable’ 
(Jeffery, 2009: 67). In 1984, townships in the Vaal triangle erupted in violent protest against 
local Apartheid controls and took to the streets, setting roadblocks, burning down businesses 
and government buildings and attacking municipal councilors (McKinley, 1997: 64). This 
would be the start of the period of ‘ungovernability’ and the most intense, violent and 
sustained mass struggle in South African history (Lodge, et al, 1991: 65). These events 
propelled the struggle into a new phase with boycotts, protest marches and funerals came to 
dominate the political landscape as South Africa was immersed in violent unrest (Alden, 
1993: 68). According to Eidelberg (1999: 58), the ANC, in an effort to garner the allegiance 
of the township inhabitants, used a considerable amount of armed violence which the UDF 
condoned. Related to the notion of a ‘people’s war’ was that of ‘people’s power’ (Eidelberg, 
 
28
 The official launch of the UDF took place on August 20, 1983 (Lodge et al, 1991: 49). 
29
 P. W. Botha’s attempt to rearrange Apartheid through the cooption of the Indian and colored 
communities. Through this, Indians and coloreds would have representation in government, whilst the 
African majority was excluded (Deegan, 2001: 54). 
30
 COSATU brought together the unions that had been in FOSATU, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) and several independent unions (McKinley, 1997: 70). 
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1999: 58). ‘People’s power’ was closely linked to the civic organizations, such as the UDF, 
and was characterized by violence in particular against the township administration 
(Eidelberg, 1999: 58). In the wake of the 1985-1986 collapse of community councils, 
township civics and youth organizations often took over, leading to acts of severe violence, 
including a practice known as ‘necklacing’31. According to Jeremy Seekings (2000: 23), the 
1980s were “the decade of the toyi-toyi and the necklace, the comrade and the collaborator, of 
ungovernability and people’s power.” 
 
  The government, in turn, responded to the growing resistance during this period of time with 
increased repression in the form of successive States of Emergency (Seekings, 2000: 145). In 
July 1985, P. W. Botha declared a State of Emergency in 36 districts in the Eastern Cape, the 
east Rand, the Vaal triangle and areas near Johannesburg which contributed to the escalating 
violence (Jeffery, 2009: 99). The new policy that was adopted by the state was known as the 
‘total strategy’ and would take on an indirect form by using various channels, for example 
propaganda, media, societal, education, et cetera. Shortly after the state of emergency in 1985, 
the government deployed thousands of South African Defense Force (SADF) troops into the 
townships (McKinley, 1997: 72). The military approached the revolt in terms of ‘low 
intensity’ warfare that aimed to pacify the population not through conventional methods of 
military involvement, but via clandestine grassroots operations (Deegan, 2001: 63). Vigilante 
killings (black-on-black violence) and clandestine assassination squads launched a new 
pattern of aggressive violence in the townships. On the 12th of June 1986, a second State of 
Emergency was announced in all parts of South Africa, except the homelands (Jeffery, 2009: 
136). These States of Emergency were particularly damaging to the UDF because it included 
detentions, censorship and de facto military rule (Lodge et al, 1991: 87). Even though the 
‘low-intensity’ warfare was effective in terms of repression and disorganization, it only 
created a continuous cycle of violence and according to some analysts, the activities of the 
security forces only fuelled the anarchic state of affairs (Deegan, 2001: 67). By the end of the 
1980s, it became evident that low-intensity warfare could not continue indefinitely and that 
the government’s counter-revolutionary strategy had brought South Africa to the brink of civil 
war. 
 
31
 ‘Necklace’-killings were horrific acts of violence in which a tire was placed around a victim’s neck, 
filled with gasoline or diesel oil and then set on fire (Jeffery, 2009: 110). The victim suffered great 
physical pain as well as enormous psychological trauma. 
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  The struggle against Apartheid was long, hard, complex and very violent – evolving from 
passive resistance in the 1950s to a fierce people’s war in the 1980s. Furthermore, it involved 
a variety of actors that had a significant influence on the struggle for liberation and the 
repression thereof. Eventually the events culminated in the negotiations of the early 1990s 
that would lead to the transition from minority to majority rule. 
 
3.3.2 Transition to Majority Rule: Negotiating with the Enemy: 
  With the emergence of F. W. de Klerk at the end of the 1980s and the changes in the world 
system after the collapse of the USSR, avenues for formal talks and negotiations between the 
government and the ANC were opened. De Klerk, in 1990, announced a change of course by 
stating that the government would seek a political, rather than a military solution to the 
demands of black opponents (Deegan, 2001: 69).   
 
  It has to be kept in mind, however, that the road to talks “had been long and winding” and 
throughout the 1980s, influential forces pushed the leaders of the NP-government and ANC to 
negotiations (Butler, 2007: 267). Thus by the time De Klerk came to power in 1989, there had 
been extensive contact between the liberation movement leaders and the government’s 
intelligence services. For instance in 1986, the ANC and the government were already 
involved in discussions while in 1987 Frederik van Zyl Slabbert organized the Dakar 
conference between a group of prominent Afrikaner intellectuals and the ANC who 
participated in talks about how democracy could be established in South Africa (Jeffery, 
2009: 156, 168). One of the main reasons for this was the rapidly changing international 
context – which will be discussed in more detail later – with the Cold War cooling down after 
1986 (Deegan, 2001: 71). Support for the ANC from the Soviet Union was drastically cut 
back after 1989, whilst the US and Western allies of the South African government withdrew 
its backing due to the collapse of communism; thus both parties were weakened and not in the 
position to defeat the other one militarily (Southall, 2006: 227). Both sides had reached a 
stalemate. Thus, this situation essentially pushed the ANC and Apartheid government to the 
negotiation table (Deegan, 2001: 74). This process was initiated with the release of Nelson 
Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990. 
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  On 2 February 1990, Pres. F. W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the ANC and SACP 
and on 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after 27 years (Jeffery, 
2009: 236). Wa Muiu (2008: 131) notes how the internal organization of the ANC changed 
after the return of the exiles and how this ultimately affected their strategy at the talks with the 
government. Due to the ANC’s eclectic organizational structure, there was crisis of identity 
and ideological confusion that was compounded by disagreement over future leadership. The 
National Party, on the other hand, – since the split between the conservatives and liberals in 
1982 – was a far more settled party (Wa Muiu, 2008: 133). McKinley (1997: 106) argues that 
the Apartheid government sought to exploit this new situation, including the disorder within 
the ANC, to conduct a “two-tier strategy – the use of violence and negotiation – which would 
weaken the ANC-led Alliance on the ground and it was hoped at the negotiations table as 
well.” As a result of this, violence and clashes between the police and opposition forces 
continued amid the preparations for the negotiations (McKinley, 1997: 10; Jeffery, 2009: 
244).  
 
  In December 1991, the ANC and NP were joined by various other political organizations32 – 
nineteen in total – to conduct the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
(Deegan, 2001: 78; Wa Muiu, 2008: 136). Delegations from these nineteen organizations 
came together in an effort to negotiate the future of the country. CODESA33 exposed the 
divergent and conflicting views of the major parties regarding the nature of the new South 
African state (Wa Muiu, 2008: 138). Spitz (in Butler, 2007: 291) makes the following 
observation: “CODESA was responsible for exposing, rather than reconciling, basic 
differences between the parties.” By the second half of 1992, the negotiations reached a dead-
end with the ANC turning to mass protest during this stalemate in an effort to remove the 
government. This only led to more violence and the breakdown of law and order, but with 
intense international pressure on the government and the ANC, negotiations resumed with the 
signing of the Record of Understanding (Deegan, 2001: 81). By November 1993, agreement 
was reached on the interim constitution that would form the basis of the government of 
 
32
 The Conservative Party, AZAPO and the PAC refused to attend the convention (Deegan, 2001: 79). 
33
 CODESA 1 was organized around a management committee and utilized five working groups to 
look at specific issues. Working group 1 (WG1) focused on the international community and free 
political participation; WG2 was assigned with exploring constitutional principles and constitution; 
WG3 looked potential forms of interim government; WG4 dealt with the Bantustans; and WG5 looked 
at the time frames (Butler, 2007: 292 
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national unity and on 22 December 1993, the interim constitution was adopted by parliament 
(Deegan, 2001: 85; Butler, 2007: 310). In addition to this, the remaining Apartheid legislation 
was removed and the Electoral Act was adopted. The negotiations, although treacherous at 
times, brought the NP and ANC together in antagonistic cooperation; both parties realizing 
that the alternative to negotiation would be civil war. It was decided that on 27April 1994, 
South Africa would hold its first democratic elections, bringing an end to Apartheid and 
ushering in the period of liberal democracy. 
 
  Unfortunately as in Zimbabwe’s case, the run-up to the liberation-elections was marred by 
acts of systematic and politically-driven violence, especially in Kwazulu-Natal. March and 
April in 1994 were some of the most violent months in the history of political violence in 
Kwazulu-Natal; largely between the ANC and IFP (Deegan, 2001: 104). The reasons for the 
violence between the two parties were related to political competition, suggestion of ‘third 
force’ involvement and also ethnic antagonism (Deegan, 2001: 105). Whatever the reason for 
the violence, it threatened to undermine the elections and Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) finally enlisted the help of the SADF to manage the elections (Deegan, 2001: 106). The 
IFP only agreed the week before the election to participate, stemming the tide of political 
violence with the decision (Deegan, 2001: 107). On 27 April 1994, 86% of the registered 
voters participated in the historic elections with the ANC winning a big majority of the vote 
(62.5%) and NP together with the IFP gained 30% of the national vote (Deegan, 2001: 107). 
The elections, despite difficulties were declared largely free and fair by the IEC (Deegan, 
2001: 112). The 1994 elections marked the end of Apartheid and racial discrimination and 
was the first step towards a new political dispensation. 
 
3.3.3 The International Context: 
  As in Zimbabwe’s case, the international context and external actors exerted considerable 
influence on the liberation struggle in South Africa and the transition to majority rule. This 
specifically relates to the Cold War-security context, regional geopolitics and international 
condemnation of Apartheid. In this section, focus will be placed on all the above factors and 
the impact they had on the liberation struggle in South Africa. 
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  As with most liberation struggles in Southern Africa, the Cold War-security context played a 
major role in the struggle against Apartheid and the Apartheid regime’s counter-revolutionary 
efforts. As said in the preceding section on Zimbabwe, the USSR – in competition with China 
– supported the ANC (and ZAPU) in Southern Africa (Southall, 2006: 225). The provision of 
support can mainly be attributed to the links that the SACP in South Africa had with the 
Soviet Union; thus due to this, the ANC was provided with resources, both financially and 
military by the superpower (de Jager, 2009: 277). Umkhonto we Sizwe soldiers also received 
training in the Soviet Union from the 1960s onwards, specifically training in guerrilla warfare 
(Shubin, 2007: 253). Therefore, the Soviet Union became a key ally to the ANC/SACP-
alliance and had a significant impact on the ability of the liberation movement to conduct a 
liberation struggle against a powerful and repressive state. On the other side of the Cold War 
coin, the Apartheid state became “an investment haven and a much needed ally of the West in 
the ongoing Cold War” (McKinley, 1997: 36). The Cold War-security context also had a 
major impact on the role South Africa took on in Southern Africa. 
 
  South Africa played a vital role in the conflict between the capitalist West and communist 
East on Southern African soil; essentially proving to be a bastion against communism in the 
region (Southall, 2006: 226). The conflict between the superpowers was the most intense in 
Southern Africa, especially after the Portuguese revolution of 1974 (Southall, 2006: 226). 
This had a major impact on the liberation struggles with Alden (1993: 66) stating the 
following: “The collapse of Portuguese suzerainty in Mozambique and Angola was a 
watershed event in the history of southern Africa. With the establishment of avowedly 
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Luanda and Maputo, the cordon sanitaire of white settler states 
surrounding South Africa was irrevocably punctured.” Vitally for the ANC, the change of 
government in Mozambique created new opportunities to infiltrate South Africa from a 
bordering state (Jeffery, 2009: 11). These developments impacted the strategy of the 
Apartheid regime and enhanced the opportunities of the liberation movement. 
 
  Meanwhile, the South African government adopted a program of destabilization against the 
new independent, black and Soviet-backed regimes. For instance, in 1981 the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) began striking ANC targets in adjacent countries, including 
Mozambique (and Lesotho) (Jeffery, 2009: 54). The Botha-regime launched raids and 
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bombing attacks on neighboring Mozambique and Angola where MK was based (McKinley, 
1997: 53). The post-1980 Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe was also a target of this 
destabilization by means of “direct military action including sabotage, clandestine support for 
banditry, assassination, espionage, economic sabotage, propaganda and disinformation” 
(Johnson & Martin, 1988: 57). This was due to the Mugabe regime’s support for the South 
African liberation movements, diplomatically and by allowing the ANC – and the PAC – to 
set up bases in Zimbabwe. The main purpose of this destabilization was to weaken the ANC’s 
quest to launch an offensive against the Pretoria-regime. But by the end of the 1980s, 
international condemnation of Apartheid had grown considerably – largely due to the ANC’s 
diplomatic efforts – and the Cold War was cooling down, changing the complexion of the 
liberation struggle and the government’s efforts to stop it. 
 
  After 1986, the relations between the Soviet Union and the West were evidently softening 
and during various meetings between the two superpowers, it became apparent that the USSR 
wanted to reach an agreement about its aims in Southern Africa (Deegan, 2001: 71). Alden 
(1993: 69) states that by the beginning of the 1980s, as a result of mounting financial costs, 
the Soviet Union found itself in severe crisis; something that was recognized by the country’s 
leadership in 1986, the year Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms were initiated. This had a 
significant impact on its approach to the Third World, placing emphasis on negotiation rather 
than engaging in conflict. Therefore considering the Soviet Union’s change in policy towards 
the region, the Apartheid regime’s ‘total strategy’ approach against the ‘total communist 
onslaught’ – which almost brought the country to the brink of civil war – did not seem 
justified (Deegan, 2001: 73). In fact, the harsh and violent suppression of domestic opposition 
in the mid-1980s began to frustrate and embarrass the United States with Apartheid becoming 
a major domestic issue in America. Consequently, in 1986, the US Congress passed the far-
reaching Anti-Apartheid Act which introduced economic sanctions (Deegan, 2001: 73). In 
terms of the ANC, Soviet support for the liberation movement was removed after the collapse 
of communism in 1989. Thus, with the collapse of communism both Soviet support for the 
ANC and Western support for the South African state disappeared, consequently forcing the 
two parties to the negotiating table (Southall, 2006: 227). It is thus clear that international 
factors and external actors had a profound impact on the course, character and outcome of the 
liberation struggle and also the negotiations that followed.       
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3. 4. Comparison: Accounting for similarities & differences: 
  The first obvious similarity between the two cases is that the liberation struggles were 
conducted against white-minority regimes. In Zimbabwe, the liberation struggle was directed 
against the settler governments, especially Ian Smith’s regime, and in South Africa, it was 
directed against the Apartheid regime. The difference here, though, is that British colonialism 
played a major role in Zimbabwe’s case. Therefore, Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle was as 
much about racial emancipation as it was about independence from British colonialism. South 
Africa on the other hand was characterized by a ‘colonialism of a special type’ where white 
South Africa was essentially an ‘imperialist state’ and black South Africa its ‘colony’ 
(Jeffery, 2009: 5). Initially, resistance against these regimes was peaceful with movements in 
Zimbabwe appealing to Britain for intervention while the ANC opted for non-violent, mass 
protest (Fogel, 1982: 339; McKinley, 1997: 18). It is interesting to note that in both cases, 
around the same time, the main liberation movements underwent a split. In Zimbabwe, ZANU 
split from ZAPU and the PAC split from the ANC. In Zimbabwe’s case, the split in ZAPU 
was largely due to dissatisfaction with Nkomo’s leadership and the lack of political activity in 
the country (Gibson, 1972: 174). In South Africa’s case, the PAC split because of 
dissatisfaction with the ANC’s accommodationist approach and its close relations with white 
and Indian groups (McKinley, 1997: 19). These movements were all banned in the 1960s by 
the respective Rhodesian and Apartheid regimes; subsequently forcing them into exile. This 
provided the impetus for the launch of armed struggles against the repressive minority 
regimes. 
 
  One of the most important differences in terms of the armed struggle seems to be the terrain 
on which it was fought – in Zimbabwe, it was exclusively rural and in South Africa, it was 
largely urban (Phimister, 1995:89). The peasant commitment was crucial to ZANU’s election 
victory while the support of the urban, working class underpinned the ANC’s electoral 
victory. Another difference in terms of the armed struggle was that the two main movements 
were supported by different superpowers due to the Sino-Soviet split. ZANU received support 
from China, while the ANC received support from the Soviet Union. The PAC, the rival to the 
ANC, also received assistance from China, while ZAPU – ZANU’s rival – had the USSR’s 
backing (Southall, 2006: 225). ZANU and PAC, due to their ties to China, shared an affinity, 
while the ANC and ZAPU had a partnership (Stiff, 2000: 31; Gibson, 1972: 165). The wider 
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Cold War-security context and the effects this had on the Southern African region, greatly 
influenced the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In both cases, the 
Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the emergence of black regimes in Mozambique and 
Angola had a powerful influence on the events in both Zimbabwe and South Africa (Kössler, 
2010: 34).  
 
  It is also interesting to note that in both Zimbabwe and South Africa the minority regimes 
attempted to co-opt leaders or sections of the population into a partnership; this was rejected 
in both cases. In Rhodesia, Smith “co-opted Muzorewa and Sithole, and a puppet tribal chief 
into his government in an ‘internal settlement’” (Fogel, 1982: 355) while in South Africa, the 
government attempted to make Apartheid work by adopting the so-called tricameral 
constitution, through which colored and Indian South Africans would have representation in 
parliament (Deegan, 2001: 54). In both cases, this seemed to be the final attempt of flagging 
minority-regimes to survive. Another similarity that both Zimbabwe and South Africa share is 
negotiated transitions to majority rule as opposed to civil war.  
 
  Dorman (2006: 1087) makes the point that “none of these countries can be considered to 
have gained independence as a result of military victory. The combined effect of ‘bush war’ 
and international pressure led to multi-racial elections and the negotiated removal of settler 
rule.” In having said that, Phimister (1995: 89) argues that ZANU came closer to 
overthrowing the Smith regime than the ANC came to overthrowing the Apartheid 
government; therefore, “ZANU entered negotiations in a much stronger position than did the 
ANC in its turn, as witnessed by the constitutional provisions for compulsory coalition 
government which the latter was obliged to accept.” In both cases, the liberation movements 
made considerable concessions due to desire to have peaceful transitions to majority rule. It is 
also important to mention how international conditions and external actors affected the 
negotiation process.  
 
  In Zimbabwe, the negotiations were affected by the desire of Britain and the Frontline States 
to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the armed liberation struggle. As said earlier, Joshua 
Nkomo and Robert Mugabe were basically forced into negotiations due to the threat from 
Kenneth Kuanda that if they failed to do so, that the Front Line States would withdraw their 
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support and subsequently end the liberation struggle (Reed, 1993: 51). It has to be kept in 
mind that Zimbabwe’s negotiated transition took place in a time when superpower rivalry in 
Southern Africa was still rife. In South Africa’s case, the end of the Cold War seemed to be a 
major catalyst for negotiations to take place. With the collapse of communism both Soviet 
support for the ANC and Western support for the South African state disappeared, 
consequently forcing the two parties to the negotiating table (Southall, 2006: 227).  
 
3. 5. Conclusion:  
 It is clear from the preceding comparison that Zimbabwe and South Africa in terms of their 
liberation struggle history share various similarities, but also reveal a plethora of differences. 
This comparison of the liberation struggle history is vital to our understanding of the post-
liberation dispensations, including the metamorphosis of the liberation movements into 
governing parties and the adoption of liberal democratic politics. In the following chapter, the 
respective political cultures of each movement that developed during the liberation struggles 
and evolved in the post-liberation eras will be investigated.  
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Chapter 4 
From Liberation Movements to Ruling Parties: 
Investigating the political cultures of ZANU-PF and the ANC 
 
 
4. 1. Introduction: 
  The struggles for liberation in Southern Africa have left indelible marks on the post-
liberation politics of the states involved. Even though the experiences of the different 
countries may vary, there seems to be agreement amongst scholars (Dorman, Melber, 
Southall) – as pointed out in Chapter 2 – that the armed struggles many liberation movements 
engaged in produced a certain political culture within these movements. This political culture, 
in turn, has affected the liberation movements’ metamorphosis into ruling political parties and 
their behavior as ruling parties.  
 
  Before we can comprehend the effect of liberation movement governance on democratic 
consolidation, we need to understand the internal political culture that drives these 
movements. Therefore, in this chapter, the political cultures of both ZANU-PF34 and the ANC 
will be discussed, specifically focusing on i) the organizational structures and hierarchy that 
have developed within each movement; ii) the ideological inputs that have guided their 
behavior; iii) their exposure to and use of violence; and iv) also hostility towards opposition. 
The purpose of this is firstly to investigate the political cultures of ZANU-PF and the ANC 
respectively and secondly to compare the two cases in order to account for similarities and 
differences. 
 
4. 2. The Logic of Liberation: The political cultures of ZANU-PF and the ANC: 
  Political culture – which is nurtured over an extended period of time – refers to people’s 
values, beliefs and orientation toward the political process and is vital to the development of 
regime legitimacy and stability (Mahler, 2003: 15). Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995: 19) 
 
34
 The Patriotic Front (PF) referred to the alliance between Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU and Robert 
Mugabe’s ZANU in the late 1970s and specifically during the Lancaster House Conference 
(Campbell, 2003: 22).  Even though ZANU and ZAPU’s alliance broke down and they did not contest 
the elections together, ZANU retained its title as ZANU-PF in the post-liberation era. 
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define political culture as the “beliefs and values concerning politics that prevail within both 
the elite and the mass” while Almond (in Mahler, 2003: 15), states that political culture 
consists of “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the 
situation in which political action takes place.” It is therefore clear that political culture has a 
crucial influence on the establishment and people’s acceptance of a particular political regime. 
 
  Therefore, it can be argued that the successful establishment and endurance of democracy 
hinges largely on people’s – especially the political elite’s – acceptance of democratic 
procedures and institutions as the most appropriate way of governing collective life (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996: 16). Or in other words, it depends on the development of a democratic political 
culture amongst the citizenry of a state, including the political elite. A democratic political 
culture consists of the following: “[a] belief in the legitimacy of democracy; tolerance for 
opposition parties…; a willingness to compromise with political opponents...; trust in the 
political environment, and cooperation, particularly among political competitors; moderation 
in positions and partisan identifications; civility of political discourse; and political efficacy 
and participation…” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995: 19).  
 
  However, as various scholars (Dorman, Melber, Southall) have pointed out, the political 
culture of liberation movements – which now form part of the political elite – seem to exhibit 
anti-democratic tendencies that have their origins in protracted armed liberation struggles. In 
fact, many liberation movements have found it difficult to establish a democratic political 
culture within their own ranks (Gumede, 2007: 12). Furthermore, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 
(1995: 19-20) argue that democratic success in developing countries can be traced not only to 
the growth and development of democratic values, but also to their origins in a country’s 
historical and cultural traditions. When looking at the history of both Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, it is clear that the experience of prolonged periods of authoritarian rule and drawn out 
armed struggles had a detrimental effect on the development of a democratic political culture 
– especially within the ranks of the respective liberation movements.  
 
  The experiences of state oppression and prolonged violence, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, have predisposed liberation movements to “a particular type of politics, self-
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conception and relationship with other organizations and the people or nation as a whole” 
(Suttner, 2004: 2). This has occurred because:  
 
“Prolonged warfare leads to the development of hierarchies, hardship and brutality 
have been experienced, and links with external supporters and arms dealers have 
been strengthened. These factors continue to influence the style of governance, 
institutional reforms and relations with civilian populations ‘post-liberation’” 
(Dorman, 2006: 1086). 
 
  Thus, the adoption of “rough survival strategies and techniques while fighting an oppressive 
regime” caused a highly militarized and authoritarian culture to take root and to be 
permanently nurtured (Melber, 2010). Roger Southall (2003: 31), in addition to this, argues 
that the logic of national liberation struggles – or the political culture of liberation movements 
– seems to be authoritarian in nature and reluctant to engage with democracy. Thus, rather 
than promoting democracy, it suppresses it.  
 
4.2.1 ZANU-PF: From Heroes of Liberation to Masters of Suppression: 
  Over the last thirty years, Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF went from being a popular liberation 
movement fighting Ian Smith’s minority regime to being Zimbabwe’s increasingly 
authoritarian ruling party, displaying complete disregard for democratic procedures and 
institutions. In accordance with this, William Gumede (2007: 12) states that ZANU-PF “has 
become the symbol of the descent of African liberation movements into brutal dictatorship” 
while Bratton and Masunungure (2008: 42) characterize the Zimbabwean regime as “a 
militarized form of electoral authoritarianism.”  
 
4.2.1.1 Organizational structure & hierarchy: 
  The Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) was established in 1963 after senior 
members from the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) broke away from the 
movement in protest against Joshua Nkomo’s leadership (Gibson, 1972: 174). ZANU 
immediately made its intentions clear when its then leader, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (in 
Gibson, 1972: 175), stated the following: 
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“African politics in Zimbabwe, as well as in European-ruled Africa, began as 
‘reformist politics’, but now we have entered the phase of ‘take-over’ politics, as it is 
impossible for the present white minority to rule Zimbabwe for the benefit of the 
voteless (sic) African majority. We have entered the period of political 
confrontation… We have a duty to ourselves and to unborn generations of Zimbabwe, 
and that duty is to free Zimbabwe.‘We are own liberators’.”  
 
ZANU was divided into two wings: a military and political wing that both operated within 
Rhodesia. The military wing (ZANLA) was responsible for waging the liberation war 
(Skagen, 2008: 55). It was organized along the lines of the Chinese and Vietnam guerilla 
armies and adopted Mao Zedong’s three stages of guerilla warfare35 as its main strategy 
(Campbell, 2003: 47; Skagen, 2008: 51). The political wing, on the other hand, was 
responsible for the socialization, politicization and mobilization of the masses within 
Rhodesia. Furthermore, at ZANU’s first conference in 1972, a Central Committee was 
selected to plan and execute a national revolutionary struggle, ultimately becoming the core 
leadership of the movement (Skagen, 2008: 51). During the struggle, the Central Committee 
was divided into an internal and external branch – the internal branch was responsible for 
spreading propaganda, for providing information and for preparing the population for 
insurgency (Skagen, 2008: 55). The external branch – which was present in not only 
neighboring countries, but also all across the world – was the main decision-making wing and 
was focused on bringing the world’s attention to events in Rhodesia. It is important to note 
that the leaders of the newfound movement had also been part of the elite in ZAPU; in other 
words, there was no substantial change in the type of leadership that headed ZANU. Thus, the 
leadership of ZANU was dominated by a nationalist petit bourgeoisie or a so-called ‘old 
guard’. When most of ZANU’s leadership was detained in 1964, the movement was forced to 
operate in exile, impacting the organization and functioning of the movement. 
 
 
35
 The three stages of guerrilla warfare included a strategic defensive stage, a strategic offensive stage 
and a mobile warfare stage (Skagen, 2008: 51). The ZANLA guerrillas operated in groups of four or 
five and after a brief training period in Mozambique, they entered the operational zones of the 
Rhodesian forces to engage the army (Campbell, 2003: 47). Key to this strategy was the mass support 
of the rural population. Once they (ZANLA fighters) were inside Zimbabwe, they made use of the 
village communities’ ideological, political, cultural and economic resources. 
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  Exile politics played an important role in the organizational hierarchy and the source of 
authority that developed within ZANU. Due to the Smith regime’s ban of ZANU (and ZAPU) 
in 1964, the movement relocated its headquarters outside Rhodesia and went on to become an 
underground domestic movement (Reed, 1993: 36). In addition to this, the top leaders of 
ZANU, including Sithole and Mugabe, were detained from 1964 onwards (Gibson, 1972: 
342); Mugabe, for instance, was imprisoned for eleven years (Meredith, 2002: 37). Due to 
these events, a split occurred in ZANU’s ranks between the reformist ‘old guard’ – 
specifically Reverend Sithole – and the young, radical guerrilla soldiers (Fogel, 1982: 343). 
There was a feeling among some of the rank and file members that the struggle was not 
moving at a rapid enough pace and complaints were also raised about so-called ‘bourgeoisie 
leaders’ (Fogel, 1982: 182). This clearly indicates that a gap existed between the top 
leadership of the movement and the experiences of rank and file members who were directly 
involved in the armed struggle. In fact, at one stage ZANLA basically operated independently 
from the political leadership, indicating how severe the chasm between the military and 
political wing of the movement had been (Campbell, 2003: 47).  
 
  The circumstances of prolonged warfare necessitated the emergence of “a strong leader who 
could combine both military and political attributes” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 107). ZANU 
found this leader in the form of Robert Mugabe who came to power in 1977 after Reverend 
Sithole resigned (Foley, 1982: 349). In his tenure as ZANU-PF’s leader, Mugabe has steadily 
tightened his grip on power, creating a situation within the party whereby he is nearly 
irreplaceable (Moore, 2006:  132). In accordance to this, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002: 109) 
makes the following observation: “…the glorification of nationalist leaders engineered a 
feeling of indispensability as well as irreplaceability (sic).” Mugabe has, for example, 
acquired the power to “assign posts in the Politburo, the Cabinet, and the 30 MPs he appoints 
after elections to that assembly” (Moore, 2006: 133). Furthermore, he has managed to stay in 
power by bringing people into his inner circle and expelling those who pose a threat to him or 
are no longer useful. The reasons for Mugabe’s prominence and hold on power are rooted in 
the liberation struggle. Firstly, due to Marxist-Leninist ideology, the importance of a 
movement’s leader was solidified (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 107). Secondly, there was a 
glorification of the party leader and the party itself during the liberation struggle; for example: 
“Pamberi ne ZANU, Pamberi na Robert Gabriel Mugabe!” (Forward with ZANU, Forward 
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with Robert Gabriel Mugabe) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 107). Lastly, it was also very difficult 
to criticize nationalist leaders (such as Mugabe) due to the culture of suspicion and fear and 
the siege mentality that had developed (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 108). This military mindset, 
thus, has not only affected the organization, but also the source of authority within the 
movement. 
 
  The party, according to Stiff (2000: 30), was and is still structured along the lines of Soviet 
and Chinese communist parties with a Politburo and Central Committee, highlighting the 
influence of communist-socialist ideologies. Power is centralized around a core leadership 
that is made up of the members of the Politburo, Central Committee and (after the 1980 
elections) its parliamentary caucus (Sithole & Sithole & Makumbe, 1997: 123). Furthermore, 
this core leadership is relatively small, mainly due to the overlap of members from the top 
three structures of the party. Therefore, decision-making is left in the hands of an elect few. 
Since 1989, with the adoption of a new party constitution, Poltiburo members are no longer 
selected by the Central Committee, but are appointed by the party president, in this case 
Mugabe (Knight, 1991: 26). Furthermore, the 1989 party constitution also afforded the party 
president the power to control the appointments of the decision-making committees and this, 
according to Knight (1991: 26), caused veterans of the struggle to become entrenched in party 
posts while young leaders and popular grassroots-level figures have been left out. Mondli 
Makhanya (in Stiff, 2000: 30) states the following with regards to the power relations within 
the liberation movement: 
 
“A caste system of chefs (chiefs) – a nickname given to the exile leadership – and 
povos (people in the sense that they are peasants) – those who had never been exiled 
– became entrenched in the national psyche. The chefs were the wise liberators, and 
the povos owed them for their liberation and would not dare raise a voice against 
them”. 
 
 Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2002: 103), in accordance to the above-mentioned, states the following: 
“The guerrilla armies and nationalist parties were never democratically structured and did not 
operate in a democratic fashion. They were highly commandist (sic) and authoritarian.” Due 
to requirements (both military and politically) of the armed struggle, a culture of discipline, 
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covert operation and hierarchy inevitably developed (Southall, 2003: 36). Phimister (2008: 
212) also points out that, during the armed struggle, ZANU was hierarchical and authoritarian 
and it continued to be “militaristic, vertical, undemocratic, violent and oppressive” after 
Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. In addition to this, having been a militarized 
liberation movement, the ruling party has also failed to demilitarize itself in the post-1980 era; 
both in practice and in attitude (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 111). This clearly indicates the lack 
of an internal democratic political culture.  
 
  From this, it becomes apparent that ZANU as a liberation movement operated with a clear 
hierarchy of command in which the ‘old guard’ enjoyed authority. It is also clear, due to the 
nature of the conflict and the influence of communist-socialist ideologies that an authoritarian 
and distinctly undemocratic political culture developed within the movement. This 
corresponds with Henning Melber’s (2009) assertion that the armed liberation struggles were 
not conducive for the development of a democratic political culture because the methods of 
resistance against repressive regimes were organized in strictly authoritarian and hierarchical 
lines. As Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF has continued to operate in an authoritarian 
manner under the leadership of Robert Mugabe who has ingrained himself as a lifelong leader 
of the party.  
 
4.2.1.2 Ideological inputs: 
  Various scholars (Gibson, 1972; Fogel, 1982; Reed, 1993) seem to agree that ZANU was 
more militant, violent and radical in its rhetoric than its rival nationalist movements. For 
example, it was ZANU who called for the preparation for a direct (military) confrontation 
with the white regime (Gibson, 1972: 175). An important influence in this regard was the 
combination of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought that infiltrated the convictions, strategies and 
methods of the liberation movement. By 1977, ZANU had officially committed itself to 
socialism, based on the principals of Marxism-Leninism and with the adoption of a new party 
constitution in 1984, the ruling ZANU-PF expressed its desire to create a socialist state in 
Zimbabwe based on Marxist-Leninist principals (Shaw, 1986: 374). This was largely due to 
ZANU’s partnership with China during the liberation struggle. According to Reed (1993: 41), 
ZANU’s ties with China had a significant impact on the ideology that it adopted. In addition 
to this, it has also been argued that it was ZANU’s objective to place “all means of production 
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and distribution...in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe” (Mwenge in Reed, 1993: 41). 
Furthermore, ZANU also now saw itself as the vanguard party which would guide the 
revolution and socialist transformation.  
 
  The impact of these ideas was most evident amongst the young guerrilla cadres fighting in 
the ZANLA ranks. Alexander and McGregor (2004: 80) argue that the guerrilla fighters’ 
commitment was political and that over time some of them went from being nationalists to 
being socialists. This is mainly due to the guerrillas’ military and socialist training (Alexander 
& McGregor, 2004: 81). The above-mentioned also corresponds with Foley’s (1993) 
discussion on the political education of guerrillas during the height of the liberation struggle. 
The themes of ZANLA political education for example included: the history of colonial 
oppression, the need for solidarity and sacrifice in the struggle, the history of ZANU and the 
theory of guerrilla war. There seemed to be at least some conception of key socialist notions 
such as class, class exploitation and capitalism (Foley, 1993). But, crucially, the focus was on 
a racial conception of exploitation and the resultant system which grew out of it. Thus, one 
can argue that the application of socialist ideology was more a means to an end rather than an 
end in itself. The reality was – as pointed out by a few scholars (Gibson, 1972; Fogel, 1982; 
Foley, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002) – that ZANU was a nationalist movement with a petit 
bourgeoisie nationalist leadership whose focus was on the capture of state power and not 
necessarily on the radical and socialist transformation of society. Nevertheless, socialist 
ideology and rhetoric did come to have an impact on the values and ideas and the internal 
organization of ZANU. This would have a profound impact on ZANU’s metamorphosis from 
a liberation movement to a political party in a liberal democratic setting. 
 
  Since the 1980s, according to Sithole and Makumbe (1997: 122), ZANU-PF sought to 
establish a one-party state and the socialist ideology (as discussed above) that the ruling party 
adopted, only confirmed this desire. Mugabe (quoted in Norman, 2008: 79) made this 
intention clear in 1984 when he made the following claim in an attempt to justify the 
establishment of a one-party state in Zimbabwe:  
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“The one-party state is more in keeping with the African traditions. It makes for 
greater unity for the people. It puts all opinions under one umbrella, whether these 
opinions are radical or reactionary.”  
 
This was the main objective all along – the creation of a one-party state where ZANU-PF 
would have total power and Mugabe would rule (Norman, 2008: 79). Furthermore, the desire 
to establish a one-party state is closely related to the conviction that ZANU-PF has earned the 
right to rule permanently. In fact, Mugabe (quoted in Shaw, 1986: 376) on one occasion stated 
that “as clear as day follows night… ZANU-PF will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no 
other party besides ours that will rule this country.” This conviction is closely related to the 
ideology of national liberation in which the ruling party’s credentials as the “moving force 
behind anti-colonial liberation” (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 43) has earned them the right 
to rule indefinitely. For liberation movements, like ZANU, the capture of state power marks – 
in their understanding – something similar to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘the end of history’ (1992) 
and following from this then is the belief that a liberation movement “should stay in power 
forever after succeeding in its anti-colonial struggle” (Melber, 2010). In accordance with the 
above-mentioned, Lene Christiansen (2009: 49) makes the following observation:  
 
“In the post-war consolidation of ZANU as the dominant legitimate political force in 
Zimbabwe, an imagery of the liberation war soldier-heroes came to hold a symbolic 
meaning, as the political elite claimed that participation in the liberation war was the 
only valid political currency.” 
 
  Thus, due to its credentials as one of the main liberation movement during the struggle, 
ZANU-PF has claimed the right to rule indefinitely and also used this as a justification for its 
attempts to establish a one-party state. 
 
  The above-mentioned ideological influences (particularly stemming from socialism) and 
objectives (the creation of a one-party state) – that have been reinforced by the principles of 
national liberation – only confirm the anti-democratic tendencies of ZANU-PF and the 
authoritarian political culture that has developed within the movement.  
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4.2.1.3 Exposure to and Use of Violence: 
  Armed liberation struggles, as pointed out previously, are characterized by the use of 
violence by both the states and the movements involved in these conflicts. The case has been 
no different in Zimbabwe. However, this cycle of violence has not ended with the conclusion 
of the armed liberation struggle, but has instead continued throughout the post-liberation era 
with ZANU-PF becoming the main perpetrator. 
 
  The armed struggle in Rhodesia, launched in the late 1960s, was met by violent repression 
from the Ian Smith regime – especially in the rural areas where the conflict was 
predominantly located. As the struggle intensified in the 1970s, executive carte blanche was 
given to all the spheres of the state, including the military, political and judicial areas (Maxey, 
1977: 65). Thus, the agents of these respective agencies were given indemnity against acts 
that would otherwise be classified as criminal, including murder. The rural population in 
particular paid a heavy price for the conflict between the Rhodesian government and the 
nationalists. The Rhodesian state for instance followed a policy of ‘collective punishment’ of 
the rural population in response to the insurgency (Yap, 2002: 21). This included life 
imprisonment or the death penalty for those who were engaged or assisting ‘terrorist 
activities’ or for those who ‘failed to report the presence of terrorists.’  
 
  However, the use of violence was not only confined to the Rhodesian state, but was also 
employed by the nationalists themselves. In fact, it was accepted as a “legitimate tool of the 
struggle” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 107). Lloyd Sachikonye (2002: 173) makes the following 
observation in relation to this: 
 
“Analyzes of post-independence political developments should not underestimate the 
role which violence and other forms of coercion played in colonial regime strategies 
to block independence, and in nationalist politics themselves. The use of detention, 
torture and killings was perpetuated by the colonial regime but nationalists also 
utilised violence and intimidation in mobilising and competing for supporters.” 
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ZANLA (ZANU’s military wing), due to its exposure to Chinese tactics and training and Mao 
Zedong’s ideas, resorted to violent tactics in order to mobilize support from the rural 
communities (Stiff, 2000: 22). Some of these tactics included the following: 
 
“On entering the villages, they (ZANLA soldiers) selected victims for execution, 
perhaps a headman, maybe a schoolteacher, often the wives or children of civil 
servants working in the towns. Their objective was to rid communities of their 
leadership and destroy the bourgeois (sic). Executions were conducted in an 
exemplary fashion. Villagers were burnt alive in their grass huts or used for bayonet 
practice. Those more fortunate were just shot…” (Stiff, 2000: 22). 
 
This was done to rid the communities of their leadership and annihilate the bourgeois. In 
other words, these rural communities and civilians were targeted in an effort to enforce 
compliance and support. The liberation struggle in all claimed over 30 000 lives while many 
were displaced, injured and traumatized (Sachikonye, 2002: 173). Therefore, when taking all 
of the above into account, it becomes clear that violence became embedded into the 
Zimbabwean political culture and this would have significant and long-term consequences for 
the post-liberation era. 
 
  The violence that was a characteristic of the liberation struggle did not cease with the 
attainment of independence in 1980 (Kössler, 2010: 35). In fact, just as violence was a 
prominent feature of the minority regime before 1980, it became the defining feature of the 
ZANU-PF regime (Sachikonye, 2002: 173). According to Scarnecchia (2006: 236):  
 
“…the current political culture in Zimbabwe has melded the political weapons of 
previous white-minority governments with the divisive and violent African nationalist 
politics of the 1960s. As in the 1960s, the progressive and non-violent Zimbabwean 
voices of all races and ethnicities become the victims of this radical rhetoric of 
organic solidarity.” 
 
Power in Zimbabwe has been reinforced through coercion while the political elite “takes as 
articles of faith the assumptions that violence was effective in delivering independence and 
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that repression is the party’s most effective weapon for countering real and imagined threats” 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2008: 50). The ruling ZANU-PF is infused with a culture of 
intimidation, intolerance and violence derived from the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2002: 103). The post-independence period, as a result, has been marked by various instances 
of state-sponsored violence which have been accompanied by major human rights violations 
(Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 50). This has included the Matabeleland massacres of the 
1980s – referred to as Gukuruhundi36 – where the ZANU-PF regime attempted to crush 
ZAPU dissidence and opposition, eventually resulting in thousands of deaths as well as the 
torture, beating, rape and disappearance of countless villagers. The Matabeleland massacre 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The ‘land grabs’ or land expropriations of 
the early 2000s and Operation Murambatsvina37 in 2005 are further examples of the violent 
and oppressive nature of the ZANU-PF-regime (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 50). In 
addition to this, every election – including the independence elections – has been marred by 
systematic acts of violence whenever an opposition party challenged ZANU-PF (Auret, 2009: 
90; see Godwin, P. The Fear, 2010). From the outset it appeared that Robert Mugabe (and 
ZANU) embraced a militaristic conception of political authority; he stated the following in 
1976: “Our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote... shall have been a 
product of the gun. The gun, which provides the votes, should remain its security officer, its 
guarantor” (Mugabe quoted in Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 50). Violence, in other words, 
has simply been seen as another electoral tool in an attempt to retain power, regardless of the 
costs (Auret, 2009: 91). This violence has also manifested itself into various acts of 
oppression against opposition by the ZANU-PF-regime.  
 
4.2.1.4 Hostility towards opposition: 
  ZANU-PF’s response towards opposition, whether during the liberation struggle or during 
the post-1980 era, has throughout been one of intolerance and hostility. The ruling party’s 
intolerance of political opposition was conceived and developed during the liberation 
 
36 Gukurahundi is a Shona word that means “the first rains which wash away the chaff” (Auret, 2009: 
75) or the “storm that destroys everything” (Sithole, 1993: 37). It refers to the policy ZANU-PF 
adopted during the 1980s in order to get rid of the opposition political party, ZAPU. 
37
 Operation Murambatsvina or ‘Operation Drive out the Trash’ in May 2005 saw the eviction of 
millions of people from their homes in squatter camps in urban areas all around Zimbabwe. The 
government claimed that this formed part of their so-called ‘urban renewal’ program, but it was rather 
an act of vengeance against the urban population, the majority of whom supported the opposition 
MDC (Norman, 2008: 112). 
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struggle, mainly due to its rivalry with ZAPU (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 43). The two 
main liberation movements were bitter rivals and as a result operated separately from and 
sometimes against each other. This rivalry was born out of ZANU’s split from ZAPU in 1963 
and in the immediate aftermath of the split, intense fighting broke out between the youths of 
both movements, mainly in the townships of Salisbury (Kössler, 2010: 34). Violence between 
them raged on and, according to Yap (2002: 22), the two movements fought each other with a 
‘winner-takes-all’-mentality. The acrimonious relationship between the two organizations 
continued throughout the liberation struggle and even extended into the post-liberation era. It 
eventually culminated in the brutal Matabeleland massacres of the early 1980s. The violence 
that the ZANU-PF-regime has employed during its tenure is directly linked to its rivalry with 
ZAPU and complete disregard for opposing political parties or any dissenting voices for that 
matter 
 
  The armed liberation struggle and African nationalism that drove it, proved to be intolerant 
of opposition, pluralism and different opinions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 107). The split, 
rivalry and hostility between ZANU and ZAPU during the liberation struggle, for instance, 
were the results of the “different interpretations of the struggle and methods for achieving 
independence” and intolerance “was indicated by the use of rigid and annihilatory (sic) terms 
such as ‘patriots’ versus ‘puppets’, ‘freedom fighters’ versus ‘sell-outs’, as well as by 
officially sanctioned violence against those defined as ‘puppets’ and ‘sell-outs’” (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2002: 107). The liberation struggle was, furthermore, an environment of intense 
distrust and intolerance, marked by violence, leadership assassinations and various instances 
of deception (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 43). It also produced suspicion, fear and a siege 
mentality that made it difficult (and dangerous) to criticize the leaders of these nationalist 
liberation movements because those who did so were branded as traitors and enemies of the 
revolution (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 109). This mentality has also become a feature of the 
discourse and policies the ruling party has adopted since it claimed power in 1980.  
 
  The ruling party’s initial approach to any political opposition was taken together in the so-
called policy of Gukurahundi that in Shona means the ‘storm that destroys everything’ 
(Sithole, 1993: 37). In 1979 ZANU declared the year to be Gore re Gukuruhundi (“The Year 
of the Storm”), the revolutionary storm that, according to ZANU, would destroy Zimbabwe’s 
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three main enemies: the white settler regime of Ian Smith, the internal settlement ‘puppet’ 
parties and the capitalist system (Sithole, 1993: 37). Gukuruhundi was a policy of 
annihilation, a policy of destroying any opposition (black and white) that stood in ZANU’s 
way. This approach to opposition forces was carried over into the post-liberation period and 
eventually led to the violent suppression of ZAPU and the Matabeleland massacres of the 
early 1980s. Robert Mugabe and his ruling party also went on to further weaken opposition 
forces during the 1980s firstly by destroying their main political rival (ZAPU) and secondly 
by making various crucial constitutional changes that afforded the ruling party and president 
greater powers. In 1987, ZAPU was banned after talks between the two leaders (Nkomo and 
Mugabe) broke down and the party’s offices were raided and its officials were jailed (Blair, 
2002: 34). These events, coupled with the Matabeleland massacres, eventually led to the 
signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987, the dissolution of ZAPU and the merging of 
the two rival parties; in essence,  ZAPU was effectively ‘swallowed’ by the ruling party 
(Sithole, 1993: 37; Blair, 2002: 34). Furthermore, in the same year, Mugabe went on to 
unilaterally make a series of drastic constitutional reforms that changed the way Zimbabwe 
would be governed, afford him greater power and essentially destroy parliamentary 
opposition (Blair, 2002: 36). By the beginning of the 1990s, Zimbabwe was effectively a de 
facto one-party state. According to David Blair (2002: 36) “Mugabe did not go as far as to 
proscribe opposition parties and the one-party state was never enshrined in law. He did not 
need to. Instead, he just heaped unbearable pressure on his opponents and waited for them to 
surrender.” The ruling party continued throughout the 1990s to sabotage any opposition 
groups through violent suppression and the use of increasingly authoritarian legislation. 
 
  Most recently, after the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the 
government’s defeat in the 2000 constitutional referendum, ZANU-PF adopted a policy of 
official anti-colonialism that has been hailed as the Third Chimurenga (Christiansen, 2009: 
49). The 2000 referendum can be described as a watershed moment for Zimbabwe and 
ZANU-PF. During the referendum, voters had to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ regarding the Mugabe 
regime’s draft constitution and 54.7% voted ‘no’ (Norman, 2008: 83). The result of the 
referendum stunned Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF who expected nothing less than a 
victory (Matshazi, 2007: 123). However, the referendum was ignored by the Mugabe regime 
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and the constitution was amended in his favor (Norman, 2008: 84). In the period following the 
referendum, ZANU-PF went on to launch the Third Chimurenga against its opposition. 
 
  The Third Chimurenga discourse has been described by Robert Muponde (in Christiansen, 
2009: 49) as rigid and simplified in its dualism between the “binaries of insider/outsider, 
indigene/stranger, landed/landless, authentic/inauthentic, patriotic/sell-out.” In the post-
liberation period, the discourse of binary opposites has served to exclude political rivals of the 
ruling party – specifically opposition political parties (most recently the MDC) and other 
forms of opposition, including: civil society organizations, the independent media, human 
rights activists, non-indigenous blacks, the urban poor and whites (Christiansen, 2009: 49). 
Importantly, those who have been excluded by this Chimurenga ideology and discourse are 
being treated as threats to and enemies of the nation, while the government (or rather the 
ruling party) protects the nation from this perceived threat. For example, soon after 
independence in 1980, supporters of Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU were branded and portrayed 
as ‘dissidents’ in the official media while presidential aspirants, Edgar Tekere (in 1990) and 
Morgan Tsvangirai (in 2002), were harassed by the ruling party through assassination plots, 
treason trials or both (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 44). The ruling party, throughout its 
tenure, has also used the state apparatus in response to opposition – in the form of competing 
political parties or dissenting civil society groups (Knight, 1991: 29). In most recent years, the 
main opposition party, the MDC, has been relentlessly persecuted with its supporters and 
officials being subjected to violent suppression (Norman, 2008: 84). In fact according to 
Andrew Norman (2008: 86), in “an ideal world, Mugabe would like to see no opposition 
whatsoever, with everyone in the country voting for ZANU-PF.” Therefore, because ZANU-
PF claims to embody and represent the whole nation, anyone or anything that opposes the 
ruling party is seen as opposing the nation and therefore becomes the enemy (Southall, 2003: 
40).  
 
  It is clear from looking at the above-mentioned factors, that the political culture that has 
been fostered in ZANU-PF is inherently undemocratic and largely authoritarian. Furthermore, 
this political culture that was produced during the liberation struggle has manifested itself in 
the ruling party’s behavior since coming to power in 1980. It can be said, in conclusion, that 
repression and the violent nature of the liberation war ruled out: 
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“…open, democratic practice and tolerance and alternative views. It fostered what 
could be termed a ‘culture of authoritarianism’ that was certainly compatible with 
state socialist ideology of nationalist leaders at the time, as well as a ‘traditionalist’ 
discourse which stressed strong leadership and unquestioning loyalty,” (Alexander, 
McGregor & Ranger [2000] quoted in Sachikonye, 2002: 174).  
 
4.2.2 The ANC: From Freedom Fighters to the Ruling Elite: 
  The ANC has gone from being one of the main liberation movement in the struggle against 
Apartheid to becoming South Africa’s dominant ruling party, increasingly entrenching itself 
in the highest echelons of state power.  However, the political dominance that the ANC has 
enjoyed since coming to power in 1994 seems to have instilled a culture of entitlement and a 
sense of being irreplaceable as South Africa’s governing party. This perception and culture is 
rooted in the ANC’s history as a liberation movement and its experiences during a protracted 
armed struggle. 
 
  The intensity of the struggle against Apartheid, the brutal methods of repression the 
Apartheid regime employed and the violence that accompanied this struggle, formed internal 
dynamics and culture of the ANC.  
 
4.2.2.1 Organizational structure & hierarchy: 
  The ANC, established in 1912, has throughout its history represented a broad church of 
interests, ideologies and members ranging from “socially conservative and radical 
nationalists, democratic socialists, liberal constitutionalists and Marxists of various 
persuasions” (Lodge in Deegan, 2001: 28). In accordance to the above, both Suttner (2003) 
and de Jager (2009) point to the diverse character of the ANC, identifying the different 
factions that have developed within the organization throughout the liberation struggle.  
 
  The 1950s saw the advent of the liberation struggle with the ANC transforming from “the 
petition-orientated elitism of the previous three and one half decades into a mass political 
movement” (Alden, 1993: 63) who headed campaigns that enhanced democracy, non-
racialism and to a lesser extent, non-sexism (Suttner, 2003: 181). But with the banning of the 
ANC in 1960, the launch of the armed struggle in 1961 and the Rivonia trial in 1964, the 
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make-up of the movement changed significantly. According to de Jager (2009: 278), as a 
result of the Rivonia trial three distinct factions were produced that influenced the make-up of 
the organization, this included: leaders imprisoned on Robben Island, those in exile and the 
internal mass movement (represented by the UDF and COSATU).  
 
  Each of these factions differed from each other in terms of culture and organization. The 
Robben Islanders, for instance, were hierarchically organized and disciplined, but was still 
relatively democratic (de Jager, 2009: 278). Colloquially referred to as the ‘University’ and 
with an emphasis on theoretical and political learning, it was open to debate. But due to their 
prolonged incarceration, it can be concluded that the imprisoned leaders were out of touch 
with what was happening on the grassroots level. The internal faction – namely the UDF and 
its associates – mobilized a broad base of support against Apartheid and was open, inclusive 
and non-racial while its operations were relatively chaotic (de Jager, 2009: 278). Those in 
exile, in contrast, had a vastly different experience which in turn produced a particular – and 
lasting – culture within their ranks. 
 
  For approximately three decades, from 1960 to 1990, the ANC operated in exile, conducting 
the liberation struggle from outside South Africa’s borders (Ellis, 1991: 439). After the 
Rivionia trial in 1964, the ANC practically ceased to exist in South Africa because its key 
leaders were either imprisoned on Robben Island or forced into exile (de Jager, 2009: 278). 
The ANC leadership and most of the rank and file members were based abroad during this 
time while the movement was in danger of becoming extinct and forgotten in South Africa. 
According to Suttner (2003: 181) with the commencement of the armed struggle in 1961, 
security and military considerations came to dominate organizational practice. Thus the 
democratic culture that had been developing within the ANC in the 1950s, gave way to 
hierarchical organization, security and secrecy: 
 
“Underground work is a form of political activism requiring certain tools necessary 
to safeguard secrecy as well as calling for a personal commitment that will sustain 
people through adverse conditions. Most people who entered underground units knew 
they faced great dangers” (Suttner, 2009: 84). 
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It has to be kept in mind that those who were either in frontline camps or in Europe were 
constantly targeted by security forces (de Jager, 2009: 278). It is due to this that the 
organization within the exile faction became hierarchical with decision making being 
centralized and information being protected (de Jager, 2009: 278). Tom Lodge (in Deegan, 
2001: 77) states that ANC exiles “returned home with a well-developed set of authoritarian 
and bureaucratic reflexes”; this was very different from what was going on in South Africa. 
This exile faction and its hierarchical and militaristic political culture would have a profound 
impact on organization and functioning of the ANC as a political party in the post-1994 era 
(Butler, 2007: 313). 
 
  The ANC, at the time of its unbanning, was as “an exiled insurgent body” that possessed a 
“disciplined and autocratic character” with no leadership elections held between 1959 and 
1985 (Deegan, 2001: 77). After 1990, the ANC had to contend with the different factions that 
developed throughout the course of liberation struggle and attempted to forge them together. 
Butler (2007: 227) states that the ANC had three centers of power, competing for influence 
and dominance of the organization: the exiles in Lusaka under the leadership of Oliver 
Tambo; the Robben Islanders, including the likes of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and 
Govan Mbeki; and the underground ANC together with the ‘internal leadership’ which 
loosely referred to the leaders who were affiliated with the UDF. This factionalism had an 
impact on the character of the ANC during the negotiations, the transition to democracy and 
ultimately the post-liberation era.  
 
  After 1994, the ANC transitioned from being a party in exile to a mass movement with a 
large membership that combines the “hierarchy and democratic centralism of an exile 
movement with the mass organizational politics that once characterized domestic anti-
Apartheid struggle” (Butler, 2007: 38). Power within the ANC resides in the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) and the election of the NEC every five years is the most 
important election to take place at the national conference (Calland, 2006: 118). Furthermore, 
it is the ANC’s main constitutional structure and is therefore very important; within it the “full 
broad church of the ANC and its divergent ideological traditions… are all represented” 
(Calland, 2006: 122). Even though the NEC is the most important structure within the ruling 
party, its influence is constrained due to its size and political character and also because it 
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only meets four or five times a year. The National Working Committee (NWC), the main 
subcommittee of the NEC, is another important structure within the ANC and is crucial to 
understanding how power is distributed within the party (Calland, 2006: 123). The NWC is 
responsible for carrying out the instructions and decisions of the NEC; ensuring that all ANC 
structures (provinces, regions, branches and parliamentary caucus) carry out the decisions of 
the ANC; and, lastly, to submit reports to each of the NEC’s meetings (African National 
Congress, 2011). It is constituted as follows: the President (Jacob Zuma), Deputy President 
(Kgalema Motlanthe), National Chairperson (Baleka Mbete), Secretary General (Gwede 
Mantashe), Deputy Secretary General (Thandi Modise) and the Treasurer (Mathews Phosa). 
The NWC is made up out of members of the NEC and outside members that are selected by 
the NEC; the ANC Veterans’ League, Women’s League and the Youth League all appoint one 
representative to serve on the NWC (ANC, 2011).  
 
  Due to the divergent groups and interests mentioned above, it has been necessary for the 
movement, according to Butler (2007: 38), to combine central discipline and wider 
deliberation in order to retain political unity. During the 1990s, several attempts were made – 
especially under Thabo Mbeki’s leadership – to transform the ANC from an extra-
parliamentary liberation movement to an effective ruling party (Gumede, 2008: 35). This 
transformation process under Mbeki led to adoption of new values, goals and strategies that 
have had serious implications for the relationship between the ANC and its alliance partners, 
the way in which the party operates and the way in which power is distributed in the 
organization. One of the key results of this reformation process was the increasing 
centralization of power in the hands of the party leadership – especially during Mbeki’s reign.  
Peter Kagwanja (2008: xv) states the following in accordance with this:  
 
“Mbeki’s second term (2004-2008) saw an accelerated move to tighten the 
administrative nuts and bolts and to realign the party with the governmental 
structures. In June 2005 the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) produced a 
document titled Organizational Design of the ANC: A Case for Internal Renewal. The 
blueprint sought to restructure the ANC into a more streamlined and technocratic 
organization with its structures at regional and branch levels aligned to those of the 
government, thus the party grassroots under the firm control of the party 
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headquarters and the government... The Mbeki administration tightened the noose on 
the ANC to rein in ‘unruly’ regions and branches and to limit the scope for what it 
saw as creeping patronage and factionalism...” 
 
It is important to state here that this centralizing political culture or ‘logic’ has its roots in the 
exile structures of the ANC and this exile culture “tended to emphasize centralization of 
power, teamwork, secrecy and discipline, but also intellectualism” (Kagwanja, 2008: xx). 
Mbeki belonged to this faction and thus, when he came to power, the experiences of exile 
politics had a profound impact on his leadership style (Pottinger, 2008: 25). Furthermore, 
during his tenure, Mbeki “actively undermined opponents, even where they have been giving 
voice to widely felt aspirations” (Butler, 2000: 201) and was accused of having an 
authoritarian leadership style (Kagwanja, 2008: xxi). The politics of exile and the consequent 
centralization of power, according to critics and commentators, have been responsible for the 
declining internal democracy of the party (Kagwanja, 2008: xxi; Butler, 2005: 730). For 
instance, the elections for the National Executive Committee (NEC) – the body that runs the 
ANC in between conferences – and senior party officials have been tightly managed (Butler, 
2005: 732). Furthermore, internal debate (especially under Mbeki’s reign) has been 
circumscribed and intolerant of leadership criticism while a small group of leaders usually 
dominate the party. In fact, this centralizing tendency – that came to the forefront forcefully 
after 2004 – led to the immediate alienation of the ANC’s alliance partners and so-called 
‘inxiles’ or those who did not form part of the exile faction during the struggle (Kagwanja, 
2008: xxii). This alienation eventually led to a split in the party between the Mbeki- and 
Zuma-factions or what Brian Pottinger (2008: 16) refers to as ANC ‘Lite’ and ANC ‘Classic’. 
 
  As it was during the liberation struggle, the ANC remains an organization that 
accommodates various groups with divergent interests and ideological positions. It still 
operates within a system of alliances, the most important one being the tripartite alliance 
between the ruling party, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Butler, 2007: 38). However, contradicting interests 
and profound disagreements on important principals eventually led to a split in the tripartite 
alliance, culminating in the watershed succession race in December 2007 during the ANC’s 
52nd National Conference. Brian Pottinger (2008: 16) describes this rupture within the ANC 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
79 
as a split between ANC ‘Lite’ and ANC ‘Classic’. ANC ‘Lite’ refers to the smaller, elite 
group that was created by Mbeki’s system of aggressive affirmative action and patronage – a 
group who has very little in common with the poor. ANC ‘Classic’, on the other hand, refers 
to the faction who represents the heart of the movement – the poor and the disadvantaged. It is 
a broad front that includes “the privileged labour elite... the civic organizations, youth 
movement, traditionalists, some elements of the old internal resistance, foot soldiers of the 
United Democratic Front... certain business personalities, academics, communists, eternal 
fishers in troubled waters” who were united by their goal to deny Mbeki power (Pottinger, 
2008: 16). The succession struggle, therefore, was the result of drawn-out ideological battles 
within the ANC alliance that can be traced back to the organization’s turn to neo-liberalism 
during the Mandela presidency (1994-1999) (Kagwanja, 2008: xxii). According to Somadoda 
Fikeni (2008: 4), “the increased protests against service delivery... sharp differences between 
the ANC leadership and its alliance partners over perceived alienation from government 
decision-making, as well as contestation over ANC policy direction signified the growing 
divisions.” Therefore, when Thabo Mbeki dismissed Jacob Zuma from his position as deputy 
president of South Africa in 2005, it led to open rebellion and direct challenge against the 
ANC leadership, thereby setting up the stage for leadership change in Polokwane.  
 
  The Polokwane Conference has been described as the most significant political event since 
1994 for South Africa as a whole and for the ruling party in particular (Fikeni, 2008: 3).  
Furthermore, Polokwane has been described as the greatest test that South Africa’s democracy 
and the ANC have ever encountered. The Polokwane Conference, however, on reflection was 
more about the change of guard and a shift in leadership style rather than fundamental 
changes in central ANC policies (Fikeni, 2008: 31). Therefore, despite claims of the 
emergence of a ‘new’ ANC, the lack of changes in key ANC policies will certainly lead to 
greater intra-party discord and more internal ruptures within the already brittle alliance. Fikeni 
(2008: 31) sates the following with regards to this: 
 
“Although the ANC remains the most dominant party on the South African political 
landscape, the post-Polokwane era does not necessarily translate into ANC unity and 
consolidation, as the party is still saddled with factionalism, divisions and deep 
fractures.” 
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  These internal fractures have been prevalent in the aftermath of the 2009 elections with 
frequent public squabbles, vociferous disagreements and even personal attacks between the 
members of the tripartite alliance. Furthermore, the fragility of the ruling party’s unity is 
especially evident with the alleged plots that surfaced recently to replace Jacob Zuma as the 
ANC’s leader at the party’s next national conference in 2012 (Letsoalo & Mataboge, 2011: 2). 
This is reminiscent of the period before the 2007 Polokwane Conference, clearly indicating 
that the ANC as an organization (along with the tripartite alliance) – as Fikeni pointed out – is 
still grappling with great internal divisions and deep-seated fractures.  
 
4.2.2.2 Ideological inputs: 
  The ideological influences that have formed the ANC’s strategy and guided its actions seem 
to be broad and varied; ranging from Marxist-Leninism to liberalism, from socialism to 
nationalism. Furthermore, the broad base of ideological influences, seem to reflect the variety 
of interests the ANC represented. Mandela (in Ottaway, 1991: 68), in accordance with this, 
states the following:  
 
“Right from the start, up to now, the ANC is a coalition, if you want, of people of 
various political affiliations. Some will support free enterprise, others socialism. 
Some are conservative, others are liberal. We are united solely by our determination 
to oppose racial suppression. That is the only thing that unites us.” 
 
  According to de Jager (2009: 275), there have been three key ideological influences that 
have contributed to the make-up and complexity of the ANC. The first one came from 
Christian liberal democrats – including the founders of the ANC as well as Albert Luthuli and 
Oliver Tambo – who mainly included the emergent black petty bourgeoisie (de Jager, 2009: 
276; McKinley, 1997: 6). According to McKinley (1997: 6), the new leaders “did not bring 
with them only their particular class politics but also the strong influence of a Christian 
education and its corresponding social mores. Thus a perspective emerged that incorporated a 
politics of non-violence and of incorporation.” Rather, the leadership was committed to “a 
form of opposition which stressed responsible citizenship and disdained popular agitation” 
and bound to constitutionalism (Dubow, 2000: 7). The early ANC, furthermore, called for the 
inclusion of all South Africans, emphasizing the Christian and liberal notions of humanity and 
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justice. Therefore, the first tradition can be described as liberal democracy based on Christian 
principles.  
 
    A crucial ideological influence that follows the liberal notions of the early ANC and that 
still guides the ANC today has been the Freedom Charter38 of 1955. It was the statement of 
core principles of the multi-racial, multi-organizational Congress Alliance39 (ANC, 2011). 
The Charter was the ANC’s main ideological influence with its principles and objectives 
underpinning the ANC’s political ideas (Suttner, 2009: 155). According to Ellis and Sechaba 
(1992: 28), the Freedom Charter represented most of the distinct strands in the ANC and that 
it was not a policy document, but rather a declaration of principle. The result of this 
ambiguity meant that the strategic approach of the ANC Alliance was both a nationalist anti-
Apartheid umbrella for all social forces as well as a revolutionary struggle for radical socio-
economic transformation (McKinley, 1997: 22). Despite the denouncement of the document 
by the Apartheid government and the banning of the ANC in the early 1960s, the Freedom 
Charter continued to play an important role; throughout the struggle, it was circulated in the 
underground structures of the movement (ANC, 2011). Furthermore, South Africa’s new 
democratic constitution has included “in its text many of the demands called for by the 
Freedom Charter” (ANC, 2011).  
  
  From the 1920s onward, the ANC was influenced by two other traditions, namely: pan-
Africanism (sic) – ‘Africa for Africans’ – and communism. At first, these two groups placed 
themselves at the polar ends of the scale with the Africanists (sic) emphasizing African self-
sufficiency and superiority of the racial struggle (Dubow, 2000: 15). The communists on the 
other hand, emphasized non-racialism and class unity. Despite the differences, these two 
traditions would unite at vital periods throughout the liberation struggle to produce a 
 
38
 The Freedom Charter set out a list of demands that included the following: the people shall govern; 
all national groups shall have equal rights; the people shall share in the country’s wealth;  the land 
shall be shared among those who work it; all shall be equal before the law; all shall enjoy equal human 
rights; there shall be work and security; the doors of learning and culture shall be opened; there shall 
be houses, security and comfort; there shall be peace and friendship (Freedom Charter in McKinley, 
1997: 20). 
39
 The Congress Alliance was formed by the ANC, the Congress of Democrats, the South African 
Coloured Organization and the South African Indian Congress; the Alliance also included the newly 
formed South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the (mainly white) Federation of 
South African Women (FSAW) (McKinley, 1997: 19). 
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“composite form of indigenous radicalism embodied in the vague but often compelling idea of 
African socialism” (Dubow, 2000: 15). In the 1940s, the ideals of pan-Africanism became a 
prominent ideological influence on the ANC. The ANCYL played an important role in 
transforming the ANC into a vigorous, modern mass movement (Dubow, 2000: 27). It 
differed significantly from previous ANC discourse and polite requests gave away to demands 
with the ANCYL emphasizing more direct forms of mass struggle (Dubow, 2000: 23; 
McKinley, 1997: 15). The ANC at this time was dominated by the ANCYL who espoused 
philosophies that were more militant, radical and racially exclusive than those of the previous 
generations (de Jager, 2009: 277). However, the most significant influence on the ANC 
probably came from the communists. 
 
  In 1921 the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was formed and in 1928 a 
relationship between them and the ANC was cemented (Jeffery, 2009: 2; Dubow, 2000: 13). 
According to Jeffery (2009: 2), the CPSA was instructed by its affiliates in the Soviet Union 
to pay specific attention to the ANC and “transform it into ‘a fighting nationalist 
revolutionary organization’.” By the 1960s, the SACP – the banned successor of the CPSA – 
became a major influence on the ideology that the ANC espoused (de Jager, 2009: 277). It 
was, as said earlier, largely responsible for the ANC’s shift from non-violence to the adoption 
of an armed struggle (Jeffery, 2009: 4). The SACP, in addition to the above-mentioned, 
provided the ANC with “organizational discipline, revolutionary theory and ideological 
conviction” (Dubow, 2000: 77). It also provided the ANC with “authoritarian ‘democratic-
centralist’ practices and attitudes” (Dubow, 2000: 77). Furthermore, the ANC-SACP alliance 
was based on the so-called two-stage theory of revolution: first democracy, then socialism (de 
Jager, 2009: 278). This theory is embodied in the National Democratic Revolution, the project 
the ANC has adopted to transform the state and society as a whole (de Jager, 2009: 279). 
 
  The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) was developed in the 1960s by communist 
intellectuals in an attempt to try and conceptualize the relationship between the overarching 
aim of international socialism and the immediate task of national liberation (Butler, 2007: 39). 
It was adopted during the 1969 Morogoro Conference and is seen as the heart of the ANC’s 
Strategy and Tactics document (Butler, 2005: 725). The NDR’s central objective is “the 
creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society” (African National 
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Congress, 1997); in other words the transformation of the state and the South African society 
as a whole. This transformation entails the rapid achievement of ‘demographic representivity’ 
(sic) in all the important institutions of the economy, society and state (Southall, 2008). 
Therefore, transformation is conceptualized in terms of race – all institutions within society, 
private or public, has to reflect the racial composition of the South African society as a whole 
(de Jager, 2009: 282). The ANC’s role in this project of transformation is crucial.  
 
  The ANC places itself at the helm of this project to transform South African society; in fact, 
it perceives itself to be leader of South African society and the embodiment of the national 
will (de Jager, 2009: 279). During its 50th National Congress in 1997, the following was 
stated: 
 
“The ANC is a vanguard for all the motive forces of the NDR, the leader of the broad 
movement for transformation. Its leadership has not been decreed, but earned in the 
crucible struggle and battles for social transformation,” (ANC, 1997). 
 
Raymond Suttner, according to Melber (2009: 453), argues that the ANC’s ideology and 
rhetoric does not make a distinction between the liberation movement and the people; in other 
words, the liberation movement is ‘the people’. This corresponds with the fact that liberation 
movements in general have seen themselves as the embodiment of the nation itself (Gumede, 
2007: 13). Furthermore, liberation movements’ claim to legitimate rule comes from their 
emergence from the liberation process as the representatives acting on behalf of ‘the people’ 
(Melber, 2009: 453). This is clearly reflected in the ANC’s perception of itself: 
 
“...the ANC considers itself to be a movement, the leader in the attainment of social 
transformation and the only leader of the people. Its claims of position and power fit 
within Leninist vanguardism. This is where the party provides ideological leadership 
for the masses, aimed at the attainment of their revolutionary destiny,” (de Jager, 
2006: 78). 
 
Therefore, the transformation of the state requires that the ANC seize and extend its power 
over all levers of power, including the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence 
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structures, the judiciary, the media, parastatals and agencies such as regulatory bodies and the 
central bank (Southall, 2008). In other words the NDR and this project of transforming the 
state and society, urges the ruling party to control the state. Furthermore, it also includes the 
penetration of the economy, civil society and society as a whole as well (de Jager, 2009: 284). 
One of the ways the ANC plans to achieve this is through their so-called Cadre Development 
and Deployment Strategy (de Jager, 2009: 282). This refers to the appointment or assignment 
of those loyal to the ruling party to areas of key influence, including: business, non-
governmental organizations, parliament, scientific bodies, sporting associations, state 
institutions (that are supposed to be independent), et cetera (Pottinger, 2008: 37). In the 
ANC’s 2007 Strategy and Tactics Document, the party reiterated this intention: 
 
“In order for it to exercise its vanguard role, the ANC puts a high premium on the 
involvement of its cadres in all centres of power. This includes the presence of ANC 
members and supporters in state institutions. It includes activism in the mass terrain 
of which structures of civil society are part. It includes the involvement of cadres in 
the intellectual and ideological terrain to help shape the value systems of society. 
This requires a cadre policy that encourages creativity in thought and in practice and 
eschews rigid dogma. In this regard, the ANC has a responsibility to promote 
progressive traditions within the intellectual community, including institutions such 
as universities and the media. Playing a vanguard role also means the presence of 
members and supporters of the ANC in business, the better to reshape production 
relations in line with the outlook of a national democratic society,” (African National 
Congress, 2007). 
 
 This process, however, is fundamentally undemocratic because the ANC is determined to 
control all levers of power – even if it entails the encroachment of the Constitution (de Jager, 
2009: 283). In 2008, then state president Mbeki made the following statement to an ANC 
Lekgotla (a meeting):  
 
“Everybody in this room is ANC and all deployed in government by us are ANC. The 
mandate is not government’s mandate, but that of the ANC. We have a common 
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responsibility to ensure that the ANC continues to enjoy the support and respect that 
it has enjoyed in the past,” (Mbeki quoted in de Jager, 2009: 283). 
 
In other words, when Mbeki spoke of the state, he referred to the ANC and when he spoke of 
the government, he meant the ANC (Pottinger, 2008: 38). Thus the accountability and loyalty 
of (key) state institutions is firstly to the ruling party while the ANC has quite unashamedly 
committed itself to extending its power over these institutions that are responsible for holding 
the government accountable (de Jager, 2009: 283; Schlemmer, 2005: 9). The ANC, as a result 
of this ideological influence, has therefore set its sights on establishing control over the state 
in particular and also penetrating both political and civil society through this overarching 
transformation project (de Jager, 2009: 283). Other important influences on the political 
culture of the ANC have been the violent nature of the Apartheid regime, the movement’s 
exposure to violence and its own use of violent means during the liberation struggle.  
 
4.2.2.3 Exposure to and use of violence 
  The Apartheid regime was a system characterized by subjugation, immense state repression 
and perpetual violence. Furthermore, the resistance to it – in the form of an armed liberation 
struggle – was also violent in nature, especially during its height in the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s. Thus, this violence not only permeated throughout South African 
society, but also penetrated the methods, strategies and values of the African National 
Congress. 
 
  From the start, the Apartheid government’s response to resistance was violent and the 
history of the struggle against Apartheid shows shifts in the forms and patterns of gross 
human rights violations that were perpetrated (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report Volume Two, 1998: 8). However, it was in the aftermath of the events of 1960 
(Sharpeville) and the adoption of an armed struggle by the ANC that the state’s response to 
resistance intensified significantly; it went on to employ the full force of its security 
legislation which included the detention, abuse and torture of political activists. According to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1998: 165), the Apartheid government’s security 
forces used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress resistance and thwart the armed 
actions of the state’s opponents. The overt methods included the banishment of political 
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activists, detention without trial, public order policing and judicial executions. The covert or 
clandestine methods that were employed included extra-judicial killings, support for proxy 
forces and also torture (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 165).  
 
  Furthermore, the period between 1960 and 1994 saw the extensive and systematic use of 
detention without trial (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 187). During the incarceration period, it has 
been reported that torture was systematically used by the Security Branch not just as a means 
to gather or obtain information, but also to terrorize activists and detainees. In addition to 
extended periods of detention and the use of torture, the security forces were convinced as the 
struggle intensified that it no longer could rely on “the due process of the law and that it was 
preferable to kill people extra-judicially” (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 220). These extra-judicial 
killings usually targeted high-profile activists “whose detention in terms of security legislation 
would give momentum to the liberation struggle” (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 220). The state 
also conducted targeted killings in order to permanently remove those who were perceived to 
be a threat from society; the targets of these attacks were once again high-profile political 
figures (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 222). The Truth Commission ultimately found that the 
Apartheid state and its security forces committed the principal amount of human rights 
violations, especially from the late 1970s onwards (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
South Africa Report Volume Five, 1998: 212). The South African state, however, was not the 
only party that used violence against its opponents.  
 
  The ANC officially launched an armed liberation struggle against the Apartheid regime in 
November 1961 with the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (‘Spear of the Nation’ or MK) 
(Jeffery, 2009: xxxi). The ANC’s decision to do so was based on the argument that they had 
no other choice but to wage war against the Apartheid state: “…it is the oppressor who 
defines the nature of the struggle; in the end, we would have no alternative but to resort to an 
armed struggle” (Mandela, 1994: 226). This struggle was seen to be legitimate and just by the 
ANC and its supporters (ANC, 1996: 12). In fact, the ANC (1996: 6) made the following 
statement with regards to this: “…it would be morally wrong and legally incorrect to equate 
Apartheid with the resistance against it. While the latter was rooted in principles of human 
dignity and human rights, the former was an affront to humanity itself.” In addition to this, the 
armed struggle was also declared legitimate by the TRC, but the Commission found that the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
87 
ANC and its organs did commit gross violations of human rights throughout its struggle 
against the Apartheid state (TRC Volume Five, 1998: 239). In other words, the ANC was 
justified due the reasons for an armed struggle, but they were deemed ‘unjust in war’ or 
because of their conduct during the struggle. 
 
  By the mid-1970s, the ANC was virtually forgotten inside South Africa while Umkhonto’s 
armed struggle was failing, but the Soweto revolt on 16th June 1976 revitalized the liberation 
movement and pushed thousands of youths into MK’s ranks in exile (Jeffery, 2009: xxxiii). 
The ANC, buoyed by the developments of 1976, went on to launch a ‘people’s war’ based on 
the strategies it adopted from Vietnam in 1978. A “people’s war” entailed both political and 
military struggle and in fact entailed a ‘program of violence’. With this, the ANC did not seek 
to defeat the South African security forces, but rather to “generate a level of unrest, social 
turmoil, and economic malaise that in time would put enormous pressure on its adversaries to 
sue for peace” (Jeffery, 2009: xxxiv). The adoption of a people’s war and the state’s response 
to it, led to an unprecedented period of violence; especially from 1984 onwards when 
intimidation and political killings rapidly accelerated. The goal was to make South Africa 
‘ungovernable’ (Jeffery, 2009: 67). The ANC, in an effort to garner the allegiance of the 
township inhabitants, used a considerable amount of armed violence which the UDF at the 
time condoned (Eidelberg, 1999: 58). According to Deegan (2001: 60) vigilante groups 
operated freely during this period, adopting a practice known as ‘necklacing’ where people 
were burned alive by placing tires filled with gasoline around their necks. The victims of 
these attacks included alleged police informers (referred to as impimpis), political opponents, 
local councilors and anyone who stood in the way of militants (Welsh, 2009: 288). Winnie 
Mandela (quoted in Welsh, 2009: 288) made the following (controversial) statement with 
regards to this practice in 1986: 
 
“We have no guns – we have only stones, boxes of matches and petrol. Together, 
hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our necklaces we shall liberate this 
country.” 
 
The ANC, however, claim that these violent methods were never the policy of the liberation 
movement or the UDF/MDM (African National Congress, 1996: 12). The ANC claims that it 
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was impossible for either the ANC or the UDF to exercise control over the manner in which 
people chose to fight against Apartheid – in other words, it denied responsibility for these 
violent practices (ANC, 1996: 77). The TRC, though, still found the ANC both morally and 
politically responsible for the gross human rights violations of their supporters during the 
turbulent 1980s (TRC Volume Five, 1998: 241). The Commission held the liberation 
movement accountable for creating an environment in which their supporters believed that 
their violent actions to be legitimate and in accordance with the so-called ‘people’s war’. 
Furthermore, the Commission found the ANC responsible for various gross human rights 
violations after its unbanning in the period between 1990 and 1994 (TRC Volume Five, 1998: 
242). This included the attacks, assaults and killings of various political opponents and also 
the creation and arming of self-defense units (SDUs) that contributed to the spiral of violence 
in South Africa during this era. In the period after the ANC’s unbanning, political violence 
was at its most intense and approximately 15 000 people died as a result of this violence 
(Jeffery, 2009: xxxiv). Furthermore, it has been found that in the period between 1984 (when 
the people’s war was launched) and 1994 (when the first democratic elections were held), 
20 500 were killed in the political violence that swept South Africa (Jeffery, 2009: xxxxv). 
The ‘people’s war’ and the methods employed during it were characterized by unprecedented 
levels of violence; violence that the ANC, according to Jeffery (2009: 500) played a large role 
in fomenting. 
 
  Violence, however, was not just reserved as a tool against the Apartheid regime, but it was 
also utilized by the ANC to ensure order amongst its own ranks – especially amongst 
members of its military wing. There have been at least four commissions (including the TRC) 
that found evidence of gross human rights violations (including torture, executions and other 
inhumane treatment) perpetrated by the ANC in exile (Welsh, 2009: 272). These human rights 
violations were mainly committed against suspected spies and those who revolted against 
their MK-leadership, particularly in 1984 in the Angolan camps (Welsh, 2009: 273; Bopela & 
Luthuli, 2005: 175). It was in the context of the so-called ‘spy scare’ of 1981 in the ANC –  
that led to the creation of an atmosphere of paranoia about infiltration by spies – that many 
members of the ANC were detained and tortured (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 349). It was 
especially the ANC’s security apparatus, Mbokodo (‘crushing boulder’), in the camps as well 
as the MK commissars (mostly from the SACP) who developed a reputation of being 
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particularly brutal. Mbokodo, primarily tasked with finding and ridding the camps of spies, 
became notorious for their violent behavior and methods – it possessed virtually unlimited 
power in the camps (Bopela & Luthuli, 2005: 174). In fact, it has been described as “an ‘army 
within an army’ with unlimited powers and immune from punishment” (Bopela & Luthuli, 
199: 176). Bopela and Luthuli (1999: 177) make the following statement with regards to the 
abuses and brutality of the ANC in exile: 
 
“Who gave orders for people to be tortured, maimed or killed? Where did they get 
this awesome authority from? People fled South Africa to fight for freedom from 
oppression, yet ended up being oppressed by their own. To this day, the ANC – and 
that includes all of us who belong to this great organization – still have blood of 
innocents on our hands.” 
 
  The repression of the Apartheid state coupled with the intense resistance to it, led to the 
acceptance and use of violent means by the ANC during the struggle. Furthermore, it seems 
that the violence that engulfed the South African society (especially during the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s) also seeped into the values, methods and strategies of the liberation 
movement. The experiences during the liberation struggle also contributed to an intolerance of 
opposition – whether in the form of the Apartheid government, rival political movements or 
internal dissidents. This intolerance of opposition has also been prevalent in the ANC’s 
rhetoric in the post-Apartheid era, once again revealing the impact of the ruling party’s 
experiences as a liberation movement. 
 
4.2.2.4 Hostility towards opposition 
  Liberation movements, as said earlier in this chapter, perceive and claim themselves to be 
the only legitimate and authentic representation of ‘the people’ or the nation as a whole 
(Suttner, 2004: 6). As a result of this, pluralism and any form of opposition are not viewed 
favorably by liberation movements. The ANC is not excluded from this tendency. 
 
  The political violence that engulfed South Africa in the late 1980s and the early 1990s is a 
testament to the political intolerance that existed during that time – especially between the 
ANC and rival political movements like the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Violent conflict 
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broke out between the IFP and the UDF (the close internal associate of the ANC) in Natal in 
the 1980s and these violent confrontations escalated over the next decade (TRC Volume Two, 
1998: 340). The ANC at the time encouraged its followers and supporters to view the IFP as 
‘the enemy’ and also declared that Inkatha members were legitimate targets (TRC Volume 
Two, 1998: 341). Furthermore, the ANC has been deemed responsible for various attacks, 
assaults and killings of political opponents between 1990 and 1994, including members of the 
IFP, PAC, AZAPO and the SAP (TRC Volume Five, 1998: 243). The relations between the 
ANC and the IFP revealed an important trait of the ANC as a liberation movement – its 
intolerance of competition and its determination to “crush all political rivals” (Ottaway, 1991: 
77) 
 
  This intolerance of rival political parties and other forms of opposition has also reared its 
head in the ANC’s rhetoric and attitude in the post-1994 era. Due to the ANC’s electoral 
dominance the ruling party – as said before – has come to view itself as synonymous with ‘the 
people’ and also that democracy is indistinguishable from ANC rule (Brooks, 2004: 9). This 
has had a profound effect on the way the ruling perceives its political opposition and also the 
nature of relationship between them. In general the ANC has labeled rival political parties – 
such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) – as “forces opposed to transformation” while the 
ANC, as pointed out earlier, views itself to be the leader of this transformation process (de 
Jager, 2006: 77). The ruling party steadfastly believes that the struggle is far from over and on 
multiple occasions has tried to “bully its opponents from the high moral ground of its claimed 
mandate on behalf of the ‘masses’ and the ‘people’” (Schlemmer, 2005: 9). Thus, opposition 
parties are viewed as the ‘enemies’ of this transformation project and then consequently also 
the ‘enemies’ of the will of the ‘people’ which the ruling party represents (Brooks, 2004: 15). 
This attitude has also been clearly displayed in the ANC’s 2011 local elections campaign 
where President Jacob Zuma has stated for instance that a vote for opposition parties is a vote 
for ‘hell’ while voting for the ANC is a vote for ‘heaven’ (Zuma: a vote for opposition is a 
vote for ‘hell’, 2011). In 2008 during a rally in Khayelitsha, Zuma (quoted in Mkhwanazi, 
2008) made the following statement while addressing supporters: 
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"We shall build this organization. Even God expects us to rule this country because 
we are the only organization which was blessed by pastors when it was formed. It is 
even blessed in Heaven. That is why we will rule until Jesus comes back…” 
 
Julius Malema, the leader of the ANC Youth League, has launched various personal attacks 
on the Democratic Alliance’s leader, Helen Zille, referring to the opposition leader as a ‘racist 
little girl’ and a ‘cockroach’ (Malema: Zille a ‘racist little girl’, 2009; Malema takes aim at 
‘cockroach’ Zille, 2010). These verbal attacks and the ANC’s reluctance to take action against 
Malema, illustrates the ruling party’s hostility towards opposition. This stark dichotomy that 
the ruling party has created between itself and rival parties reveals the ANC’s inherent 
intolerance of political opposition. This intolerance, however, is not only reserved for 
opposition parties, but also for civil society actors – in particular the media – that have, on 
various occasions, taken a critical stance towards the government and ruling party. 
 
  In recent years, the media in particular has become the central focus of the ANC. The ruling 
party has adopted an accusatory tone in relation to the media, claiming that “some fractions of 
the media continue to adopt an anti-transformation, anti-ANC stance” (ANC quoted in de 
Jager, 2009: 281). The ANC’s distrust of media institutions, has led to the vociferous support 
for the highly controversial Protection of Information Bill40 and a media tribunal. Blade 
Nzimande (SACP secretary general and current minister of higher education) for instance 
made the following statement: “We have a huge liberal offensive against our democracy... 
The print media is the biggest perpetrator of this liberal thinking” (Nzimande warns of ‘huge 
liberal offensive’, 2010). This type of view is held by many within the ANC (including Jacob 
Zuma). The ruling party insists that media should rather contribute to the transformation of 
society and the NDR rather than acting as a check on government power (de Jager, 2009: 
281). The ANC, as mentioned earlier, has placed itself at the helm of the project of 
transforming South Africa and it “views and portrays the strategies of the opposition, whether 
it be a political party or civil society organization that is critical of the NDR or its tactics, as 
 
40
 This refers to the controversial bill put forward by the ANC-led government that seeks to “provide 
protection of certain information from destruction, loss or unlawful disclosure; to regulate the manner 
in which information may be protected; to repeal the Protection of Information Act, 1982; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith” (Protection of Information Bill, 2010). The proposed bill has 
been severely criticised by opposition parties, the media and various civil society actors with claims 
that it threatens government transparency and accountability (Sole, 2010). 
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being anti-transformation and thus illegitimate” (de Jager, 2009: 281). The intolerance of 
opposition, however, does not only extend to external opposition, but also internal opposition 
within the ANC’s own ranks. 
 
  It has been argued that the politics of exile has led to the decline of the ruling party’s internal 
democracy (Butler, 2005: 730). Furthermore, Marina Ottaway (1991: 63) argues that an 
organization that was forced to operate in an inhospitable environment for close to seventy 
years, including thirty years in exile and clandestinity, would not be democratically inclined. 
This also seems to be the case with the ANC. The tendency to centralization and the stifling 
of internal opposition within the ANC’s ranks in recent years indicate “the somewhat Stalinist 
party school education from the exiles… replicated in the guerrilla camps” (Jeremy Cronin 
quoted in Butler, 2005: 730). As mentioned before, internal debate and criticism were 
repressed during Mbeki’s reign while the leadership of the ANC – during this time – launched 
attacks against internal opposition in the form of the ultra-leftists (Butler, 2005: 732). In April 
2001 for instance, Mbeki-loyalist and then minister of safety and security, Steve Tshwete 
made the spectacular public claim that a trio of old ANC stalwarts – Cryril Ramaphosa, 
Mathews Phosa and Tokyo Sexwale – were planning to get rid of Mbeki and that he was in 
personal danger because of it (Pottinger, 2008: 31). Since then, there have been various other 
alleged plots and most recently there have been claims of a plot to replace Jacob Zuma as 
ANC leader in 2012 (Dawes, 2011: 2; Letsoalo & Mataboge, 2011: 2). Whether these claims 
are legitimate or merely being employed to discredit potential competitors is not yet clear. 
The ANC, it seems, in the post-1994 has been intolerant of internal dissent, competition and 
opposition – especially when it was directed against the ruling party’s core leadership. 
 
  Intolerance of opposition – external or internal – seems to be a characteristic that is typical to 
liberation movements; the ANC is no different. The harshness of the liberation struggle and 
the experiences of oppression greatly affected the political culture that was forged within the 
African National Congress. The organizational structure the movement took on, the factions 
that were created by the realities of the struggle and the ideological inputs that have guided its 
actions are still evident in the post-liberation ANC. Furthermore, the exposure to and use of 
violence during the liberation struggle have also contributed to the molding of the modern 
ANC while intolerance of opposition has manifested itself in the approach, conduct and views 
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of the ruling party in the post-liberation era. In the last part of this chapter, a comparison 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa will be provided in order to highlight the similarities 
and account for the differences. 
 
4.3 Comparison: ZANU-PF & the ANC: 
   The political cultures of liberation movements seem to exhibit anti-democratic tendencies 
that have their origins in protracted armed liberation struggles and a context of state-led 
suppression. In fact, many liberation movements have subsequently found it difficult to 
establish a democratic political culture within their own ranks (Gumede, 2007: 12). ZANU-PF 
and the ANC are not excluded from these tendencies. However, even though liberation 
movements display tendencies that endanger democracy, Suttner (2004: 4) challenges the 
assertion that liberation movements have an inherent and inevitable tendency towards 
authoritarianism. He points out that there is considerable variation under the label ‘liberation 
movement’ and that a democratic component has also been present within liberation 
movements by stating the following:  
 
“Most NLMs (National Liberation Movements) comprise a variety of tendencies and 
cannot be assumed to simply succumb to an authoritarian logic. They are more likely 
to struggle over the organization’s direction as well as the relationship that the 
organization, prior to and after attaining power, has with other organizations outside 
its camp” (Suttner, 2004: 5). 
 
  Therefore, when discussing and comparing different liberation movements – like ZANU-PF 
and the ANC – it should be kept in mind that, even though there are significant similarities, 
there are considerable differences between the movements. Thus when looking at and 
investigating the political cultures of ZANU-PF and the ANC, this variation must be kept in 
mind.  
 
  The two liberation movements share a few similarities, but also differ considerably in terms 
of the factors that have been discussed. In terms of organizational structure and hierarchy, the 
two organizations differ noticeably. Firstly, the ANC in comparison to ZANU-PF seems to be 
a more eclectic and broad-based movement due to the various interests and ideologies it has 
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traditionally accommodated and represented (Deegan, 2001: 28). In other words, ZANU-PF 
does not have the internal diversity that the ANC possesses. Secondly, the two movements 
differ considerably in terms of leadership. Since 1977, there has been no leadership change in 
ZANU – Robert Mugabe has ingrained himself as the party’s lifelong leader. The ANC, in 
contrast, has had various different leaders and centers of power during the liberation struggle 
and also in the post-1994 era. The ANC’s leaders of the 1950s and 1960s have retired by 
choice, in contrast with Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF and Namibia’s SWAPO who are still being 
led by their founding leaders (Gottschalk & Maphai, 2003: 61). In the post-1994, the ANC 
has had regular changes in its leadership – from Mandela to Mbeki and from Mbeki to Zuma. 
This, however, does not mean that the changes have occurred without any internal conflict or 
hostility, but it does mean that the ANC as an organization at least seems to accept a change 
in leadership. ZANU-PF, on the other hand, has continued to operate in an authoritarian 
manner under the leadership of Robert Mugabe.  
 
  In terms of ideological inputs, the two movements share a few differences and similarities. 
In terms of similarities, both movements have been greatly influenced by 
Marxism/Leninism/Maoism. ZANU-PF, for instance, has greatly been influenced by Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist thought, largely due to its association with China (Reed, 1993: 41). The ANC 
has also been greatly impacted by Marxist-Leninist ideology (due to its relationship with the 
SACP). Secondly, this ideological influence had significant impacts on the structural 
organization within both movements. In the ANC’s case, the influence of Marxist-Leninist 
thought led it to becoming hierarchically organized with a tendency to tight control and the 
centralization of decision making (de Jager, 2009: 278). Correspondingly, ZANU revealed the 
communist influence in its organization – it was structured along the lines of the Chinese 
communist party with a Politburo and Central Committee (Stiff, 2000: 30) and clearly also 
lacking an internal democratic political culture. Thirdly, there seems to be similarities in 
ZANU-PF’s desire to create a one-party state in Zimbabwe and the ANC’s quest to extend its 
power into all spheres of South African society via the National Democratic Revolution 
(NDR) – both ruling parties are bent on retaining their power, even if it proves detrimental to 
democratic institutions. In terms of ideological discrepancies, the ANC has been influenced 
by a plethora of different ideological influences due to the broad-church character that it 
possesses while ZANU-PF, in contrast, has been impacted by predominantly two ideological 
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traditions: African nationalism and socialist ideology. Very importantly, the ANC possesses a 
liberal democratic heritage while ZANU-PF does not. 
 
  In terms of exposure to and use of violence, a similarity is that both movements were 
exposed to prolonged periods of violence and engaged in protracted armed struggles that were 
violent in nature. The ANC, however, was involved in a much longer armed struggle against 
the Apartheid state – from the early 1960s up until 1990 – while ZANU launched an armed 
struggle in the mid-1960s up until the end of the 1970s. A second similarity is that both 
movements were engaged in violent rivalry with other organizations during the respective 
liberation struggles. During the liberation struggle in Rhodesia, ZANU was engaged in violent 
competition with rival liberation movement, ZAPU. Violence between them raged on and the 
two movements fought each other with a ‘winner-takes-all’-mentality (Yap, 2002: 22). The 
acrimonious relationship between the two organizations continued throughout the liberation 
struggle and even extended into the post-liberation era. The ANC also had rivals in the form 
of other liberation movements – the PAC at the beginning of the 1960s and the IFP in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The ANC and its internal associates, the UDF, were engaged in 
violent confrontation with rival movement, the IFP, during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The 
ANC at the time encouraged its followers and supporters to view the IFP as ‘the enemy’ and 
also declared that Inkatha members were legitimate targets (TRC Volume Two, 1998: 341). 
Thirdly, both organizations used unconventional methods of warfare – ZANU employed Mao 
Zedong’s three stages of guerrilla warfare while the ANC in the 1980s specifically 
implemented a ‘people’s war’ based on the strategies used by Vietnamese guerrilla fighters. 
In addition to this, both movements often targeted civilians, in particular to enforce 
compliance and to ensure that people supported their cause. One of the main and most 
significant differences between the two movements is the fact that ZANU-PF has continued to 
use violent means to retain their hold on power, while the ANC has not. Just as violence was a 
prominent feature of the minority regime before 1980, it became the defining feature of the 
ZANU-PF regime (Sachikonye, 2002: 173). In South Africa, in contrast, the ANC has 
operated within the confines of the constitution and has not used violence against political 
opponents or other rivals. 
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  Lastly, both organizations display hostility towards opposition. As said earlier, liberation 
movements do not view pluralism and political competition favorably; the case is no different 
with ZANU-PF and the ANC. Both ruling parties seem to display the conviction that they are 
the sole, legitimate representatives of the ‘people’ and that all other political competition is 
illegitimate. However, even though both organizations seem to display intolerance for 
opposition in their attitude, rhetoric and behavior, ZANU-PF has purposefully (and violently) 
suppressed any form of opposition since it came to power in 1980. The ANC, on the other 
hand, seems to view opposition groups largely as annoyances and merely obstacles to their 
project of transformation. Despite this though, the ANC has tolerated opposing political 
parties and civil society groups, not infringing on the rights of these organizations to exist.  
 
  It is clear, from the above, that the two organizations share a few similarities, but that there 
are also important differences to take into account. Therefore, when comparing the two case 
studies in terms of democratic consolidation, these similarities and especially the vital 
differences between ZANU-PF and the ANC have to be taken into account. 
 
4.4 Conclusion: 
  A liberation movement’s political culture refers to a particular set of values, beliefs and 
worldviews that the movement holds. The context in which this particular political culture has 
developed, is vital to take into consideration. The liberation struggles were essentially armed 
conflicts and violent in nature, forcing liberation movements to adopt certain organizational 
structures and strategies appropriate for warfare.  This in turn, shaped their values, beliefs and 
worldviews. Various scholars (Dorman, Gumede, Melber, Southall) have pointed out, the 
political culture of liberation movements seem to exhibit anti-democratic tendencies that have 
their origins in protracted armed liberation struggles. 
 
  In this chapter, the political cultures of ZANU-PF and the ANC have been investigated by 
looking at various factors that have contributed to it, including: organizational structure and 
hierarchy, ideological inputs, exposure to and use of violence and intolerance of opposition. 
Particular attention was paid to how these factors affected the two organizations during the 
liberation struggle periods and how these factors also affected the two movements’ evolution 
into ruling political parties. In the following chapter, democratic consolidation, specifically 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
97 
the rule of law, will be discussed and how the attitudes, actions and behavior of the two 
respective ruling parties have affected it. 
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Chapter 5 
Liberation Movement Governance & the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
  The guiding research question of this study, as put forward in Chapter 1, is as follows: 
“What has been the impact of liberation movement governance on democratic consolidation 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa?” Democratic consolidation, as already discussed, broadly 
refers to the establishment of democracy as the ‘only game in town’ and simultaneously the 
prevention of democratic decay and regression into non-democratic forms of government. The 
quest for democratic consolidation is one fraught with many obstacles and challenges. The 
survival of democracy or, in other words, its consolidation is dependent on a variety of 
(institutional, economic and social) factors, including the rule of law. For the purposes of this 
particular study, only one factor will be focused on: namely, the rule of law.   
 
  In this chapter, specific focus will be placed on how the rule of law has been affected by 
liberation movement governance in both Zimbabwe and South Africa; keeping in mind how 
both ZANU-PF and the ANC’s political culture has affected their actions. The two cases will 
be compared by looking at the following factors, namely: government transparency and 
accountability, fundamental democratic rights and judicial independence and respect for the 
judicial process. As already said in Chapter 2 these are the most suitable factors to help 
determine what the effects of liberation movement governance are on the rule of law and by 
extent democratic consolidation. Once again, a comparison will be made in an effort to 
account for the differences and similarities between the two case studies.  
 
5.2 The Foundations of Democratic Consolidation: The Rule of Law in 
Zimbabwe & South Africa: 
 The rule of law is a core principle for liberal democracies and embodies the principles of 
constitutionalism and limited government. Furthermore, it is considered to be one of the most 
important factors needed for a democracy to be consolidated. The rule of law is generally 
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contrasted to the ‘rule of men’ which denotes the unrestrained and arbitrary personal rule by 
an unconstrained ruler (Rosenfeld, 2001: 1313). It is the essential element of a constitutional 
government, or in other words, a limited government (Martin, 2006: 239). This entails that 
every state organ and government institution has to operate within the limitations imposed 
upon it by the law and the constitution. The rule of law “seeks to ensure that the state will not 
behave in an arbitrary, corrupt, or oppressive fashion” (International Commission of Jurists 
quoted in Martin, 2006: 239). Therefore, the emergence of a Rechsstaat – a state of law or a 
state subject to law – is vital for the consolidation of democracy: “The consolidation of 
democracy…requires a law-bound, constraint-embedded state” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 19). 
A Rechsstaat has meant that the government and state apparatus would be subject to the law, 
that discretionary powers would be defined and limited and that citizens could turn to the 
courts to protect themselves against the state. However, it is important to point out here that 
the rule of law is principally a procedural concept – it does not address substantive questions 
(Martin, 2006: 239). In other words, if a country’s constitution and laws are oppressive or 
unjust – as in the case of Apartheid South Africa – the rule of law will not limit the oppression 
or injustice. This is echoed by Agrast, Botero & Ponce (2011: 12):  
 
“...the rule of law must be more than merely a system of rules – that, indeed a system 
of positive law that fails to respect core human rights guaranteed and established 
under international law is at best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be called a 
rule of law system.” 
 
In terms of democratic consolidation, therefore, the rule of law does not only entail 
governance according to the law, but also whether the law is in fact democratic. Thus, it is 
also closely linked to the protection of individual rights which are considered to be the core of 
a democracy (Carothers, 1998: 97). The rule of law, according to the World Justice Project 
refers to a law-based system in which the following factors are upheld: a) the government and 
its officials are accountable under the law; b) the laws are clear, stable, fair and protect 
individual human rights; c) the process by which the laws are enacted, administered and 
enforced is well-organized, accessible and fair; d) and lastly, access to justice is provided by 
independent, competent and ethical judges, attorneys and judicial officers who have enough 
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resources, reflect the composition of the communities they serve and who are of enough 
numbers (Agrast et al, 2011: 7).  
 
  As said in Chapter 2, this study argues that the attitudes of actors – in this case the political 
cultures of liberation movements – impact their behavior/actions. This then in turn has an 
influence on democratic institutions – in this case, the rule of law – that eventually affects 
democratic stability positively or negatively (see figure 1.1 on page 19). Liberation 
movements have demonstrated certain tendencies – due to the nature of the armed liberation 
struggles – that are adverse to democracy. It has to be kept in mind that liberation movements, 
such as ZANU and the ANC, were engaged in struggles not only against white-minority 
regimes but also against the unjust legal systems that these regimes were based on. In the 
post-liberation era, therefore, these movements – in addition to transforming into ruling 
parties – were now expected to act within the confines of a constitution and to respect the law 
as the highest authority in society; values that had been alien to them during the liberation 
struggles. Sufian Bukurura (2003: 35) makes the following important observation with 
regards to this: 
 
“On the one hand, liberation struggle was predicated on the defiance of colonial 
authority and the laws on which it was based. On the other hand, however, 
constitutionalism is anchored on respect for the rule of law and constitutional limits 
of power. Put differently, liberation struggle was based on deliberate and concerted 
violation of law, with confrontation being the basic strategy. Constitutionalism, for its 
part, depends on adherence to law and the limits it imposes, where tolerance and 
compromise are the basic methods.” 
 
 Thus, adherence to and respect for the rule of law may prove problematic for these liberation 
movements who have become ruling parties because: “…the ruling elites of southern Africa 
have shown that their chief concerns are with self-interest and retention of power, and 
constitutionalism counts for little by comparison” (Good, 2003:7).  
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
101 
5.2.1 ZANU-PF & the Rule of Law: 
  The rule of law in Zimbabwe has gradually and deliberately been eroded by the Mugabe 
regime since 1980. For the first ten years of independence, Zimbabwe was governed in 
accordance with the Lancaster House constitution and the rule of law was generally observed 
and upheld. Soon, though, ZANU-PF began to display contempt for the rule of law, starting 
with the Gukuruhundi in 1983 (Moore, 2006: 249; Martin, 2006: 248). However, it was the 
crucial constitutional amendments41 made in 1987 that facilitated the ruling party’s political 
dominance and seriously undermined the rule of law; in fact, it paved the way for 
Zimbabwe’s democratic decay and descent into authoritarianism. These changes marked “an 
abandonment of the classic notion that the purpose of constitutions is not to facilitate the 
exercise of state power, but to limit it” (Kagoro, 2004: 241). But it has been the period since 
2000 in particular that has witnessed an unrelenting, blatant and vicious attack against the rule 
of law in Zimbabwe (Feltoe, 2004: 12). Susan Booysen (2003: 2), in accordance with Feltoe, 
states the following: 
 
“The façade of supremacy of the law and legality of political and electoral measures, 
and, on a certain level, adherence to electoral procedure and multi-partyism, started 
caving in under the pressure of the electoral domain trilogy of the 12-13 February 
2000 constitutional referendum, the 24-25 June 2000 parliamentary, and the 9-10 
March 2002 presidential elections. A growing chasm emerged between 
constitutionalism-legality, and furnace politics42 within the legal-constitutional 
shell.”  
 
5.2.1.1 Government transparency & accountability: 
  Some of the most important facets to the rule of law – and vital features of a democratic 
regime – are the transparency of the government’s actions and the accountability of 
 
41
 In 1987, a series of decisive amendments were pushed through parliament; one being the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (Amendment no. 7) (Kagoro, 2004: 240). This led to the 
abolition of the office of the Prime Minister and the creation of a very powerful executive presidency 
“with sweeping powers,” (Blair, 2002: 36). The provisions of this amendment essentially placed the 
president above the judiciary and parliament (and therefore above parliamentary accountability) while 
it granted the president rule-making powers that equaled that of the rest of the legislature (Booysen, 
2003). 
42
 According to Booysen (2003: 2), ‘furnace politics’ refers to political practice which contradicts 
claims to constitutionalism. 
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government officials to the law (Agrast, Botero & Ponce, 2011: 7). However, in Zimbabwe’s 
case this has been eroded due to a culture of patronage and high levels of corruption. In 2007, 
Transparency International found that corruption in Zimbabwe had “reached epidemic 
proportions” while its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2010 ranked Zimbabwe 134 out 
of 178 countries with a weak score of 2.443 (Transparency International, 2007: 6; 
Transparency International, 2010: 3). Additionally, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
of 2009 gave Zimbabwe a very low score of 14.9 (0 being the worst and 100 the best) and a 
ranking of 51 out of 53 countries (with 1 being the best) for accountability and corruption 
(Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). In the 2010 Freedom House report, Countries at the 
Crossroads, Zimbabwe received a score of 1.0444 for transparency and anti-corruption (Lloyd, 
2010: 12). This report also found that the government does not possess effective 
administration processes or legislation that punishes corruption and promotes integrity, which 
only leads to increased levels of corruption. The aforementioned findings clearly indicate that 
Zimbabwe has a serious problem with government transparency and accountability. 
 
  One of the key components of corruption and the lack of transparency and accountability in 
Zimbabwe is the system of patronage that ZANU-PF has perpetuated. In fact, this has played 
a key role in keeping ZANU-PF in power for the last three decades. As pointed out in Chapter 
4, ZANU-PF sees itself as the only legitimate party to rule Zimbabwe and has used state 
organs to reflect this firmly held belief (Kaulemu, 2004: 80). The greatest prize for ZANU-PF 
in the aftermath of the liberation struggle has been the capture of the state; in other words, the 
attainment of authority over state apparatus, including its military machinery and economic 
resources (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 44). As a result of this, Zimbabwe has a ruling 
party that is fused with the state and “a party machinery that penetrates the organs of the 
state” (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 42, 43). Crucially, ZANU-PF has also extended its 
influence over the security apparatus of the state. In reality, senior security officials owe their 
positions to Mugabe and are loyal to ZANU-PF due to the patronage they have received for 
their loyalty (Lloyd, 2010: 11). With the transformation (Africanization) of the civil service, 
the politicization of state agencies took place. This has led to a situation whereby employment 
 
43
 Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 representing ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 ‘very clean’ 
(Transparency International, 2010: 3). 
44
 Scores in the Countries at the Crossroads-report are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing 
the weakest and 7 representing the strongest performance (Lloyd, 2010: 1). 
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in the civil service is dependent on support for ZANU-PF; in other words, those loyal to 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF are ‘rewarded’, whilst those deemed disloyal are punished or 
eliminated (Sachikonye, 2009: 2). A Minister (quoted in Vivian, 2006: 7) once made the 
following announcement: “Civil servants who do not support the principles of the ruling 
political party should not continue to work for the government.” Lloyd (2010: 4) states the 
following in accordance with this: “The civil service has generally been seen as a means to 
reward political supporters, with ZANU-PF loyalists receiving privilege in employment 
opportunities.” It has especially been the elite within the upper echelons of the party-state that 
has benefitted from this; those members of the elite who have been loyal to Mugabe and the 
leadership of the ruling party (Meredith, 2002: 78). 
 
  The controversial land reform policy of 2000 provided the government with additional 
sources for patronage as “cabinet ministers, senior civil servants, security-force commanders, 
senior judges, and ZANU-PF parliamentarians were rewarded the best properties confiscated 
from commercial farmers” (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). This patronage, however, has 
not been limited solely to farmland but has also included housing, government contracts and 
state enterprises. In fact, state enterprises have effectively been looted by ZANU-PF cronies: 
 
“The toll on state-owned enterprises, all staffed by ZANU-PF appointees (PEPs), was 
especially severe. One by one the national airline, the railways, the National Oil 
Company, the Grain Marketing Board, the Zimbabwe Electricity Corporation, the 
National Security Authority and the District Development Fund were all hit by gross 
mismanagement, rampant graft, and outright theft,” (Meredith, 2002: 98). 
 
Furthermore, ZANU-PF also owns a wide range of companies that allows party elites to share 
in the profits, while Mugabe heads various enterprises of patronage, government and business 
(Lloyd, 2010: 13). The government, in addition to the above-mentioned, also does not 
disclose many financial details, like for example asset declaration which makes transparency 
difficult. Henning Melber (2011: 83) made the following important observation in relation to 
liberation movements who have become dominant ruling parties: 
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“The party machine serves also as a vehicle for economic wheeling and dealing in 
favor of political dons and their clientele… Such trends of political entrenchment of 
particular class interests at the expense of democracy and redistributive socio-
economic measures beyond privileging a new elite are also visible… The denial of 
collective political participation of the majority goes hand in hand with the continued 
socio-economic exclusion of those who remain politically marginalised…” 
   
This is also evident in the case of Zimbabwe where ZANU-PF’s inner circle – essentially a 
political/business elite – has used the state as an instrument of accumulation; accumulation 
that they perceive themselves to be entitled to, even if it is detrimental to the national interest 
(Scarnecchia, 2006: 233, 234). Roger Southall (2003: 37) states the following in relation to 
the culture of entitlement that has developed within dominant parties, including ZANU-PF: 
“The growth amongst power-holders of a ‘culture of entitlement’ to state resources, and even 
to resources owned by the state, is an inevitable result.” Under circumstances like these, 
government transparency and accountability are made nearly impossible; this in turn adds to 
the continuing deterioration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. 
 
5.2.1.2 Fundamental democratic rights: 
  The protection of and respect for democratic rights is fundamental to the rule of law and 
defining features of a democracy. Without this, no regime can be considered democratic. 
Zimbabwe’s record with regards to rights (human rights, political rights and civil liberties) is 
dire, especially for the last ten years. In 2009, the country scored a measly 20.7 out of 100 for 
rights and a ranking of 48 out of 53 countries with 1 being the highest (Mo Ibrahim Index, 
2010). According to the Ibrahim Index, Zimbabwe has received the lowest possible score for 
human rights45; it scored 0 out of 100 and a ranking of 48 out of 53 countries with 1 being the 
highest (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). In addition to this, Zimbabwe has also not fared well with 
regards to political rights and civil liberties. Zimbabwe received a low score of 646 for both 
political rights47 and civil liberties48 in Freedom House’s (2010) ‘Freedom in the World’-
 
45
 The human rights indicator assesses the likelihood of a state being accused of serious human rights 
violations (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). 
46
 Scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the 
lowest level of freedom (Freedom House, 2010). 
47
 These rights allow people to participate freely in the political process. This includes the right to vote 
freely for any party, to compete for public office, to join political parties and organizations and also the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
105 
survey while the Countries at the Crossroads-report also gave Zimbabwe a low score of 2.21 
for civil liberties (Lloyd, 2010: 6). It is clear from this then that ZANU-PF’s blatant attack on 
these fundamental rights over the course of three decades has been the clearest manifestation 
of the regime’s undemocratic character.  
 
  ZANU-PF is infused with a culture of intimidation, intolerance and violence derived from 
the liberation struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 103). It has therefore, on many occasions, 
reverted to violent repression in order to stay in power and to impose its dominance, in the 
process destroying citizens’ fundamental democratic rights. The ZANU-PF-regime’s first 
assault on human rights was Gukuruhundi in 1983, a violent and brutal military campaign in 
Matabeleland which proved to be a defining moment for the ZANU-PF regime. It 
demonstrated the ruling party’s willingness, more than any other period in the history of post-
independence Zimbabwe, to use violence against defenseless citizens (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2002: 116). The violence that engulfed Matabeleland between 1983 and 1986 led to the death 
of approximately 20 000 people and the torture, rape and displacement of thousands more 
(Phimister, 2008: 197). It was essentially a massacre of the ZAPU-supporting Ndebele-
population and was carried out by the notorious (and predominantly Shona) Fifth Brigade49; 
they were deployed with the main aim of crushing ZAPU and enforcing support for ZANU-
PF (Blair, 2002: 30). The justification for the Fifth Brigade’s operations was the existence of 
so-called ZAPU dissidents who were deemed to be a threat to the state (Phimister, 2008: 198). 
However, it became clear that the Fifth Brigade was trained to target civilians, using a high 
level of brutality: 
 
“According to eye witnesses, the mass beatings and killings involved marching at gun 
point, of scores of hundreds of villagers over large distances to a central venue such 
as a school or water point. Once there, there followed hours of public beatings by the 
      
right to elect representatives who have an important impact on government policies and are 
accountable to the electorate (Freedom House, 2010). 
48
 Civil liberties include freedom of expression and belief, organizational and associational rights, the 
rule of law and personal autonomy without the interference of the state (Freedom House, 2010).  
49
 The Fifth Brigade refers to the North Korean-trained military unit responsible for carrying out the 
attacks in Matabeleland in the 1980s (Blair, 2002: 30). It was a unit placed directly under Mugabe’s 
personal control and outside of the normal army command structure. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
106 
Gukuruhundi soldiers which, more often than not, ended up in civilian public 
executions,” (Matshazi, 2007: 81). 
 
In addition to this, the Zimbabwean Human Rights NGO forum concluded that: 
 
“Hundreds of thousands of others were tortured, assaulted or raped or had their 
property destroyed… Of the people who died, some were shot where they were found; 
some were ‘disappeared’, then executed and buried or thrown down disused mine 
shafts; some were taken to torture camps where some died under torture or were later 
executed,” (the Zimbabwean Human Rights Forum quoted in Phimister, 2008: 198). 
 
  The Matabeleland-massacre, however, was only the first instance of violent repression by the 
Mugabe regime. In the aftermath of the 2000 referendum, a period of unprecedented state 
violence was unleashed. It was immediately after the government’s defeat in the referendum 
that the controversial ‘land grabs’ or land expropriations50 started. This launched what the 
ZANU-PF-regime has termed the Third Chimurenga51 in reference to the liberation struggle of 
the 1960s and 1970s (Martin, 2006: 249). The farm invasions were orchestrated and carefully 
planned by ZANU-PF’s leadership and violently executed by the war veterans who were loyal 
to the ruling party (Feltoe, 2004: 199). The year 2000 was a turning point for Zimbabwe 
because the (violent and unlawful) seizure of white-owned, commercial farms started the 
country’s descent into “barbarism and anarchy” (Martin, 2006: 250). Another example of the 
ruling party’s complete disregard for human rights was Operation Murambatsvina52 in 2005 
(Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 50). In May 2005, police attacked the largely informal 
enterprises of thousands of vendors and traders all over the country; it was estimated that 
around 90 000 people lost their livelihoods due to this (Ndlovu, 2008: 217, 218). This assault 
and destruction also shifted towards housing in which thousands of dwellings were destroyed. 
 
50
 This refers to the government’s policy of uncompensated land seizures that started in 2000 and 
primarily targeted commercial farmland owned by white Zimbabweans (Lloyd, 2010: 11). 
51
 According to Booysen (2004: 90) the Third Chimurenga constitutes the final phase of the liberation 
struggle in which the land will be returned to the people.  
52
 Operation Murambatsvina or ‘Operation Drive out the Trash’ in May 2005 saw the eviction of 
millions of people from their homes in squatter camps in urban areas all around Zimbabwe. The 
government claimed that this formed part of their so-called ‘urban renewal’ program, but it was rather 
an act of vengeance against the urban population, the majority of whom supported the opposition MDC 
(Norman, 2008: 112). 
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The government claimed that the houses and businesses were illegal and therefore had to be 
removed so that order could be restored (Ndlovu, 2008: 222). The real reason for this, 
however, seemed to be the retention of power by ZANU-PF – Murambatsvina was launched 
two months after the dubious 2005 parliamentary elections – and also due the urban 
population’s support for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Ndlovu, 2008: 224, 
225). These examples clearly illustrate the ZANU-PF-regime’s complete disregard for human 
rights and the rule of law.   
 
  The Lancaster House constitution specifically guaranteed various rights including protection 
from arbitrary search or entry, among other rights. However, the crucial constitutional 
amendments made in 1987 subordinated these rights to “the interests of defense, public safety, 
public order, and public morality” (Lloyd, 2010: 6). In addition to this, the state of emergency-
laws that the Ian Smith regime employed to limit civil liberties before independence were 
retained and used by the ZANU-PF-government to suppress opposition. Zimbabwean security 
forces – that are loyal to the ruling party – abuse citizens with impunity, often ignoring basic 
rights in relation to searches, seizures and detention (Freedom House, 2010). The harassment, 
detention, torture and killing of civilians by these security forces have not been condemned by 
the ZANU-PF regime or investigated (Lloyd, 2010: 11). It has also been found that: 
 
“ZANU-PF militias operate as de facto enforces of government policies and have 
committed assault, torture, rape, extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions 
without fear of punishment...,” (Freedom House, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, political opponents of the government have no protection against arbitrary arrest 
or long-term detention without trial:  
 
“Pretrail detention is a major problem, with some inmates held for over 10 years 
without trial. Scores of MDC officials and activists were abducted, charged with 
treason, and detained without due process throughout 2008,” (Freedom House, 
2010). 
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Citizens also do not have the effective means to safeguard them from government abuses or 
the means of reparation and petition when their rights have been violated (Lloyd, 2010: 8). 
Furthermore, citizens’ right to independent counsel is also often denied and while defendants 
have the right to request legal assistance it is not usually granted unless the charges are serious 
felonies (Lloyd, 2010: 11).  
 
  Elections are also not free and fair and generally characterized by widespread violence and 
intimidation; for instance, the 2008 elections were marred by violence and intimidation, biased 
media coverage, the use of state resources to bribe and threaten voters and flawed voter 
registration and balloting (Freedom House, 2010). Freedoms of expression and the press are 
also severely restricted in Zimbabwe due to draconian legislation such as the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Official Secrets Act, the Public Order 
and Security Act (POSA) and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (Freedom 
House, 2010). These laws have allowed the state to exercise extensive control over the media 
while the government continues to dominate the broadcast and print media; in 2009, retired 
military and intelligence officers that were loyal to Mugabe were appointed to the boards of 
the state-controlled Zimbabwean Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), state-owned newspapers 
and the NewZiana news agency (Sachikonye, 2009: 2; Freedom House, 2010). Both the POSA 
and the AIPPA impose limits on activists’ ability to associate, assemble and speak (Lloyd, 
2010: 4). Furthermore, the POSA has also made it easier for the ZANU-PF-government to 
charge political opponents because of the limits it imposes on association, assembly and 
speech (Sachikonye, 2009: 2; Lloyd, 2010: 7). As with other rights, Zimbabwe received a low 
score of 22.2 out of 100 for freedom of expression53 and 25.6 out of 100 for press freedom in 
2009 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). In addition to this, ZANU-PF’s disrespect for 
judiciary’s independence and the judicial process has further undermined the rule of law in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
5.2.1.3 Judicial independence & the respect for the judicial process: 
  Some of the most important features of a functioning democracy are the independence of the 
judiciary and respect for the judicial process; when this is compromised, the rule of law 
 
53
 The extent to which citizens, organizations and the mass media can express their opinions freely (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). 
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breaks down. Throughout its tenure as Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF has consistently 
undermined the authority and independence of the judiciary by manipulating the judicial 
process, attacking judges and ignoring court rulings. 
 
  The independence of the judiciary is crucial because it is the branch of government that 
monitors the allocation and use of power and therefore needs to be free from pressure and 
interference from those in power it is responsible for checking (Goredema, 2004: 100). 
However, since 1980 this has consistently been under attack in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the 
Zimbabwean government has a long history of overruling or simply ignoring court orders, 
starting almost immediately after Robert Mugabe came into office in 1980 (Vivian, 2006: 3). 
This was done in the follow ways: firstly, the ZANU-PF-regime paid no heed to court orders; 
secondly, the government chose to ignore selected criminal actions; and thirdly it issued 
presidential pardons and granted amnesties in order to overrule court decisions. A speech 
made in 2001 by ZANU-PF MP, Webster Shamu (quoted in Goredema, 2004: 99), perfectly 
captures the ruling party’s view on an independent judiciary: 
 
“Those who exercise power do so on behalf of the people to which they must always 
be accountable. No species of power is exempt from the universal tendency to corrupt 
those who wield it. Our Judiciary is no exception. No person who wields power 
should therefore be exempt from the obligation to be accountable to us the people and 
to God… The rhetoric of Judicial independence must not be allowed to continue to be 
used to mask the reality of Judicial despotism… It is therefore the democratic right 
and duty of the people of Zimbabwe, as a free people, to monitor and control the 
power of the Judiciary.” 
 
Initially, though, Zimbabwean judges were appointed on merit and “fought an exemplary 
fight to uphold the rule of law” (Vivian, 2006: 5). But since the late 1980s and early 1990s, it 
became evident that government and sections of the legislature were not comfortable with the 
existence of an autonomous judiciary (Goredema, 2004: 101). The judiciary – just like most 
state institutions – has become an instrument in the hands of the ZANU-PF-regime and 
despite the fact that the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the president has 
the authority to directly appoint judges to the Supreme and High Courts without legislative 
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approval and over the years, President Mugabe has steadily increased his control over the 
judiciary (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46; Lloyd, 2010: 10). The country received a low 
score of 25 out of a 100 for judicial independence in 2009 and has not received a score of 
above 40 for this particular indicator over the last ten years (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). 
This illustrates the stark reality of just how much judicial independence has been withered 
away in Zimbabwe. The ZANU-PF-regime has gone on to subjugate the judiciary through the 
use patronage and intimidation (Goredema, 2004: 106; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). 
 
  The economic crisis that Zimbabwe has faced since the late 1990s, has affected every layer 
of society including the judiciary (Goredema, 2004: 105). The sources that are available to the 
judiciary have dwindled dramatically, leading to adverse consequences for its impartiality and 
ability to fulfill its tasks. The salaries of judges, for instance, cannot keep up with the cost of 
living and working conditions have continued to deteriorate, thus making incumbents 
susceptible to bribery and illegitimate influence from the government and other sources. For 
example, the farms that were seized in the government’s controversial land reform policy 
have been offered to each of the judges of the superior courts with some of them accepting the 
offers (Goredema, 2004: 106). Additionally, Mugabe has also appointed judges to the superior 
courts who are loyal to ZANU-PF, further undermining the independence of the judiciary and 
by extent the rule of law. As opposition to the government grew in the aftermath of the 2000 
referendum, the judiciary and specifically independent judges became the target of 
intimidation and manipulation (Tshuma, 2010).  
 
  When it became clear that judges were determined to uphold the constitution and thereby 
hinder the government’s ‘land grab’ plans, Mugabe launched an intensive attack on the 
judiciary (Vivian, 2006: 5). Due to the political nature of the land reform policy, the 
government was not prepared to let the courts interfere (Feltoe, 2004: 204). It therefore 
proceeded to “mount vicious verbal attacks upon the judges, and stage-managed a series of 
protests by the war veterans against them” – this eventually led to the invasion of the Supreme 
Court buildings by the pro-government war veterans in 2001 (Feltoe, 2004: 205). 
Furthermore, Mugabe also frequently denounced and verbally attacked white judges in an 
effort to discredit the judiciary and to create the impression that the judges were deliberately 
obstructing the fair distribution of farmland. Eventually, these merciless attacks took their toll 
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– the chief justice of the Supreme Court at the time, Anthony Gabbay, was forced into 
retirement in 2001 after the government stated that it could not guarantee his personal safety 
(Feltoe, 2004: 208; Lloyd, 2010: 10). Throughout 2001, the government continued with its 
campaign of intimidating senior judges into retirement and with the transformation the court 
system by appointing a dozen new judges to the Supreme and High Courts (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2008: 46). The way in which government obtained these resignations and made 
the new appointments “constituted the most notable breach of the independence of the 
judiciary since the achievement of independence in Zimbabwe” (Goredema, 2004: 103). 
Furthermore, the ZANU-PF-regime has also undermined the rule of law by blatantly ignoring 
or overruling court orders. 
 
  Anthony Gabbay (referenced in Bukurura, 2003: 36) states that there have been two phases 
of the way in which the government has responded to judicial decisions. In the first phase 
(from 1980 until 1990), the government disregarded court orders in relation to the release of 
detainees and the payment of damages to the victims of human rights violations. The second 
phase (from 1991 until 2000) entailed constitutional manipulation in order for the government 
to reduce its responsibility towards human rights or to overrule court decisions favorable to 
human rights. In the post-2000 period, however – as pointed out earlier – the ZANU-PF-
regime has not only ignored court rulings, but it has gone on to directly attack the judiciary. 
Therefore, the judicial process – and the rule of law by extension – has been undermined due 
to the concerted efforts of the ZANU-PF-regime. According to the Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
Human Rights (quoted in Goredema, 2004: 105): 
 
“In Zimbabwe we have had the executive refusing to enforce certain court orders that 
are seen to be unfavorable to the state or the ruling ZANU-PF party. The executive 
has also attacked the judiciary openly, quite unprofessionally and unfairly in a 
number of cases. The government of Zimbabwe however has a history of attacking the 
judiciary or members of the legal profession each time the executive is unhappy at 
certain judicial decisions.” 
 
The ZANU-PF-regime has considered itself superior to the judiciary and therefore not 
accountable to it and although it has been fully aware of the fact that disrespecting court 
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rulings is extralegal, it has continued on this course anyway (Goredema, 2004: 105). This 
behavior, in turn, has had devastating effects on the rule of law and democracy in Zimbabwe. 
 
  It is clear from the discussion of these above-mentioned factors, that the ZANU-PF-regime 
has displayed disrespect and disregard for the rule of law and what it entails. In fact, it has 
made a concerted effort to undermine this in order to remain in power; in the process 
destroying democratic governance. When looking at the destruction of the rule of law in 
Zimbabwe, it is clear that ZANU-PF’s behavior has been shaped by its authoritarian political 
culture as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
5.2.2 The ANC & the Rule of Law: 
  The end of Apartheid and the start of a democratic era in South Africa facilitated the 
emergence of a strong commitment to the rule of law and the values of constitutionalism. The 
South African democracy has prided itself on the strength of its constitution and in particular 
the emphasis that is placed on the protection of democratic rights. According to the World 
Justice Project, South Africa has the best record for the rule of law in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Agrast et al, 2011: 7). The country has fared well with regards to indicators such as 
government accountability, respect for democratic rights and judicial independence (Agrast et 
al, 2010: 34). However, in recent years – especially after the ANC’s 2007 National 
Conference and the Zuma corruption case – there have been instances where the ANC’s 
behavior has proven detrimental to the rule of law and harmful to democracy in general. Pierre 
de Vos (2010: 95) makes the following statement in regards to this:  
 
“The post-1994 era has been characterized by a one party political landscape, which 
brings enormous pressures to bear on the integrity of our system of government, the 
rule of law and, ultimately democracy.” 
 
In the following section, the three factors associated with the rule of law will be discussed, 
focusing specifically on how the ANC’s behavior as South Africa’s ruling party has affected 
these factors. 
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5.2.2.1 Government transparency and accountability: 
  South Africa has various democratic institutions in place to ensure government transparency 
and the accountability of government officials to the law. In terms of accountability and 
corruption, South Africa received a good score of 76.5 out of 100 (with 0 being the worst and 
100 being the best) in 2009 and a ranking of 5 out of 53 countries – with 1 being the highest – 
for this particular indicator (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). Transparency International’s 2010 
Corruption Perception Index gave South Africa a score of 4.754 and a ranking of 54 out of 178 
countries with 1 being the highest (Transparency International, 2010: 2). In terms of the 
absence of corruption, South Africa received a score of 0.6155 and a ranking of 29 out of 66 
countries and a regional ranking of 1 out of 9 states from the World Justice Project (Agrast et 
al, 2010: 93).  
 
  Furthermore, the constitution has provided a vigorous system of checks and balances 
between the executive, legislature and judiciary (Rosenberg, 2010: 4). The legislature – which 
consists of the National Assembly and the 90-seat National Council of Provinces (NCOP) – 
has, in theory, significant oversight and approval powers in relation to the executive and can 
also question members of the executive in parliamentary sessions. In addition to this, every act 
that is passed is subject to review by the judiciary which is headed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals and the Constitutional Court (Rosenberg, 2010: 4). Furthermore, six independent 
institutions56 – referred to as the Chapter 9 institutions – that are accountable to the National 
Assembly and protected from outside interference, have been created in order to support a 
constitutional democracy (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Two of these 
institutions that specifically deal with corruption are the Auditor-General (AGSA) and Public 
Protector (Ombudsperson) (Rosenberg, 2010: 13). The Auditor-General is tasked with 
auditing and reporting on the finances of any agency or institution that receives public 
funding; it has to submit its reports to the National Assembly and make its findings accessible 
to the public (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Public Protector is 
 
54
 Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 representing ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 ‘very clean’ 
(Transparency International, 2010: 3). 
55
 The lowest score possible is 0.00 while the highest score possible is 1.00 (Agrast et al, 2010: 93). 
56
 The institutions include: the Public Protector (Ombudsperson); Auditor-General; Electoral 
Commission; Human Rights Commission; Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights 
of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities; and the Commission for Gender Equality 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
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empowered to investigate “maladministration, abuse of power, improper conduct, and acts of 
omission that result in prejudice to another person” (Rosenberg, 2010: 13). Outside of these 
Chapter 9 institutions, there are also several other bodies and agencies tasked with 
contributing to South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts, most notably the police’s anti-
corruption unit, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks) that 
controversially replaced the Directorate of Special Operations (the Scorpions) in 2008. It is 
clear from this that the South African democracy has – at least in theory – a robust system of 
accountability and oversight. However, in reality, the ANC’s overwhelming dominance of the 
legislature and executive at both national and provincial level has significantly undermined the 
effectiveness of South Africa’s institutional checks and accountability mechanisms 
(Rosenberg, 2010: 4).  
 
  In South Africa, the lines between party and state – just as in the case with Zimbabwe – have 
become blurred with the ANC purposefully extending its control over state apparatus largely 
through its policy of cadre deployment. This entails the appointment or assignment of those 
loyal to the ruling party to areas of key influence, including: business, non-governmental 
organizations, parliament, scientific bodies, sporting associations, state institutions (that are 
supposed to be independent), et cetera (Pottinger, 2008: 37). As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
deployment of cadres is based on the ANC’s determination to control the state and penetrate 
all levers of power in society (de Jager, 2009: 283). Brian Pottinger (2008: 38), in relation to 
this, makes the following important observation: 
 
“By 2004, the ruling party’s program of appropriating the state bureaucracy was all 
but complete. At national, provincial and local levels, ANC-appointed public servants 
were in office, if clearly not in charge. When Mbeki spoke of the state, he actually 
meant the ANC. And when he referred to the government, he was talking about the 
ANC.” 
 
Thus the accountability and loyalty of (key) state institutions is firstly to the ruling party while 
the ANC has quite unashamedly committed itself to extending its power over these institutions 
that are responsible for holding the government accountable (de Jager, 2009: 283; Schlemmer, 
2005: 9). For instance, the ANC has invoked party loyalty on various occasions to prevent 
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Parliament from conducting efficient oversight over the executive’s actions (Mattes, 2002: 
27). As a result of this cadre deployment policy, the public service is riddled with corruption 
due to appointments being made based on political affiliation (to the ANC) and nepotism 
(Rosenberg, 2010: 4). Furthermore, members of the ruling party have also been involved in 
various high-profile corruption scandals over the years, including the infamous Arms Deal or 
the 1999-2000 Strategic Defense Procurement Package; Oilgate57; Travelgate58; police 
commissioner Jackie Selebi’s conviction of corruption; et cetera. In fact, President Jacob 
Zuma has also faced corruption charges since 2005 which were finally dropped in 2009, only 
two weeks prior to the national elections (Freedom House, 2010). It seems that party and state 
positions are viewed to be the gateway to private wealth (Southall, 2007: 8). These corruptions 
scandals reflect the tendency of the lines between the ruling party and the state to become 
blurred. According Southall (2007: 9): 
 
“At fault, it appears, is not a lack of formal measures but of political will to combat 
corruption. This has its roots in the volatile combination of the ANC’s erosion of the 
distinction between party and state, the widespread sense entitlement amongst many 
public and ANC functionaries, and a scramble for private wealth within an economy 
whose advantages have historically been denied to the majority of the population on 
grounds of race.” 
 
  Despite the existence of a robust system to combat corruption, the enforcement of anti-
corruption legislation remains a major problem in South Africa (Rosenberg, 2010: 13). For 
instance, civil servants regularly fail to declare their business interests as required by law and 
punishment for failing to declare these interests are virtually nonexistent (Freedom House, 
2010; Rosenberg, 2010: 14). Furthermore, civil servants who have been convicted of 
corruption are not barred from working for the government in the future. In addition to this, 
the ANC-regime in the last few years has shown a dangerous tendency of subjugating some of 
these institutions that are responsible for ensuring government transparency and 
accountability. For instance, in October 2008 the parliament – amidst heavy objection from 
 
57
 This refers to the scandal whereby Imvume Management made an irregular payment of R15 million 
it received from the state parastatal PetroSA, to the ruling ANC – with whom it had a close 
relationship – ahead of the 2004 general elections (Southall, 2007: 10). 
58
 This refers to the scandal involving the abuse of travel vouchers by predominantly ANC Members of 
Parliament (Rosenberg, 2010: 14). 
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civil society and opposition parties – disbanded the Directorate of Special Operations (the 
Scorpions), an independent agency that was tasked with pursuing several high-profile 
investigations – including the Jacob Zuma and Jackie Selebi corruption cases (Freedom 
House, 2010). Pottinger (2008: 41) claims that the Scorpions became a casualty in the 
Mbeki/Zuma-power struggle within the ANC and that the state apparatus was manipulated to 
serve one or other faction’s interests: 
 
“The mere fact that such an important organ of state with a demonstrable record of 
success could be made a football of whim, expedience and prejudice was an 
indication of the fragility of state institutions fourteen years into ANC rule.” 
 
 The disbandment of the Scorpions is viewed by many as an example of how the ANC is 
willing to manipulate state institutions for its own purposes. Incidents in 2011 have also 
caused concern with the investigations being launched against the current Public Protector, 
Thuli Madonsela, and the head of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), Willie Hofmeyr. It has 
been reported that Madonsela was under investigation for fraud and corruption charges; she is 
currently investigating a corruption scandal involving National Police Commissioner, Bheki 
Cele, and has also indicated that she intended to reopen the Oilgate-investigation (Sole, 
McKune & Evans, 2011: 2). According to Sole et al (2011: 2) these developments reveal that 
“her independence represent a common threat to all major factions of the ruling party”. 
Shortly after this, it was also announced that the head of the Special Investigating Unit (SUI), 
Willie Hofmeyr, was under investigation (Marrian, 2011). The SIU is currently involved in 
several serious and high-profile investigations, including a probe into police acquisition of 
office space. According to the chairperson of the Council for the Advancement of the 
Constitution, Sipho Pityana (quoted in Marrian, 2011): “It seems that anybody who 
investigates corruption has to accept that they themselves would eventually be investigated.” 
In addition to this, the proposed Protection of Information Bill is also viewed by many as 
being in violation of the constitution, specifically the constitutional requirement of 
transparency (Activists mobilize as ANC rolls back Info Bill progress, 2011). The Bill, as it 
stands, gives any state organ (every governmental department and even the public broadcaster, 
libraries and zoos) the power to classify information. It prescribes a minimum prison sentence 
of fifteen years for anyone who makes top secret information available to the public – this 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
117 
provision is widely viewed as an attempt to restrain investigative reporting and criticism of the 
government (Activists mobilize…, 2011). Therefore, despite the fact that South Africa has 
legislation and institutions in place to fight corruption, these incidents and the ruling party’s 
behavior in recent years pose a serious threat to government transparency and accountability 
in South Africa. 
 
5.2.2.2 Fundamental democratic rights: 
  South Africa has prided itself on the wide variety of rights that are guaranteed and protected 
by the constitution. The South African constitution has been hailed as: 
  
“…the darling of both liberals and social democrats around the world. Widely seen 
as a ‘state of the art’ document, it contains a wide array of classic political and 
socioeconomic rights, institutional innovations as the National Council of Provinces, 
a range of independent watchdog agencies and commissions, and an activist 
Constitutional Court,” (Mattes, 2002: 24). 
 
Also included in the constitution is a Bill of Rights comprised of a variety of individual human 
rights, political rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, it is proclaimed to be the cornerstone of 
the South African democracy and that the state is obligated to “respect, protect, promote and 
fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
During the ANC’s tenure as South Africa’s ruling party, these fundamental rights have 
generally been respected, protected and promoted. It is important to keep in mind that the 
ANC played an active part in drafting South Africa’s democratic constitution and that the 
document has included “in its text many of the demands called for by the Freedom Charter” 
(African National Congress, 2011). In addition to the existence of a Bill of Rights, there are 
independent institutions tasked with monitoring that these rights are indeed being upheld and 
protected. One such institution is the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). 
The SAHRC is responsible for: a) the promotion of human rights and a culture of human 
rights; b) promoting the protection, development and attainment of human rights; and c) to 
monitor and assess the observance of these rights in South Africa (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996). Furthermore, the SAHRC is granted the authority to: a) 
investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; b) to take steps in order to assure 
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the appropriate redress where human rights have been violated; c) to carry out research; and d) 
to educate. Therefore, due to this, South Africa has had a favorable democratic rights record 
since 1994 with the ANC-regime respecting the fundamental rights as set out in the 
constitution. 
 
  In the latest Ibrahim Index of African Governance in 2009, South Africa received a relatively 
high score of 69.4 out of 100 overall for rights (human rights, political rights and civil 
liberties) and a ranking of 11 out of 53 countries (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). In terms of 
human rights59, South Africa received a score of 5060 out of 100 and a ranking of 11 out of 53 
countries; far better than Zimbabwe’s score of 0 and ranking of 53 (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). 
The World Justice Project gave South Africa a score of 0.6561 and a ranking of 31 out of 66 
countries for fundamental rights62 (Agrast et al, 2010: 93). The constitution also prevents 
discrimination based on the categories of “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). In terms of political 
rights and civil liberties, South Africa has also had a good record so far. According to 
Freedom House (2010), the country received a good score of 263 for both political rights and 
civil liberties and a high score of 5.0764 in the Countries at the Crossroads-report (Lloyd, 
2010: 1). As already pointed out, South Africa has a constitution that provides a set of 
comprehensive political rights and civil liberties; more importantly, though, these rights and 
liberties are generally respected and enjoyed in practice (Lloyd, 2010: 6). In terms of political 
rights, citizens have the right to: a) form a political party; b) to participate in the activities or 
to recruit members for a political party; and c) to campaign for a political party or cause 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Furthermore, every adult citizen has the 
right to vote in elections, to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office. Elections, 
 
59
 The human rights indicator assesses the likelihood of a state being accused of serious human rights 
violations (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). 
60
 Just take note that scores range from 0, 25, 50, 75 up until 100 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). 
61
 The lowest score possible is 0.00 while the highest score possible is 1.00 (Agrast et al, 2010: 93). 
62
 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination; the right to life and security; due process of law and 
the protection of the rights of the accused; freedoms of expression, religion, assembly and association; 
right to privacy; and fundamental labor rights (Agrast et al, 2010: 11). 
63
 Scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the 
lowest level of freedom (Freedom House, 2010). 
64
 Scores in the Countries at the Crossroads-report are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing 
the weakest and 7 representing the strongest performance (Lloyd, 2010: 1). 
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overseen by the Independent Electoral Commission, are judged to generally be free and fair 
(Freedom House, 2010).  
 
  South Africa has a lively civil society and a healthy protest culture that is embedded by the 
freedoms of association and peaceful assembly (Freedom House, 2010). Freedoms of 
expression and the press are also protected within the constitution and are generally respected; 
South Africa scored 77.8 out of 100 for freedom of expression65 (Freedom House, 2010; Mo 
Ibrahim Index, 2010). Even though the country still has a high ranking (2 out of 53 countries) 
and a high score for this particular indicator, it has fallen drastically in the last two years – in 
2008 it fell from a perfect 100 to 88.9 and in 2009 it fell from 88.9 to the current score of 77.8 
(Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). This clearly indicates that freedom of expression is being 
encroached upon. For instance, it has been found that the government has infringed on the 
editorial independence of the South African Broadcasting Commission. In 2006, a report 
found that government critics had been barred from the airwaves and in 2007, various groups, 
including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Freedom of 
Expression Institute, accused the government of removing unwanted figures at the public 
broadcaster (Freedom House, 2010). Even though there are various independent and 
investigative newspapers and magazines that are fiercely critical of powerful institutions and 
individuals, the ANC and state officials have grown increasingly sensitive and intolerant to 
media criticism and reporting on corruption (Lloyd, 2010: 5).  
 
  Furthermore, while journalists are rarely detained by the authorities, they are subject to 
pressure from state and non-state actors. Government and ANC-affiliated officials have 
increasingly been prone to accuse journalists of being racists and of betraying the state (Lloyd, 
2010: 5). Blade Nzimande (SACP secretary general and current minister of higher education), 
for instance, made the following statement: “We have a huge liberal offensive against our 
democracy... The print media is the biggest perpetrator of this liberal thinking” (Nzimande 
warns of ‘huge liberal offensive’, 2010). This type of view is held by many within the ANC 
(including Jacob Zuma). Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 2011 municipal elections, ANC 
Nelson Mandela Bay chairperson, Nceba Faku, addressed a group of hundred party members 
 
65
 This refers to what extent freedom of opinion and the press are generally guaranteed and also the 
extent to which the mass media system provides for a plurality of opinions (Mo Ibrahim Index, 2010). 
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and incited them to burn down a local newspaper, The Herald (Burn down the Herald: ANC 
leader, 2011). He reportedly made the following inflammatory statements: 
 
“Down with The Herald, down, down. Burn. The Herald. Fire to The Herald. The 
Herald dictated that Zille and Ngonyama would stand here today and run the metro. 
The Herald was on the forefront of that... pasop [beware] The Herald, pasop. If you 
can’t draw the line today... We have to draw the line. We have to go back to the UDF 
[United Democratic Front] approach. We sacrificed our families, we gave our flesh 
and blood for the cause of the struggle. Go and burn The Herald. We will face a 
bullet with a bullet.” 
 
These quotes reveal the ruling ANC’s distrust of media institutions and a growing intolerance 
of a free and critical press. During the 2007 ANC national conference in Polokwane there was 
a call for the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal to “adjudicate between freedom of 
speech and an individual’s right to privacy and dignity” (Lloyd, 2010: 5). As said in Chapter 
4, the ANC’s distrust of media institutions, has led to the vociferous support for the highly 
controversial Protection of Information Bill and a media tribunal. For instance, the ANC 
Youth League spokesperson, Floyd Shivambu, voiced the League’s support for a media 
tribunal with the following statement:  
 
“The establishment of a Media Tribunal is long overdue and has allowed imposters 
in media, masquerading as Journalists/Editors to undermine the integrity of our 
organizations and spread lies about their leadership... This therefore calls for an 
immediate establishment of a Media Tribunal to save our organizations and 
leadership from repeated attempts to assassinate their characters and sow divisions.” 
 
  Even though South Africa still has a good record for upholding fundamental democratic 
rights, the ANC has shown alarming tendencies in the last few years of encroaching on some 
of these rights – especially with regards to the existence of a free and critical media. The 
ruling party’s sensitivity to media criticism, its use of aggressive rhetoric against the press and 
its attempts to push through the media tribunal and Protection of Information Bill, are 
disquieting developments for democracy in South Africa. 
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5.2.2.3 Judicial independence & respect for the judicial process: 
  Judicial independence and respect for the judicial process, as said earlier, are cornerstones of 
the rule of law and by extent a democratic regime. So far, South Africa has had a good record 
for judicial independence; receiving a score of 75 out of 100 in the latest Ibrahim Index of 
2009 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010). Judicial independence is guaranteed by the constitution 
while the courts – specifically the Supreme and Constitutional Courts – enjoy substantial 
autonomy and play a vital, if not the most important, role in holding the government 
accountable (Freedom House, 2010; Alence, 2004: 87). Judicial authority is situated in the 
courts and the courts’ independence is guaranteed by the constitution while it forbids any 
organ of the state or individual with interfering with the functioning of the courts (de Vos, 
2010: 106). In addition to this, the South African President – in contrast to the Zimbabwean 
counterpart – has very little discretion in relation to the appointment of judges. He or she has 
to consult with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) on the appointments of the Chief 
Justice and Deputy Chief Justice and the President also has to follow the recommendations of 
the JSC with regards to the appointment of judges to the other courts, including the 
Constitutional Court (de Vos, 2010: 107). 
 
  Furthermore, the judiciary has the power to declare Acts of Parliament invalid if it 
contravenes the provisions of the constitution; thus, the judiciary “plays a distinctly legal but 
rather important role in the political process” (de Vos, 2010: 107). The Constitutional Court 
(CC) in particular has been important in keeping the executive’s power in check; in fact, 
according to Pottinger (2008: 47), the Constitutional Court has been instrumental in 
strengthening the judiciary at a functionary level. In various judgments, the CC has been able 
to uphold restraints on the government’s actions and force it to comply with constitutional 
requirements (Alence, 2004; 87). The most notable example of this is the Treatment Action 
Campaign’s (TAC) challenge of the government’s policies with regards to the distribution of 
anti-retroviral (ARV) medication in the early 2000s. In short, the case revolved around the 
official restriction on the use of the approved ARV-medication, nevirapine (Alence, 2004: 88). 
The TAC argued that by restricting the appropriate medical use of nevirapine, the government 
was infringing upon the socio-economic rights – which are guaranteed by the constitution – of 
the HIV-positive mothers and their babies. The Constitutional Court, in its judgment, ordered 
the government to allow the use and distribution of the ARV-medication throughout the public 
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health sector where sufficient HIV testing and counseling facilities were available and also to 
take reasonable measures in order to extend the availability of these services and facilities 
(Alence, 2004: 88). This, thus, led to a substantial change in the government’s controversial 
HIV/AIDS-policy – “a change that in most political systems could have been achieved only 
through the legislative process” (Alence, 2004: 88). Overall, the government generally 
complies with judicial decisions and cases of non-compliance are due to a lack of capacity and 
efficiency rather than deliberate disregard of court rulings; in other words, the government has 
so far respected the judicial process (Rosenberg, 2010: 10). However, in the last few years 
judicial independence has been placed under increasing pressure by the ANC-regime. 
 
  It was especially during the Mbeki-era (1999-2008) that judicial independence came under 
increasing political pressure. In December 2005, the government introduced a package of 
bills, including the Superior Courts Bill, which intended to reform Apartheid-era structures 
and extend more executive control over the judiciary (Rosenberg, 2010: 10). In other words, it 
would effectively have reduced the power of the judiciary (Pottinger, 2008: 48). The proposed 
bill gave the minister of justice enhanced powers to the president to appoint acting High and 
Constitutional Court judges and the minister of justice more power to make decisions. 
However, this was met by a slew of protest from all over the legal community and rejected by 
the chief justice and a series of senior judges. At its core, the reason for the proposed bill was 
the Mbeki administration’s ‘irritation’ with independent judges who frequently ruled against 
the government (Pottinger, 2008: 48). According to Pottinger (2008: 49), the treatment of 
judiciary by the Mbeki administration has left it vulnerable to abuse by the post-Polokwane 
incumbents: 
 
“A decade of sniping, obstruction and in some cases subtle intimidation of the 
judicial arm by ANC Lite had opened the way for an even more virulent and 
dangerous campaign by ANC Classic to undermine arguably the last remaining 
uncontaminated bastion of constitutional power. Mbeki was the Trojan Horse by 
which this was achieved.” 
 
  It was the Jacob Zuma corruption case that proved to be the greatest test of judicial 
independence in South Africa. This case – originally brought up in 2005 – has exposed the 
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judiciary and prosecutors to various attempts of political interference (Rosenberg, 2010: 10). 
Between 2006 and 2009, the case was thrown out and reinstated twice and with the second 
rejection of the charges, it was stated by the judge that there might have been political 
interference in Zuma’s prosecution. In 2008, judicial independence came under severe attack – 
in June 2008, a complaint was filed against senior High Court Judge, John Hlophe, alleging 
that he approached two Constitutional Court judges in an attempt to influence the corruption 
case against Zuma (Freedom House, 2010). The aftermath of this, led to a disconcerting verbal 
attack on the Constitutional Court by supporters of the Zuma-faction; Gwede Mantashe – the 
current ANC secretary general – allegedly labeled the jurists “counter-revolutionaries” 
(Pottinger, 2008: 49). In fact, throughout the whole Zuma corruption case, his supporters 
launched a full-scale attack on the judiciary. The whole saga, according to Alec Russel (2009: 
251):  
 
“...had raised troubling questions about the ruling party’s attitude towards 
supposedly independent institutions. The way that Zuma’s supporters and the ANC’s 
senior leaders had treated the judiciary potentially set a worrying precedent, giving 
the impression that politics could be expected at the last resort to take primacy over 
the law.” 
 
If this is the case, judicial independence in South Africa will be severely compromised and by 
extent the rule of law as well.  
 
  Furthermore, the appointment of Mogoeng Mogoeng by President Jacob Zuma to the post of 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court has raised great concern for the independence of the 
judiciary. This especially relates to Mogoeng’s record of judgments, his seemingly 
conservative attitudes regarding gender and sexual orientation and his lack of experience 
(Mogoeng: Underwhelming exchange, 2011). In addition to this, concern has also been 
expressed about his personal relationship with President Zuma. The two were introduced by a 
mutual friend, advocate Khotso Ramolefe, who conveyed his displeasure with Zuma’s 
decision to appoint Mogoeng (Sole, 2011). Ramolefe (in Sole, 2011) stated the following:  
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“I know them both quite well and, considering the circumstances under which they 
got to know each other -- with me in the middle -- I am not comfortable, not 
comfortable at all.  
There is nothing outstanding that Justice Mogoeng would bring to the office of chief 
justice. If he were (sic) properly advised, he should decline the nomination, mindful of 
the man who sits next to him, Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, who is by far 
better qualified."  

In addition to the concerns raised with the appointment of Mogoeng, the ANC and 
government’s views regarding the judiciary is also a cause for concern. For instance, the 
ANC’s secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, launched a verbal attack on the judges of the 
Constitutional Court, stating that their opposition to the nomination of Mogoeng for Chief 
Justice was fueled by racism (Courting disaster with the judiciary, 2011). Furthermore, 
Mantashe also said that the Constitutional Court judges threatened the stability of the ANC-
led government while President Zuma expressed his concern with judicial interference in 
government policy, stating that the executive should be allowed to conduct its affairs without 
the interference of the courts (Courting disaster with the judiciary, 2011). These views with 
regards to the judiciary are alarming and could prove to be very problematic for the South 
African democracy in the future. 
 
  So far, the rule of law has been safeguarded with the ANC-regime generally respecting and 
upholding fundamental democratic rights and judicial independence while there are 
independent institutions in place to ensure government transparency and accountability. There 
have been, however, instances where the ruling party’s behavior has subtly infringed upon the 
rule of law – behavior that has been informed by the authoritarian political culture that 
developed due to the nature of the armed liberation struggle, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
5.3 Comparison: The rule of law in Zimbabwe & South Africa: 
  There are vital differences between the two case studies in terms of the rule of law; in 
Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF has purposefully set out to destroy the rule of law while the ANC has 
largely been content to rule within the confines of a democratic constitution. In the following 
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section, Zimbabwe and South Africa will be compared in order to account for the differences 
and similarities between the two cases. 
 
  In terms of government transparency and accountability, there are various differences 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa. However, an important similarity between the cases is 
that both parties have gone on to ‘capture the state’ – in other words, both ruling parties have 
come to dominate the institutions of the state and in both cases, the lines between the party 
and state have become indistinct. Zimbabwe has a ruling party that is fused with the state and 
“a party machinery that penetrates the organs of the state” (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 42, 
43). In South Africa, the lines between the ruling party and the state has become blurred due 
to the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment which is based on the ANC’s determination to 
control the state and penetrate all levers of power in society (de Jager, 2009: 283). ZANU-PF, 
though, has been more overt in its subjugation of the state machinery than the ANC. 
Furthermore, it has always been ZANU-PF’s aim to establish a one-party state while the ANC 
has been content to operate within a liberal democratic setting. In addition to this, Zimbabwe 
does not have independent, democratic institutions to guarantee government transparency and 
accountability. South Africa, on the other hand, has democratic institutions (the chapter 9 
institutions) that are responsible for holding the government accountable and their 
independence is entrenched in the constitution. The two cases also differ considerably in terms 
of corruption. For instance, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) of 2010, Zimbabwe ranked 134 out of 178 countries with a weak score of 2.466 while 
South Africa received a ranking of  54 and a score of 4.767 (Transparency International, 2010: 
2, 3). However, an important similarity in terms of corruption seems to be that both regimes 
rely heavily on the use of patronage. Furthermore, there seems to be – as Southall (2003: 37) 
puts it – a ‘culture of entitlement’ amongst the elites of both parties.  
 
  The biggest differences come to light in relation to fundamental democratic rights, with 
Zimbabwe and South Africa displaying vastly contrasting records for this. From early on, the 
Mugabe regime has violated the fundamental democratic rights of Zimbabwean citizens, 
 
66
 Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 representing ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 ‘very clean’ 
(Transparency International, 2010: 3). 
67
 Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 representing ‘highly corrupt’ and 10 ‘very clean’ 
(Transparency International, 2010: 3). 
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starting with the Matabeleland massacres of the mid-1980s. As said before, ZANU-PF is 
infused with a culture of intimidation, intolerance and violence derived from the liberation 
struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 103). It has therefore, on many occasions, reverted to 
violent repression in order to stay in power and to impose its dominance, in the process 
destroying citizens’ fundamental democratic rights. Subsequently, Zimbabwe has had a poor 
record for democratic rights in contrast to South Africa where citizens’ fundamental rights are 
guaranteed and protected by the constitution. During the ANC’s tenure as South Africa’s 
ruling party, the fundamental rights that are encapsulated in the Bill of Rights have generally 
been respected, protected and promoted. Importantly, South Africa – in contrast with 
Zimbabwe – has a more developed and vociferous civil society that plays an important 
watchdog role in supervising the government’s actions. However, the ANC in recent years has 
shown intolerance towards a free, independent and critical press. Even though Zimbabwe and 
South Africa differ considerably in term of this, the ANC’s behavior show similar traits to that 
of ZANU-PF who has purposefully destroyed freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 
In terms of judicial independence and respect for the judicial process, the two case studies 
once again differ considerably from each other. 
 
  In Zimbabwe, the judiciary – like most state institutions – has merely become an instrument 
in the hands of the ZANU-PF-regime while in South Africa the judiciary plays a vital role in 
holding the government accountable (Alence, 2004: 87; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). 
Judicial independence has been virtually destroyed in Zimbabwe by the Mugabe regime 
through a campaign of patronage, verbal attacks and violent intimidation. In South Africa, on 
the contrary, judicial independence has been upheld and is entrenched in the constitution. 
However, in recent years and especially with the Zuma-corruption case, judicial independence 
has been put under pressure with the behavior of the ANC raising “troubling questions about 
the ruling party’s attitude towards supposedly independent institutions” (Russel, 2009: 51). In 
terms of respect for the judicial process, the ZANU-PF-regime has a long history of simply 
ignoring or overruling court orders and judicial decisions, starting almost immediately after 
Mugabe came into office in 1980 (Vivian, 2006: 3). This continued throughout his reign and 
intensified in the post-2000 era. In contrast, the ANC-government has generally complied with 
judicial decisions – even the ones that have gone against the government.  
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  The comparison of the three indicators shows that Zimbabwe and South Africa differ 
noticeably with regard to the rule of law which, as already mentioned, is an important feature 
of a democratic regime. Therefore, despite the fact that both ruling parties are former 
liberation movements and therefore share a few similarities – as pointed out in Chapter 4 – the 
behavior of ZANU-PF has led to the disintegration of democratic institutions while the ANC’s 
reign (so far) has not. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: 
  The rule of law, as this chapter has indicated, is a vital factor needed for democratic 
consolidation; in fact, it is one of the defining features of a democratic regime. It is the 
essential element of a constitutional government, or in other words, a limited government 
(Martin, 2006: 239). This entails that every state organ and government institution has to 
operate within the limitations imposed upon it by the law and the constitution. However, 
liberation movements not only fought against oppressive white-minority regimes, but also 
against the unjust legal systems that these regimes were based on. In the post-liberation era, 
therefore, these movements – in addition to transforming into ruling parties – were now 
expected to act within the confines of a constitution and to respect the law as the highest 
authority in society; values that had been alien to them during the liberation struggles. 
Therefore, adherence to and respect for the rule of law may prove problematic for these 
liberation movements who have become ruling parties because: “…the ruling elites of 
southern Africa have shown that their chief concerns are with self-interest and retention of 
power, and constitutionalism counts for little by comparison” (Good, 2003:7).  
 
  The two case studies were discussed and compared by looking at some of the most important 
features of the rule of law, including: government transparency and accountability, 
fundamental democratic rights and judicial independence and respect for the judicial process. 
It has been found that Zimbabwe and South Africa differ greatly in terms of these indicators – 
in Zimbabwe, the rule of law has virtually been destroyed over the course of three decades 
while in South Africa it has so far been upheld. However, in both cases, there is a blurring of 
state-party lines and both ruling parties show tendencies towards corruption, patronage and a 
disdain for other centers of power. In Zimbabwe, though, the situation is much more severe 
than in South Africa. ZANU-PF’s behavior as ruling party has been the greatest contributor to 
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the destruction of the rule of law while the ANC, on the other hand, has been forced to act 
within the liberal democratic confines of constitutionalism and therefore respect the rule of 
law. Thus, despite the fact that ZANU-PF and the ANC both have a liberation struggle history 
and share a few traits because of this, their behavior as ruling parties differ largely due to the 
context in which they find themselves in.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
  The purpose of this study – as set out in Chapter 1 – has been to ascertain how democratic 
consolidation has fared in Southern Africa, more specifically how it has fared in countries 
with liberation movement governments. There have been various studies that have 
investigated liberation struggles, but few that have gone on to study the effects of liberation 
movement governance on democratic rule and survival in Southern African states. 
Furthermore, there have been few comparisons in this regard. Therefore, this study set out to 
investigate the effects of liberation movement governance on democratic consolidation by 
using Zimbabwe and South Africa as case studies. In this descriptive study, the two cases 
were compared by looking at the following: the respective liberation struggles and transitions 
to majority rule; the respective political cultures that have shaped the behavior of ZANU-PF 
and the ANC; and, most importantly, how their conduct as ruling parties has affected the rule 
of law, a factor vital for democratic consolidation. The following sections will provide the 
summary of the findings, the key deductions that can be made and also for possible future 
research. 
 
6.2 Summary of findings: 
  Democratic consolidation, one of this study’s key concepts, is a complex process that 
involves various different factors and conditions. Various prominent scholars (Schedler; Linz 
& Stepan; Leftwich; Beetham) have studied democratic consolidation, attempted to provide 
definitions for it and determine what factors are important for it to take place. The definition 
put forward in this study is that democratic consolidation essentially refers to the 
entrenchment of democratic rule or, in other words, the process of making democracy ‘the 
only game in town’. In addition to this, it refers to the widespread acceptance of democratic 
rules, procedures, practices and institutions as the norm and the rejection of non-democratic 
forms of government. In this process of democratic consolidation, various factors are needed 
for a democracy to become entrenched, ranging from institutional, economic and social 
factors. Thus, we are able to measure democratic consolidation by looking at these factors. 
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For this study, the rule of law – an institutional factor – was chosen to determine how 
democratic consolidation has fared in countries with liberation movement governments. 
 
  The other key concepts were liberation struggles and liberation movements. There is a 
general consensus amongst various scholars (Southall 2003; MacFarlane 1985; Dorman 2006; 
Ntalaja 1979) that a distinction can be made between the decolonization process of the 
1950s/1960s in Africa and the armed liberation struggles that were waged by liberation 
movements during the 1970s onward. According to Southall (2003: 30, 31), there have been 
two waves of liberation – the first one corresponds with the decolonization process of the 
1950s/1960s and the second one refers to the armed struggles in Southern Africa during the 
latter part of the twentieth century. The so-called ‘second wave of liberation’ was the focus of 
this study, along with the liberation movements that spearheaded these struggles. Liberation 
movements – such as ZANU68 and the ANC – refer to political actors who were engaged in 
armed conflicts against oppressive, white-minority regimes; specifically settler-regimes in 
Southern Africa. It was found that liberation movements are not merely political parties 
focused on winning electoral support, but are groups focused on the radical transformation of 
society and the social order – a social order that they deem to be illegitimate. Furthermore, 
liberation movements have fought for the political, social, cultural and economic 
emancipation of indigenous peoples present in these countries. It is, however, important to 
point out here that ZANU and the ANC were not the only organizations that formed part of 
the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively; there were various 
other organizations who were also engaged in a struggle against the respective minority 
regimes. In both cases, ZANU and the ANC have appropriated the status of being the leaders 
of their respective liberation struggles.  
 
  Both ZANU and the ANC were engaged in protracted armed liberation struggles against 
oppressive white-minority, settler regimes. Furthermore, early during the course of the 
respective liberation struggles, both movements were banned by the white-minority regimes 
and forced into exile; it was found that exile politics played an important role in shaping the 
political cultures of both movements. An important difference, however, is the evolution of 
 
68
 Before 1980, ZANU did not add the Patriotic Front to its name and was simply known as the 
Zimbabwe Africa National Union. 
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the respective liberation struggles. The ANC – established in 1912 – initially attempted 
peaceful, non-violent forms of resistance against the Apartheid-regime before resorting to 
military tactics in the 1960s (McKinley, 1997: 18). ZANU, however, immediately after its 
establishment in 1963 went on to launch an armed struggle against the Ian Smith regime 
(Gibson, 1972: 15). Furthermore, the two movements were supported by different 
superpowers – ZANU received assistance from China, while the ANC received support from 
the Soviet Union. This superpower support had a great impact on the internal dynamics, goals 
and ideological convictions of the liberation movements; all of which contributed to their 
behavior during and after the liberation struggles. In fact, the Cold War politics of the time 
and the geopolitical context played a major role in liberation struggles throughout Southern 
Africa – the Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the emergence of black regimes in 
Mozambique and Angola had a powerful influence on the events in both Zimbabwe and South 
Africa (Kössler, 2010: 34).   
 
  The context in which the transitions to majority rule took place, has proven to be an 
important explanatory difference between the two case studies. In Zimbabwe, the transition to 
majority rule took place in the 1980s when Cold War-politics was still prominent. During this 
time, there was little concern from Western superpowers with the establishment of liberal 
democratic regimes in Southern Africa and rather concern with regards to the strategic 
importance of states in this superpower rivalry. South Africa, in contrast, made its transition 
to majority rule in 1994 in the wake of the Third Wave of democracy and during renewed 
international focus on good governance, democracy and human rights. In both cases, 
however, the liberation movements were forced to make vital concessions during the 
negotiated settlements with the minority regimes in order to ensure peaceful transitions to 
majority rule. Dorman (2006: 1087) makes the important point that:  
 
“…none of these countries (Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa) can be considered 
to have gained independence as a result of military victory. The combined effect of 
‘bush war’ and international pressure led to multi-racial elections and the negotiated 
removal of settler rule.” 
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In having said that, ZANU came closer to overthrowing the Smith regime than the ANC came 
to overthrowing the Apartheid government; therefore “ZANU entered negotiations in a much 
stronger position than did the ANC in its turn, as witnessed by the constitutional provisions for 
compulsory coalition government which the latter was obliged to accept” (Phimister, 1995: 
89). However, in both cases many of the gains of the liberation struggles were diluted into 
political compromises.  
 
  In Zimbabwe, the negotiations took place over a short period of three months and lacked 
popular participation; in fact, the Lancaster House Agreement was nothing more than a pact 
between political elites: 
 
“The Lancaster House Agreement served to underscore the divergence in the 
interests of the nationalist leadership on the one hand and the broad masses of the 
people on the other. To the masses of Zimbabwe, the national liberation war was 
being waged for the attainment of self-determination and full democratic rights whilst 
for the nationalists, the war was essentially a pressure mechanism to induce political 
negotiations for the transfer of power to them,” (Mhanda, 2005: 3). 
 
In South Africa, the negotiations that would lead to the transition to democracy were far more 
inclusive and extensive, spanning over a period of three years. The negotiation process 
included multiple political parties and as civil society organizations, thus the transition as well 
as the constitution that emanated from this process has come to enjoy broad-based legitimacy. 
The negotiated settlements would come to have an important impact on the type of regimes 
that developed in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively and also serve as a possible reason 
why the two cases differ. 
 
  The liberation struggles that ZANU and the ANC were engaged in produced a particular 
political culture within each movement. The exposure to prolonged violence and state 
oppression has inclined liberation movements to “a particular type of politics, self-conception 
and relationship with other organizations and the people or nation as a whole” (Suttner, 2004: 
2). It has been pointed out by various scholars (Southall, 2003; Gumede, 2007; Melber, 2010) 
that the political culture that drives liberation movements, seem to exhibit anti-democratic 
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tendencies. In this study, ZANU-PF and the ANC were discussed and compared by looking at 
four features that shaped their political cultures, including: organizational structure and 
hierarchy, ideological inputs, the exposure to and use of violence and intolerance of 
opposition. 
 
  In terms of organizational structure and hierarchy, it was found that the movements differ 
considerably from one another. The ANC had greater internal diversity than ZANU because it 
was a more broad-based organization and represented a wider variety of interests (Deegan, 
2001: 28).  It has to be kept in mind that the ANC was established in 1912, while ZANU was 
only established in 1963. Therefore, the ANC had gone through various periods of change and 
evolved from a non-violent mass organization into an armed liberation movement while 
ZANU immediately organized itself into a militarized movement. Another vital difference 
between the two movements has been leadership. While ZANU has had Robert Mugabe as its 
leader since 1977, the ANC has had various different leaders and centers of power throughout 
its existence. The ANC’s leaders of the 1950s and 1960s have retired by choice – unlike 
ZANU-PF’s case where it is still being led by one of its founding leaders (Gottschalk & 
Maphai, 2003: 61). Even though leadership change has not occurred without internal conflict 
or hostility – as witnessed in the 2007 leadership race – it does show that as an organization 
the ANC does at least accept leadership change in contrast to ZANU-PF that has continued to 
operate under the authoritarian leadership of Robert Mugabe.  
 
  Ideological influences have played a big role in the respective liberation movements’ 
behavior. The ANC, due to its broad church character, was influenced by a variety of different 
ideological influences raging from Christian liberalism, African nationalism to socialism. 
ZANU-PF, on the other hand, was influenced by predominantly two ideological traditions: 
African nationalism and socialist ideology. A very important piece of information that has to 
be taken into account is that the ANC has a liberal democratic heritage that ZANU-PF lacks. 
Both movements, however, have been greatly influenced by Marxist/Leninist/Maoist thought 
– the ANC had a close relationship with the Soviet Union through the South African 
Communist Party while ZANU-PF associated itself with the People’s Republic of China. Due 
to this ideological influence, the ANC was hierarchically structured with a tendency to 
centralize decision-making (de Jager, 2009: 278). ZANU structured itself along the lines of 
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China’s communist party, complete with a Politburo and Central Committee. Finally, there 
also seems to be an important similarity between ZANU-PF’s desire to create a one-party and 
the ANC’s determination to extend its power over all areas of South African society via the 
National Democratic Revolution. These tendencies in both cases have frequently revealed 
themselves in the ruling parties’ behavior. 
 
  The violence that characterized the liberation struggles had a profound impact on the 
liberation movements that were exposed to and used it. Both movements were exposed to 
prolonged periods of state violence and repression; the ANC more so however. It was 
involved in an armed struggle against the Apartheid-regime from the 1960s up until 1990 
while ZANU launched its armed struggle in the 1960s and ended it by the late 1970s. 
However, a major difference between Zimbabwe and South Africa is that in the post-liberation 
eras ZANU-PF continued to employ violent means in order to retain power whereas the ANC 
has operated within the democratic confines as set out by the constitution. Throughout the 
course of the respective armed struggles, both ZANU and the ANC were engaged in violent 
rivalries with other organizations. These rivalries would translate into hostility towards 
opposition in the post-liberation dispensations, especially in Zimbabwe. 
 
  Both movements, due to the experiences of the liberation struggles, have revealed a 
particular hostility towards any form of opposition. Both ruling parties display the conviction 
that they are the only legitimate representatives of ‘the people’; in order words, they are the 
only legitimate parties that are allowed to be in power. In Zimbabwe, this hostility and 
intolerance have been more pronounced with ZANU-PF blatantly attacking opposition parties 
and civil society actors that have threatened its position of power. In South Africa, the ANC 
has merely viewed opposition groups as annoyances and obstacles to transformation and 
despite this, it has tolerated the emergence of opposition parties and critical civil society 
actors, not infringing on their rights to exist and operate freely. 
 
  This study follows the premise of studies in political behavior that actors’ attitudes impact 
their behavior or actions which in turn impacts democratic institutions and eventually affects 
democratic stability. In other words, ZANU-PF and the ANC’s political cultures have 
influenced their behavior as ruling parties. This, in turn, has impacted the rule of law and 
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eventually affects democratic stability. The goal of this study has been to determine what the 
impact of liberation movement governance has been on democratic consolidation. It was 
pointed out in Chapter 2 that democratic consolidation is a complex process that can be 
measured by looking at a variety of factors. The rule of law was the factor chosen to measure 
how democratic consolidation has fared in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is contrasted to the 
‘rule of men’ and related to the concept of limited government; this entails that every 
government institution and state organ has to operate within the limitations that the 
constitution imposes (Rosenfeld, 2001: 1313; Martin, 2006: 239). Furthermore, this is closely 
associated with the idea of a Rechsstaat – a state of law or a state subject to the law – that 
means that the government and the apparatus would be subject to the law, that discretionary 
powers would be limited and that citizens could turn to the courts in order to protect 
themselves from the state (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 19). In this study, the effects of ZANU-PF 
and the ANC’s conduct on the rule of law were determined by looking at the following factors 
associated with the rule of law, namely: government transparency and accountability; 
fundamental democratic rights; and judicial independence and respect for the judicial process. 
These were are the most appropriate factors to help determine what the effects of liberation 
movement governance are on the rule of law and by extent democratic consolidation. It is 
important to keep in mind that this study’s focus has primarily been on the conduct of the 
ruling liberation movements. Therefore, the factors that were chosen to discuss could directly 
be directed back to the behavior of ZANU-PF and the ANC. 
 
  One of the most important findings has been that both ruling parties have gone on to ‘capture 
the state’ – both ruling parties have extended their control over the apparatus of the state. This 
can be related back to ZANU-PF’s desire to establish a one-party state and the ANC’s project 
of transformation, taken together with its cadre deployment policy and the National 
Democratic Revolution (NDR). In both cases, the line between party and state has been 
blurred with systems of patronage and corruption making government transparency and 
accountability difficult. However, the situation in Zimbabwe is much more severe than in 
South Africa due to the fact that ZANU-PF has been much more overt in its subjugation of the 
state than the ANC. South Africa also possesses various independent institutions to address 
corruption and to scrutinize the government’s actions, whereas in Zimbabwe there are no such 
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functioning institutions. Furthermore, corruption is far more prevalent in Zimbabwe than in 
South Africa with the two countries differing significantly in terms of corruption rankings.  
 
  Probably the key difference between the two regimes has been in terms of fundamental 
democratic rights with Zimbabwe and South Africa displaying contrasting records for this. 
From early on, the Mugabe regime has displayed a callous disregard for citizens’ rights, often 
reverting to violent repression in order to impose its authority. ZANU-PF, as a result of the 
liberation struggle, has been instilled with a culture of violence and intolerance that permeated 
through to its behavior as Zimbabwe’s ruling party. As a result, fundamental democratic rights 
have been destroyed. In South Africa, in contrast, the ANC has respected fundamental 
democratic rights; this is largely due to the robust protection that democratic rights receive in 
the country’s constitution which was the result of a long negotiation process that included 
multiple actors. In recent years, however, the ANC has shown an increasing intolerance 
towards a free and critical press, showing similar traits to that of ZANU-PF who has gone to 
destroy the existence of a free press. But, other than that, the two case studies differ 
significantly with regards to democratic rights. 
 
  Another, and vital, disparity that was found between the case studies is related to judicial 
independence and respect for the judicial process. In Zimbabwe, the judiciary’s independence 
has been completely obliterated through a combination of patronage, verbal attacks and 
violent intimidation. In fact, it has – like most state institutions – merely become an 
instrument in the hands of the ZANU-PF-regime (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008: 46). 
Furthermore, it was found that the Mugabe regime has been prone to violating the judicial 
process; in other words, it has on various occasions ignored or simply overruled judicial 
decisions. This only worsened in the post-2000 era after the controversial land reform policy 
was launched. In contrast, judicial independence in South Africa is entrenched and guaranteed 
by the constitution and has generally been upheld and respected by the ANC-regime. 
However, recent years’ events, such as the Jacob Zuma corruption case, have put judicial 
independence under pressure and the behavior of the ANC has caused some alarm. In having 
said that, the ANC-regime has throughout its tenure as South Africa’s ruling party so far 
respected judicial decisions, generally complying with court rulings – even those rulings that 
have gone against the government. From the above-mentioned evidence, it is clear that 
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Zimbabwe and South Africa differ significantly in terms of the rule of law. Simply put, in 
Zimbabwe the rule has broken down due to ZANU-PF’s conduct as Zimbabwe’s ruling party 
while the rule of law is still intact in South Africa and largely respected and upheld by the 
ANC-regime. 
 
6.3 Key deductions: 
  This study was, firstly, born out of the interest to understand how democracy has fared in 
countries with liberation movement governments. Furthermore, it was born out of the desire 
to understand how the experiences of the liberation struggles have shaped liberation 
movements such as ZANU-PF and the ANC and how the particular culture that has developed 
within these movements, has affected their behavior as ruling parties – specifically ruling 
parties within the confines of a democratic regime. Therefore, the central question that guided 
this study was as follows:  
 
“What has been the impact of liberation movement governance on democratic 
consolidation in Zimbabwe and South Africa?” 
 
This was narrowed down to two central sub-questions: 
 
“What has been the impact of ZANU-PF’s conduct – as Zimbabwe’s ruling party – on 
the rule of law?” 
 
“What has been the impact of the ANC’s conduct – as South Africa’s ruling party – on 
the rule of law?” 
 
The assumption was that, due to the particular political culture that has developed within 
movements such as ZANU-PF and the ANC, liberation movement governance would have a 
negative effect on democratic consolidation. This was examined by looking at how ZANU-PF 
and the ANC’s behavior as ruling parties have affected the rule of law, a central feature of 
democratic consolidation. It was already reiterated in the previous section that the two case 
studies differ considerably in terms of the rule of law. Simply put, in Zimbabwe, the rule of 
law has disintegrated under ZANU-PF’s rule while the rule of law in South Africa has so far 
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been upheld under the ANC’s reign. It can also then be concluded that the two case studies 
have fared very differently in terms of democratic consolidation. In Zimbabwe, democracy 
has crumbled, largely due to ZANU-PF’s behavior as ruling party. In South Africa, 
democracy still survives and is relatively strong under the ANC’s reign. However, the ruling 
ANC has shown alarming and distinctly anti-democratic tendencies that may prove 
detrimental to democracy in the long run.  
 
  The ANC and ZANU-PF have both exhibited an authoritarian political culture, a desire to 
capture the state, tendencies towards centralization of power and the delegitimation of 
opposition. However, perhaps the key explanation for the protection of the rule of law in 
South Africa and the disintegration thereof in Zimbabwe has less to do with the political 
culture than other factors. In the case of Zimbabwe, it can be argued that there was not a 
sufficient system of checks-and-balances in the form of the constitution, independent state 
institutions, opposition parties or civil society actors to hold ZANU-PF accountable. In South 
Africa, on the other hand, the ANC has been constrained and required to operate within a 
liberal democratic framework due to a sufficient system of checks-and-balances in the form of 
a strong constitution, relatively independent state institutions and a lively civil society, 
especially a robust media. Another vital difference between the two case studies is the 
contexts in which Zimbabwe and South Africa transitioned from minority to majority rule. In 
Zimbabwe, the transition to majority rule took place in 1980 during the Cold War when very 
little attention was given to democracy or values such as human rights. This allowed ZANU-
PF to perpetrate human rights violations without fear of international reprimand and also to 
pursue its desire to establish a one party state. In South Africa, in contrast, the transition to 
majority rule took place during the ‘third wave of democracy’ when there was a renewed 
focus on democracy and human rights. 
 
  It remains to be seen whether South Africa will follow a similar path to that of Zimbabwe. It 
is, however, clear that ZANU-PF and the ANC as organizations differ significantly and this 
discrepancy may be the greatest reason why democracy has wilted in Zimbabwe, but has so 
far survived in South Africa. However, the watershed moment for Zimbabwe occurred in 
2000 with the ZANU-PF’s loss in the constitutional referendum. After this, the rule of law 
disintegrated in Zimbabwe and democracy faltered. In South Africa such a defining moment 
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has not yet occurred – the ANC’s democratic credentials are yet to be tested like this. 
Therefore, the future of democracy is still uncertain even though in comparison with 
Zimbabwe, the prospects of democratic survival seem to be more positive. In conclusion then, 
it is not possible to claim that liberation movement governance in general negatively affects 
democratic consolidation. The evidence has shown that this has definitely been the case in 
Zimbabwe, but so far not in South Africa. 
 
6.4 Prospects for future research: 
  In terms of these two case studies and the topic that has been investigated, there are various 
possibilities for future research. Firstly, there seems to be a tendency for states with liberation 
movements as ruling parties to develop dominant party systems. This particular topic needs 
further investigation, specifically what the reasons are for this and also how these dominant 
party systems affect democracy. In terms of the two case studies, there is also scope to do 
further research in terms of the role of leadership and what the effects of this have been. 
Another interesting topic that warrants further investigation with regards to Zimbabwe and 
South Africa is the issue of ethnic politics. It has been well documented that ethnicity played a 
major role in Zimbabwean politics – especially in the rivalry between ZANU-PF and ZAPU 
and also in the Matabeleland massacres of the mid-1980s. In South Africa, on the other hand, 
the issue of ethnicity has largely been ignored by scholars. However, Anthony Butler (2011), 
has pointed out that ethnicity may well have emerged as an important factor within the ruling 
party and that it may even be an issue that could split the ANC during the party’s next 
national conference in 2012. He argues that Jacob Zuma’s ethnicity (Zulu) and the vast 
amount of support he enjoys in Kwazulu-Natal – a province with a mostly Zulu population – 
may be decisive for the ruling party. The reason for this is that ANC’s provincial delegation 
from Kwazulu-Natal will be the largest one at the 2012 conference and are most likely to 
support Jacob Zuma because he is a Zulu. If Butler’s assertions are correct, the issue of 
ethnicity and ethnic politics should be a topic of future investigation.  
 
  Furthermore, greater in-depth research needs to be done with regards to the impact that the 
regional and international contexts have had on both cases; in particular in relation to the 
respective liberation struggles and also with regards to developments in the post-liberation 
periods. With regards to democratic consolidation, Zimbabwe and South Africa, in this study, 
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were only compared in terms of the rule of law. There are many other factors that play an 
important role in democratic consolidation, for example socio-economic factors, the existence 
of a lively civil society and also the presence of various, competing political parties – the two 
case studies can also be further investigated by looking at some of these factors. There is still 
a variety of research possibilities with regard to Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
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